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The global experience of the last three decades illustrated the influence
that credit markets impart on economic outcomes, culminating in the shift
of the macroeconomic consensus to a new perspective where credit markets
are seen as one of the key drivers of business cycle dynamics. Theoretical
frameworks that incorporate this insight lie at the heart of this new perspec-
tive. These studies revealed that borrower balance sheets are key to narra-
tives that link the business and the credit cycle. This core intuition spawned
the vast financial-accelerator literature that analyzes the interaction of the
business and credit cycles through the use of general equilibrium models.
This thesis aims to contribute to this literature, and consists of three es-
says that investigate different aspects of the credit cycle. Each essay presents
a macroeconomic framework where credit markets and borrower balance
sheets form the core shock transmission channel, advancing the research
agenda through the novel nature of these frameworks and the manner in
which they are applied.
The first essay presents a closed economy real business cycle model with
financial frictions and two credit markets to investigate the qualitative and
quantitative relevance of credit market heterogeneity. The model is esti-
mated on U.S. data using Bayesian methods and is able to replicate observed
changes in the composition of U.S. balance sheets. The findings indicate that
credit market heterogeneity attenuates the impact of a financial shock by
presenting borrowers with an alternative to the shock affected credit mar-
ket. Balance sheet linkages within the financial sector reduce this shock
ii
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attenuation property and the origin of financial shocks can influence both
the size and persistence of their impact. When financial shocks are borne
directly by savers, their impact is relatively muted as they do not impair the
efficiency of the financial sector. On the other hand, shocks borne directly
by financial intermediaries have a large impact as they disrupt efficient in-
termediation between savers and borrowers.
In the second essay, an asymmetric two-country model is used to assess
the impact of flow specific capital controls in an emerging market context.
The inflow capital control is manifest as a restriction on borrower balance
sheets that limits their exposure to foreign borrowing. The outflow capi-
tal control is manifest as a balance sheet restriction on the financial sector
that limits their exposure to foreign assets. This analysis shows that both
flow specific capital controls are effective in managing capital flows, and
that their deployment could have reduced the build up in emerging market
foreign debt following the financial crisis. Comparing across flow specific
capital controls, the outflow capital control is preferred by society as it ex-
hibits shock attenuation properties as opposed to the shock amplification
properties associated with the inflow capital control. The shock attenuation
benefits of the outflow capital control become enhanced as capital control
regulation becomes easier, whilst stricter regulation serves to diminish this
property of the outflow capital control. In contrast, the shock amplification
property of the inflow capital control is diminished under stricter regula-
tion, and enhanced under easier regulation.
The final essay concerns an analysis into the use of macroprudential in-
struments as a means to mitigate the negative consequences of positive for-
eign interest rate shocks. A small open economy real business cycle model
with banking and foreign borrowing is presented, where loan-to-value reg-
ulation, minimum capital requirements, and reserve requirements co-exist.
The findings indicate that these macroprudential instruments can attenu-
ate the impact of foreign interest rate shocks, and that this attenuation is
increasing in the strictness of the regulatory regime. In spite of exhibiting
diminishing returns to scale, LTV regulation and capital requirements de-
liver significant attenuation benefits and are shown to be close substitutes.
Reserve requirements are shown to interact with capital requirements such
that their attenuation benefits are short-lived, indicating that this instru-
ment is most effective when used to supplement existing capital require-
ment or LTV measures. Finally, because financial and macroeconomic ob-
jectives become aligned under positive foreign interest rate shocks, a macro-
prudential response to these shocks can be to the benefit of both objectives.
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Die wêreldwye ervaring van die afgelope drie dekades het die invloed van
kredietmarkte op ekonomiese uitkomste geïllustreer en tot die verskuiwing
van die makro-ekonomiese consensus gelei. Hierdie nuwe perspektief be-
skou kredietmarkte as belangrik vir sakesiklusdinamika en toon aan dat le-
ner balansstate die kern vorm van verbintenisse tussen die besigheidsiklus
en die kredietsiklus. Hierdie intuïsie het die groot finansiële-versneller lite-
ratuur ontplooi wat die interaksie van die besigheids- en kredietsiklusse
ontleed deur die gebruik van ewewigsmodelle. Hierdie proefskrif poog
om by te dra tot hierdie literatuur en bestaan uit drie opstelle wat verskil-
lende aspekte van die kredietsiklus ondersoek. Elke opstel bied ’n makro-
ekonomiese raamwerk aan waar kredietmarkte en lenerbalansstate die skok-
transmissiekanale vorm. Die navorsingsagenda word bevorder deur die
nuwe aard van hierdie raamwerke en die wyse waarop dit toegepas word.
Die eerste opstel bied ’n reële sakesiklusmodel aan met finansiële wry-
wings en twee kredietmarkte om die kwalitatiewe en kwantitatiewe rele-
vansie van kredietmark heterogeniteit te ondersoek. Die model word toe-
gepas deur Bayesiaanse metodes op Amerikaanse data en is in staat om
veranderings in die samestelling van Amerikaanse balansstate te herhaal.
Die bevindings dui aan dat kredietmark heterogeniteit die impak van ’n
finansiële skok verminder deur leners met ’n alternatief tot die geskokte
kredietmark aan te bied. Balansstaatverbindings binne die finansiële sek-
tor verminder hierdie skokdemp eiendom en die oorsprong van finansiële
iv
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skokke kan beide die grootte en tydperk van hul impak beïnvloed. Wanneer
finansiële skokke direk deur spaarders gedra word, is hul impak relatief ge-
demp omdat dit nie die doeltreffendheid van die finansiële sektor benadeel
nie. Aan die ander kant, skokke wat direk deur finansiële tussengangers
gedra word, het ’n groot impak, aangesien dit die doeltreffendheid van be-
middeling tussen spaarders en leners ontwrig.
In die tweede opstel word ’n asimmetriese tweelandmodel gebruik om
die impak van vloeispesifieke kapitaalkontroles in ’n opkomende mark-
konteks te bepaal. Die invloei kapitaalkontole se voorkoms is as ’n beper-
king op lener balansstate en beperk hul blootstelling aan buitelandse le-
nings. Die uitvloei kapitaalkontrole se voorkoms is as ’n balansstaat be-
perking op die finansiële sektor en beperk blootstelling aan buitelandse
bates. Hierdie analise toon dat beide vloeispesifieke kapitaalkontrole ef-
fektief is in die bestuur van kapitaalvloei, en dat hul ontplooiing die op-
bou van buitelandse skuld in opkomende markte na die finansiële krisis
kon verminder het. Die uitvloei kapitaalkontrole word deur die samele-
wing verkies, aangesien dit skokdempende-eienskappe vertoon wat in teen-
stelling staan met die skokversterkings-eienskappe van die invloei kapi-
taalkontrole. Die skokdempings-voordele van die uitvloei kapitaalkontrole
word verbeter namate kapitaalkontrole regulering makliker word, terwyl
strenger regulering hierdie eiendom van die uitvloei kapitaalkontrole ver-
minder. In teenstelling hiermee word die skokversterkings-eiendom van
die invloei kapitaalkontrole verminder onder strenger regulering, en verbe-
ter onder makliker regulering.
Die finale opstel het betrekking op die gebruik van macroprudential
instrumente as ’n middel om die negatiewe gevolge van positiewe buite-
landse rentekoersskokke te versag. ’N Klein oop ekonomie-reële sakesi-
klusmodel met bank- en buitelandse lenings word aangebied, waar lening-
tot-waarde-regulering, minimumkapitaalvereistes en reserwe-vereistes be-
staan. Die bevindings dui aan dat hierdie macroprudential instrumente die
impak van buitelandse rentekoersskokke kan demp, en dat hierdie skok
verdemping met die strengheid van die regulasie toeneem. Ten spyte van
afnemende opbrengs op skaal, bied LTV-regulering en kapitaalvereistes sterk
verswakkingsvoordele en blyk dit asof beide instrument noue plaasvervan-
gers is. Reserwevereistes word beinvloed deur kapitaalvereistes, sodat hul
verdempings voordele kleiner is. Dit dui ann dat doeltreffende gebruik van
hierdie instrument beperk moet word tot die aanvulling van bestaande ka-
pitaalvereistes of LTV-maatreëls. Laastens, aangesien finansiële en makro-
ekonomiese doelwitte gebonde word met positiewe buitelandse rentekoers-
skokke, kan ’n makro-ekonomiese reaksie op hierdie skokke tot voordeel
van beide doelwitte wees.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Since the 1980s, mainstream macroeconomics has become increasingly con-
cerned with embedding the relevance of credit markets and financial in-
termediation into business cycle theory (Schularick and Taylor, 2012). This
credit perspective is motivated with reference to empirical evidence on the
simultaneity of business and credit cycles and reflects a paradigm shift in
the macroeconomic school of thought (Eckstein and Sinai, 1986). Previously,
the Modigliani and Miller (1958) inspired macroeconomic consensus implied
that explicit modelling of the credit intermediation process would offer lim-
ited benefits. This consensus was based on Modigliani and Miller’s theory
of capital structure irrelevance which opines that real economic decisions
are independent of financing choices, and so, the financial sector can be
treated as a veil. In contrast, the credit perspective asserts that if debt ca-
pacity is a function of borrower wealth, credit cycle dynamics will carry
macroeconomic implications (Kaufman, 1986; Gertler, 1988).
The adoption of the credit view spawned a new generation of general
equilibrium models where balance sheets and credit markets act as struc-
tural transmission mechanisms. Early examples focus on the role of bor-
rower balance sheets and built on ideas originally articulated by Fisher
(1933) and Gurley and Shaw (1955) following their experience of the Great
Depression. The key finding from these analyses relates to how dynamic
interaction between the real and financial sector can result in shock ampli-
fication and persistence (Mishkin, 1978; Bernanke, 1983). Subsequently, the
benchmark macroeconomic framework has deviated from the frictionless
real business cycle model of Kydland and Prescott (1982), toward a credit–
centered model where the interaction between real and financial markets is
endogenous (Quadrini, 2011).
The introduction of non-trivial borrower balance sheets into general equi-
librium models hinges on the presence of frictions in the credit creation pro-
1
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 2
cess. These so-called financial frictions can result from agency costs that
arise due to information asymmetries between borrowers and lenders, or
collateral liquidation costs that render credit markets incomplete. Informa-
tion asymmetries between borrowers and lenders see that the optimal con-
tract is characterized by an external finance premium, where this premium
is positively related to borrower leverage. Under the incomplete markets
approach, collateral liquidation costs create credit ceilings that are a func-
tion of the value of collateral. As a result, access to credit co-moves with
asset prices. The seminal contribution of Bernanke and Gertler (1989) for-
malizes the agency cost approach whilst that of Kiyotaki and Moore (1997)
describes a setup with incomplete credit markets. In both cases the finan-
cial friction facilitates dynamic feedback between credit markets, borrower
wealth, and the real economy. This feedback generates a financial accelera-
tor effect, where credit and real variable dynamics reinforce one another and
culminate in shock amplification and persistence similar to that witnessed
in the data (Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist, 1999; Kocherlakota, 2000).
Subsequent work extends these models to international settings, show-
ing that credit markets play a key role in the observed co-movement of
macroeconomic variables across countries (e.g. Faia, 2002; Kehoe and Perri,
2002; Iacoviello and Minetti, 2006). In these models, international credit
markets allow for the spill-over of foreign economy dynamics such that
foreign shocks bear implications for domestic macroeconomic conditions.
When this international credit market channel is absent, the models are un-
able to reproduce the international cycles witnessed in the data (Backus et al.,
1992). These findings point to the vulnerability of domestic outcomes to
foreign conditions, generating support for the use of regulatory measures
to mitigate this exposure. Research into the viability of such measures com-
prises two inter-related, but conceptually different strands in the literature.
The first strand consists of studies into the effectiveness of capital controls,
whilst the second relates to the use of macroprudential instruments.
Building on the ideas of Tobin (1978), several papers show that capital
controls proffer a means through which domestic authorities can attenu-
ate the international spill-over of shocks (Jeanne and Korinek, 2010; Bianchi,
2011; Brunnermeier and Sannikov, 2015). These analyses are predicated on
the existence of pecuniary externalities that result from overborrowing rela-
tive to a socially desirable level. Capital controls serve to limit this overbor-
rowing, reducing the size of the pecuniary externality. This reduction of the
externality stems from the fact that capital controls constrain the transmis-
sion of foreign shocks through international credit markets, and as a result,
their introduction can offer social welfare benefits.
Macroprudential instruments provide another channel through which
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authorities can limit domestic exposure to foreign shocks and improve so-
cial welfare (Rubio and Carrasco-Gallego, 2014). These instruments differ
from capital controls in that they do not discriminate based on the national-
ity or origin of credit flows. That is, whilst capital controls seek to influence
the behaviour of international capital flows specifically, macroprudential in-
struments focus on domestic credit market conditions and aim to foster fi-
nancial stability in general. Macroprudential instruments are also able to
distinguish between the demand and supply sides of domestic credit mar-
kets, whereas capital controls are usually studied from a net flow perspec-
tive (IMF, 2011, 2012; Galati and Moessner, 2013). The pivotal role played
by financial sector balance sheets in the 2007–2008 financial crisis served
to catalyze the macroprudential research agenda, generating significant in-
terest into the use and effectiveness of these instruments. In this regard, the
literature indicates that loan-to-value (LTV) regulation, minimum capital re-
quirements, and reserve requirements can be used to foster financial stabil-
ity and smooth adjustments in the real economy (Glocker and Towbin, 2012;
Mendicino and Punzi, 2014; Brzoza-Brzezina, Kolasa and Makarski, 2015).
Although the body of work cited above has improved our understand-
ing of the importance of the credit cycle to macroeconomic outcomes, sev-
eral unanswered questions remain. This thesis seeks to contribute to this lit-
erature, where each chapter is devoted to addressing a shortcoming in our
understanding of the credit cycle. To perform this task, I depart from the
canonical real business cycle framework, by providing a pivotal role for the
credit cycle through non-trivial financial intermediation and Kiyotaki and
Moore (1997) financial frictions. Chapter 2 deploys a closed economy ver-
sion of this framework to assess the quantitative and qualitative relevance of
credit market heterogeneity. This chapter relaxes the single-representative
credit market assumption nested in previous models and is motivated with
reference to observed changes in the balance sheet composition of U.S. firms
after the financial crisis. Chapter 3 extends this model to an asymmetric
two-country setting, where the analysis comprises an investigation into the
efficacy of flow specific capital controls in reducing the increase in emerging
market foreign liabilities following the financial crisis. Chapter 4 takes the
imminent tightening of advanced economy monetary policy as a backdrop,
and studies the effectiveness of macroprudential instruments in attenuat-
ing the negative impact of tightening foreign credit market conditions. The
small open economy framework deployed in this chapter differs from previ-
ous studies in that it is characterized by the co-existence of LTV regulation,
minimum capital requirements, and reserve requirements, with a view to
inform policymakers on the comparative effectiveness of each instrument.
Finally, chapter 5 provides a brief summary of the thesis.
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Credit market heterogeneity,
financial shocks, and balance sheet
(in)dependence
This essay presents a real business cycle model with financial frictions and
two credit markets to investigate the qualitative and quantitative relevance
of credit market heterogeneity. To address this line of inquiry, I contrast the
transmission of financial shocks in an economy where loans are the only
form of credit to one in which both loans and bonds exist. The model is
estimated using Bayesian methods over the sample period 1985Q1-2015Q1
for the U.S. economy. The results show that credit market heterogeneity
plays an important role in attenuating the impact of financial shocks by al-
lowing borrowers to substitute away from the affected credit market. The
shock attenuation property of credit market heterogeneity works through
asset prices and substitution toward alternative credit types. Bank balance
sheet linkages reduce the shock attenuation effect associated with heteroge-
neous credit markets. The origination of financial shocks can influence both
the size and persistence of their impact.
4
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2.1 Introduction
This essay presents a real business cycle model with financial frictions and
two credit markets to investigate the qualitative and quantitative relevance
of credit market heterogeneity. To address this line of inquiry, I contrast the
transmission of financial shocks in an economy where loans are the only
form of credit to one in which both loans and bonds exist. I argue that the
heterogeneous structure of credit markets can attenuate the impact of finan-
cial shocks. If credit markets behave differently to one another, increases
in the supply of one form of credit could make up for reductions in the
supply of another - a “spare tyre” as noted by Greenspan (1999). The exis-
tence of heterogeneous credit markets thus offer firms a means to substitute
between different credit sources, and in doing so, reduce their exposure to
credit market specific shocks. A similar narrative holds true for banks: oper-
ational diversification allows for the re-allocation of resources toward more
profitable markets. In this way, losses to financial sector efficiency can be
limited during times of distress.
The development of macroeconomic models with a role for credit has
come a long way since Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), however these models
still assume a single representative credit market.1 As such, the literature is
silent on the evolution of credit composition over the business cycle. Fur-
thermore, the absence of credit market heterogeneity implies an incomplete
understanding of the benefits associated with operational diversification in
the financial sector. This essay aims to fill this gap in the literature by inves-
tigating how balance sheet linkages within the financial sector impacts on
the stability benefits offered by operational diversification.
Credit market heterogeneity is introduced through an assumed risk dif-
ference between bonds and loans. This assumption is motivated with the
theoretical literature on corporate debt structure, which views financial in-
termediaries (FIs) as a solution to problems of information asymmetry and
relates the optimal choice of debt instrument to the riskiness of borrowers
(Holmstrom and Tirole, 1997; Repullo and Suarez, 2000).2 It is then possi-
ble to achieve non-trivial heterogeneity between bond and loan markets by
assuming that the risk profile of these two markets differ. In the context of
this analysis, I assume that loans are considered more risky than bonds and
1See Gertler and Kiyotaki (2011), Quadrini (2011), Brunnermeier et al. (2012) and
Bràzdik et al. (2012) for surveys of macroeconomic models characterized by financial in-
termediation.
2See also the models of Hoshi et al. (1993), Besanko and Kanatas (1993),
Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1994), and Bolton and Freixas (2000) for examples where
borrower types are revealed by their choice of debt instrument.
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that the role of FIs differs in each market. FIs’ role in loan extension follows
the traditional narrative; however, in the bond market they perform the role
of underwriter.
Introducing credit heterogeneity by way of a risk-adjusted capital con-
straint provides a channel for FI balance sheets to influence the behaviour of
the model’s credit markets. This heterogeneity is introduced into the credit
market by assuming that FIs consist of a loan branch and a bond underwrit-
ing branch. Each branch is then subjected to a risk weighted capital require-
ment, which serves to drive a wedge between the returns of the FIs’ assets.
This channel is akin to the lending channel of monetary policy as described
in Kishan and Opiela (2000). In line with credit market behaviour post-2008,
the lending channel sees credit quantities change as a result of supply-side
factors as opposed to being driven by changes in demand (Adrian et al.,
2012; Becker and Ivashina, 2014; Kaya and Wang, 2016). This characteris-
tic differentiates my analysis from that of De Fiore and Uhlig (2015), who
incorporate credit heterogeneity into a costly state verification framework á
la Townsend (1979). De Fiore and Uhlig (2015) do a good job at replicating
the behaviour of aggregate credit data, however, their model is missing the
important amplification effect of shocks since it is characterized by intra-
period borrowing. As argued by Quadrini (2011), macroeconomic mod-
els characterized by intra-period borrowing are unable to contemporane-
ously capture the impact of expected future market conditions, resulting
in a dampened response to shocks. In addition, their framework does not
provide a role for FI capital. Adrian et al. (2012) present a model of the fi-
nancial sector with pro-cyclical leverage as well as the coexistence of bond
and loan markets. Although providing a good representation of FIs, the par-
tial equilibrium nature framework of Adrian et al.’s (2012) analysis implies
their model is silent on the broader macroeconomic implications of credit
heterogeneity.
De Jonghe (2010) and Fomby et al. (2012) provide evidence which indi-
cates that the stability benefits offered by credit market heterogeneity could
depend on balance sheet linkages between financial agents. If balance sheets
are interdependent across the entire financial sector, negative shocks to one
credit market spill-over to other credit markets, thus, limiting the shock at-
tenuation property of credit market heterogeneity. When financial sector
balance sheets are independent from one another, negative shocks in one
credit market may not spill-over and, thus, shock attenuation can be facili-
tated via substitution between credit types.
The contribution of this paper is three-fold. To the best of my knowl-
edge, this paper is the first attempt to introduce credit market heterogene-
ity into a Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) world. I build on the contribution of
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De Fiore and Uhlig (2015), providing a role for both FI capital and inter-
period borrowing. These features incorporate insights offered by the ex-
isting literature on the importance of expected future market conditions as
well as the financial sector’s ability to fund credit expansions. Additionally,
this new framework is consistent with the notion that the operational role
of FIs differs across credit markets. From this property stems the second
contribution of this essay, in that it provides a theoretical framework from
which to study the effects of operational diversification within the finan-
cial sector. As opposed to De Fiore and Uhlig (2015) where FIs specialize
in specific credit markets, the framework incorporates both specialization
and diversification.3 This feature affords a contrast of settings where com-
mercial banks are prohibited from engaging in proprietary trading activities
as per the Glass-Steagall Act, to the current regulatory environment which
affords commercial bank participation in these activities (Richardson et al.,
2010; Thakor, 2012). Finally, this essay provides a framework in which the
origination of financial shocks across agents can influence their impact on
macroeconomic outcomes.
The model performs reasonably well in terms of replicating the behaviour
of US credit markets. The results show that the impact of financial shocks
in the presence of heterogeneous credit markets is attenuated as compared
to a single credit market economy as found in Iacoviello (2015). This results
from the ability of borrowers to substitute away from the shock affected
credit market toward alternate sources of financing. Additionally, the find-
ings show that inter-period borrowing amplifies the financial sector’s re-
silience to financial shocks as compared to De Fiore and Uhlig (2015).
Financial sector resilience is partly as a result of the different operational
roles required of FIs in the bond and loan credit markets of the model. This
characteristic affords revenue diversification in the financial sector, and in
the framework deployed for this analysis, the effects thereof concur with
existing evidence that links revenue diversification to financial stability (see
e.g., Elsas et al., 2010; Shim, 2013; De Jonghe et al., 2015; Köhler, 2015). In
agreement with De Jonghe (2010) and Fomby et al. (2012), the analysis shows
that the stability benefits of the revenue diversification afforded by hetero-
geneous credit markets decrease when the balance sheets of financial agents
are interdependent. This results from the shock spill-over that occurs under
balance sheet interdependence. In the context of financial regulation, these
findings indicate that the resilience of the financial sector as a whole can
3 De Fiore and Uhlig (2015) allow for two types of FIs – commercial banks, offering loan
finance, and capital mutual funds, offering bond financing. The framework deployed here
nests both the De Fiore and Uhlig (2015) setup as well as one where commercial banks can
offer both loan and bond finance.
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be amplified when commercial banks are prohibited from engaging in pro-
prietary trading activities. At the same time, I find that the resilience of
an individual commercial bank is amplified when allowed to participate in
proprietary trading activities.
Finally, the results show that when the balance sheets of FIs are indepen-
dent of one another, the origination of financial shocks can influence both
the size and the persistence of their impact. Specifically, when savers are di-
rectly hit by financial shocks, the size of their impact on the real economy is
limited since shocks on savers do not influence the functioning of the finan-
cial system. However, the impact of these shocks can be persistent through
limiting savings behaviour. In comparison, shocks borne entirely by the fi-
nancial sector are amplified as a result of their influence on the ability of the
financial sector to efficiently intermediate fund flows between savers and
borrowers. This is in line with Sandri and Valencia (2013), who find that
when shocks are borne entirely by the financial sector, their impact on the
real economy is more severe and prolonged.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2.2 presents the
empirical evidence on the behaviour of corporate finance and section 2.3
describes the baseline model. I describe extensions to the baseline model
in section 2.4. Section 2.5 discusses the estimation of the model whilst in
section 2.6 I investigate the qualitative and quantitative relevance of hetero-
geneous credit markets. Finally, section 2.7 concludes.
2.2 Empirical evidence on credit markets
In this section I motivate the need for credit market distinction by present-
ing empirical evidence on the heterogeneous behaviour of loan and bond
markets.4 Figure 2.1 plots the cyclical component of HP-filtered real GDP
and credit instruments on the balance sheets of non-financial corporations
(NFCs) in the U.S.5 Thus, figure 2.1 illustrates whether there are any sim-
ilarities between the business cycle, and the credit cycle of bond and loan
markets. The figure shows that the credit cycle of loans loans mimics the
business cycle moire closely than the credit cycle of bonds. Bonds seem ei-
ther decoupled from the business cycle or to exhibit mild counter-cyclical
4To simplify the narrative, I refer to the second credit market as the “bond” market. In
reality it represents the whole market for non-financial corporate debt securities, of which
bonds are the largest constituent. Thus, I use the data of debt securities for bonds in the
study. A description of all the data used is offered in appendix A.3.
5HP filter with λ = 1600.
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behaviour.6 This characteristic of bond markets helped mitigate the impact
of the financial crisis by providing borrowers access to an alternative form
of credit.
Figure 2.2 plots the flows of credit to NFCs. This figure provides a dif-
ferent perspective on this shift in the prominence of bond and loan markets.
It shows that although substitution from loans to bonds may have damp-
ened the effect of the crisis, the shift was not pronounced enough to entirely
counteract the reduction in credit stemming from negative loan growth. By
plotting the spreads of bond and loan interest rates to the federal funds
rate, figure 2.3 shows the symmetrical behaviour of the two spreads de-
spite the significant substitution from loans to bonds as shown in figure
2.2.7 It is, however, worth noting that there is a significant decline in the
bond spread during the 2007-2008 crisis, prior joining the hiking of the loan
spread. Taken together with the figure 2.2, this evidence concurs with the
analyses of Adrian et al. (2012) and Becker and Ivashina (2014), where sup-
ply side factors are seen as initiating the shift from loan to bond finance for
U.S. firms. Reduced bank lending realized higher loan interest rates and the
subsequent increase in demand for alternative sources of credit saw bond
rates rise. Corroborating this perspective, Kaya and Wang (2016) find that
FI balance sheet constraints and risk perceptions lead to increased bond is-
suance by EU firms.
This adjustment in firms’ financing behaviour saw FIs shift away from
loan syndication and toward the underwriting of securities (Kaya and Meyer,
2014). The underwriting role played by FIs thus aided in diversifying their
revenue streams during a period of stress. In this way, the different struc-
tures of credit markets (and firms’ ability to substitute between these mar-
kets) can bolster the resilience of the financial sector through the benefits
that revenue diversification offers to financial stability (Elsas et al., 2010; Shim,
2013; De Jonghe et al., 2015; Köhler, 2015).
In summary, the aggregate credit data presented above reveals an in-
creasing share for bonds in aggregate credit following the crisis whilst the
share of loans declined. Empirical studies on this change in credit compo-
sition see it being initiated by developments within the financial sector, as-
signing a key role to FIs in changing the composition of aggregate debt. Sev-
eral studies also find that this substitution between credit types can bolster
financial stability, especially when the balance sheets of FIs are independent
of one another. In the next section, I present a model that incorporates these
insights into a closed economy where alternative sources of credit exist.
6Where counter-cyclical is with reference to the business cycle.
7See Appendix section A.3 for details on series used in figure 2.3.
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Figure 2.1: Non-financial corporate debt and real GDP in the U.S.



















Figure 2.2: Credit flows for non-financial corporations in the U.S.
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Figure 2.3: Bond spread vs. loan spread in the U.S.
2.3 The model
The model is populated by households, entrepreneurs, and FIs. House-
holds consume, accumulate real estate and supply labour to entrepreneurs.
Households are the savers in the model, providing funds in the forms of
one period deposits and bond purchases to FIs. Entrepreneurs produce
output, consume, and incur one period debts (both loans and bonds) in
order to finance their production. Entrepreneurs are the borrowers in this
model economy and their borrowing ceiling in each credit market is deter-
mined by a Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) collateral constraint. Financial inter-
mediaries consist of a loan branch and a bond underwriting branch, where
each branch’s supply of credit to entrepreneurs is subject to their balance
sheet identity and a risk-weighted capital adequacy constraint similar to
that found in Iacoviello (2015).
Although households are the end holders of bonds, entrepreneurs have
to interact with FIs in order to access this form of credit because they pre-
fer to have their bond issues underwritten. The preference to underwrite
arises because of information asymmetries that exist between entrepreneurs
and households. Providing that entrepreneurs cannot gauge household de-
mand, the supply of funds from bond issuances directly to households may
be insufficient to meet their desire for credit. By underwriting their bond is-
suances, entrepreneurs can guarantee the amount of funds that they receive.
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Specifically, the underwriting branch of the FI guarantees entrepreneurs an
amount of bond finance that corresponds with the credit ceiling implied by
their collateral constraint. The underwriting branch then distributes these
bonds to households in accordance with household demand for bonds, where
this demand is a function of household wealth based on the lending con-
straint of Minetti and Peng (2013).
Household demand for bonds need not coincide with the quantity guar-
anteed to entrepreneurs by FIs, motivating their desire to have their bond
issuance underwritten. When this occurs, the underwriting branch is forced
to hold the excess entrepreneur bonds on its balance sheet. Such instances
reflect a misjudgement of household demand for bonds on the part of FIs,
and since they value their reputation as underwriters, I assume that positive
bond holdings by the FI underwriting branch (i.e. unsuccessful underwrit-
ing) carries utility costs such that FIs charge an underwriting premium on
bond issuances.8
In keeping with the empirical evidence on the role of supply-side factors
in the post-crisis shift from loan to bond finance (see section 2.2), branch-
specific and risk-weighted capital adequacy constraints are used to intro-
duce credit market heterogeneity into the model. These constraints afford a
non-trivial role for FI balance sheets in determining the model’s dynamics
and are used to illustrate the role of FI balance sheets in the propagation
of shocks. I assume that bonds carry a lower risk weight than loans, and
combined with the utility costs associated with underwriting as described
above, this difference in risk weights sees that the interest rate on loans is
a premium over that charged on bonds. Thus, the heterogeneity between
credit markets produced by the model is driven by supply-side factors in
the form of branch-specific risk-weighted capital adequacy constraints and
utility costs to unsuccessful underwriting.
Because this framework affords a non-trivial role for FIs in both bond
and loan markets, it can offer insights on the benefits associated with op-
erational diversification within the financial sector. I assess these benefits
by contrasting the model’s dynamics when I allow for operational diver-
sification by FIs, to a scenario where FIs only operate in one of the two
credit markets. The first of these scenarios reflects a Glass-Steagall setting,
where deposit-taking FIs are prohibited from engaging in underwriting ac-
tivities such that loan and bond branch balance sheets are regulated inde-
pendently of one another (Richardson et al., 2010; Thakor, 2012). In con-
trast, when regulation allows for operational diversification, bond and loan
8See Peng and Brucato (2004), Daniels and Vijayakumar (2007), and Andres et al. (2014)
for evidence on the role of reputation in underwriting.
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
CHAPTER 2. CREDIT MARKET HETEROGENEITY, FINANCIAL SHOCKS,
AND BALANCE SHEET (IN)DEPENDENCE 13
branch balance sheets are regulated on a consolidated basis as per Basel III
(Drucker and Puri, 2005; BIS, 2010). These two scenarios are incorporated
through adjustments to the capital adequacy constraints of FIs that allows
for balance sheet linkages which bear real implications on financial sector
resilience.
The model with heterogenous credit markets contrasts to the transmis-
sion of financial shocks in the single credit market economy of Iacoviello
(2015); however because this model nest the framework of Iacoviello (2015),
I can assess the influence of any additional features. In this regard, I as-
sess the impact of introducing an additional credit market by comparing the
transmission of a negative loan market financial shock – a negative shock to
FI assets – in Iacoviello (2015) to that when two credit markets are active.
This similarity between my framework and that of Iacoviello (2015) also af-
fords introducing a shock to bonds purchased by households that contrasts
to the loan market financial shock of Iacoviello (2015). This bond shock is in
fact akin to a negative funding shock to FIs – a negative shock to FI liabilities
– in their role as underwriter, and hence, serves as a new financial shock. As
with the impact of credit market heterogeneity, the bond shock is assessed
by comparing the model dynamics induced thereunder to those obtained
under the loan shock of Iacoviello (2015). To focus on the role of FI balance
sheets as endogenous shock propagation mechanisms these shocks are as-
sumed to be credit market specific, implying that they are independent of
one another. Because loan and bond shocks are independent of one another,
the effects of loan shocks on the bond market (and bond shocks on the loan
market) occurs endogenously and is not reliant on an ad-hoc relationship
between loan and bond shocks.
2.3.1 Households










t ) + j log(H
h
t ) + τ log(1 − Nt)
}
, (2.1)
subject to the following budget constraint














t−1 + WtNt. (2.2)
βh gives the household discount factor. j and τ are coefficients. Ct repre-
sents household consumption whilst εht is a household prefernce shock. Nt
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gives household labor that earns a real wage of Wt. Dt denotes bank de-
posits that earn a pre-determined gross return of Rdt . B
h
t denotes household
purchases of bonds. These purchases are intermediated by the FI and pay
a state-contingent gross return of Rht .
9 qt gives the price of real estate (H
h
t )
in units of consumption whilst ε
q
t is a real estate price shock that is common
to both households and entrepreneurs. Both the household consumption
shock and the common real estate price shock follow AR(1) processes:












where ιit ∼ N(0, σi) is a white noise process drawn from a normal distribu-
tion with a mean of zero and a standard deviation of σi for i = h, q.
As in Minetti and Peng (2013), I assume that households are subject to
a lending constraint where their current period holdings of bonds cannot













Given the model’s calibration, νh embeds the need for entrepreneurs to
underwrite their bonds since it restricts household demand for bonds. In
this regard, the calibration for νh sees that households’ demand for bonds
is inadequate to meet the supply thereof by entrepreneurs, implying that the
underwriting of bond issuances reflects rational behaviour by entrepreneurs.
Practically, one can think of νh as representing the fraction of net worth that
households are willing to devote to acquiring risky assets.
I introduce a shock to bond holdings in the households’ lending con-
straint, Etε
b
t+1, capturing expected bond market losses that decrease the
wealth of households, where γh =
Bh
B denotes the steady state household
share of total bonds issued by entrepreneur.10 Given that bonds held by
households appear on the liability side of FIs’ balance sheet, this shock
serves as a financial funding shock in the model. I assume that εbt follows an
AR(1) process:
9Section 2.3.3 discusses why Rht is state contingent.
10In this model, households hold approximately 98% of all bonds at the steady state, i.e.
γh = 0.98. This assumption is motivated on the grounds that issues of underwritten bonds
will mostly be fully subscribed, i.e. the FI is a successful underwriter.
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In 2.6, ιbt ∼ N(0, σb) is an independent white noise process with a normal
distribution, zero mean, and standard deviation of σb.
Optimal behaviour by households generates first-order conditions for
deposits (2.7), real estate demand (2.8), bonds (2.9), and labour supply (2.10):













































gives the multiplier on constraint 2.5 normalized by the marginal
utility of consumption.11 Equation 2.7 provides the behavioral rule for the
benchmark interest rate in the economy. The asset pricing equation (2.8)
equates the value of real estate to its direct utility benefits in units of con-
sumption plus the discounted utility benefit it offers in the next period
through its influence on household wealth. Equation 2.9 implies the pe-
riod t utility cost of bond acquisition should equal to its discounted benefits
in period t+ 1. Current period costs consist of reduced consumption as well
as a tightening of the lending constraint. Next period benefits accrue from
increased consumption offered by the interest income households receive
on bond holdings (Rht+1). Lastly, equation 2.10 gives the optimal wage rate.
To generate a non-trivial steady state role for the lending constraint, I as-
sume that bonds are less liquid than deposits. As a result of this difference
in liquidity, households require that their return on bond holdings be a pre-
mium on that offered for deposits held at the bank. Combining equations














11Normalizing the multiplier on constraint (2.5) by the marginal utility of consumption
simplifies the expression of the the first order conditions.
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where variables without a t subscript denoting steady state values. At
the steady state, a positive spread between Rh and Rd exists so long as λh >
0 and 0 < νh < 1. It can be shown that λ














t )} , (2.13)











tLt−1+WtNt = Yt + Bt + Lt. (2.14)
βe is the entrepreneurial discount factor and C
e
t gives entrepreneurial
consumption. Het gives the real estate holdings of entrepreneurs, whilst Bt
gives the size of bond borrowed on which pre-determined gross interest of
Rbt−1 is paid in period t. Lt and R
l
t denote loans and the state-contingent
gross return to loans, respectively. The intuition behind the difference in
timing between Rlt and R
b
t−1 is provided in section 2.3.3.














In keeping with a desire to focus on the role of supply-side factors in the ob-
served shift toward bond finance, entrepreneur preference for each type of
12To derive this result, take the steady state of equation (2.8), and impose the require-
ment that λh > 0.
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credit is governed by the scalar ω.13 The loan-to-value ratio of entrepreneurs,
νe, is subject to a shock as denoted by ε
e
t, where this shock is assumed to fol-
low an AR(1) process





where ιet ∼ N(0, σe) is a white noise process drawn from a normal distribu-
tion with a mean of zero and a standard deviation of σe.
Entrepreneurs’ production technology follows a Cobb-Douglas functional









Where εat is a technology shock following an AR(1) process as given by





where ιat ∼ N(0, σa) is a white noise process drawn from a normal distribu-
tion with a mean of zero and a standard deviation of σa.
As was done for households, let Λit ≡
λit
Cet
for i = b, l give the multi-








entrepreneurs’ stochastic discount factor, the entrepreneurs’ optimal condi-
tions for real estate, bonds, loans, and labour are as follows:
ε
q





































13Treating ω as a scalar is consistent with an implicit assumption that the theoretical
findings on optimal corporate debt structure hold. This literature indicates that safe bor-
rowers will make use of bond financing whilst risky borrowers make use of bank loans
(see e.g., Besanko and Kanatas, 1993; Hoshi et al., 1993; Chemmanur and Fulghieri, 1994;
Bolton and Freixas, 2000)
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Equation 2.20 shows that the cost to an additional unit of real estate in
units of consumption is equal to the benefit arising from a relaxtion of the
borrowing constraint plus the benefits that result from its influence on en-
trepreneurial wealth as well as its use in production. Equations 2.21 and
2.22 are the asset pricing equations for bonds and loans, respectively. Equa-
tion 2.23 gives the optimal wage rate.
Since borrowers take interest rates on loans and bonds as given, the
steady state of equations 2.21 and 2.22 can be used to derive the equilibrium
condition for the coexistence of two debt instruments on entrepreneurs’ bal-
ance sheets:
λb = λl + βe(R
l − Rb). (2.24)
Given that Rl > Rb, equation 2.24 states that for entrepreneurs to be
indifferent between bonds and loans as sources of credit, the shadow value
of their bond borrowing constraint needs to be larger than that on loans.
This equilibrium condition implies that entrepreneurs are more constrained
in accessing credit in the form of bonds than loans. It is intuitive to require a
differential in the tightness of the two borrowing constraints such that both
credit types exist in equilibrium. Since entrepreneurs can tap credit from
the bond market at a cheaper rate than that charged on loans, they would
make use of bond finance only if given the choice. However, by ensuring
that λb > λl , their ability to do so is constrained.
In order to ensure entrepreneurs are credit constrained in equilibrium,










Entrepreneurs will be borrowing constrained in both bond and loan markets




< 1, and Rl > Rb.14
Thus, provided that the steady state interest rate on loans is higher than
that on bonds, entrepreneurs will be credit constrained in equilibrium so
long as the inverse of the discount rate is larger than a weighted average of
household and FI discount rates.
2.3.3 Financial intermediaries
FIs maximize their utility from consumption (C
f
t ). Here, I introduce a utility
cost (ν f B
f
t ) due to the risks inherent in underwriting. Underwriting risk is
14I make use of the steady state of equations 2.7 and 2.40 in deriving this condition.
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captured by insufficient household demand for bonds, requiring FIs to hold
the remainder of it on their own balance sheet. Given that their holdings of














In equation 2.26, β f gives the FI’s discount factor, whilst ν f parametrizes
the utility cost from underwriting risk.15
I assume that credit extension occurs via two separate branches within
the FI, namely the loan branch and the bond underwriting branch. Each
branch intermediates the flows associated with a specific credit type. This




l,t + Lt + R
d





l,t refers to the consumption of the loan branch, which is equivalent
to the profit made from the intermediation of loans between households
and entrepreneurs. Here, the pre-determinate nature of Rdt−1 is consistent
with its status as the benchmark interest rate in the model, whilst the state-
dependency of Rlt embeds the notion that FIs will adapt the interest rate on
loans in accordance with changing economic conditions. The same timing
assumption is deployed by Iacoviello (2015).
In the case of the bond underwriting branch, bond credit is extended us-
ing funds received from household bond purchases. Here, I assume that
household demand for bonds is inadequate to meet the credit needs of
entrepreneurs. In equilibrium FIs are prepared to hold the remaining un-
derwritten bonds (B
f
t ) on the asset side of their balance sheets. Equation
2.28 gives the aggregation of household (Bht ) and bank holdings (B
f
t ) of en-
trepreneurial bonds:
15These utility costs are included to embed the underwriting narrative. This narrative
sees that the operational objective for FIs in the bond market is not to hold bonds, but
rather to make a profit on the sales of bonds to households. These utility costs can be
likened to a reputation cost associated with inefficient intermediation and is in keeping
with existing literature on the role of reputation in underwriting (Peng and Brucato, 2004;
Daniels and Vijayakumar, 2007; Andres et al., 2014). The inclusion of these costs do not
materially affect the results.
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b,t refers to the underwriting branch’s consumption. The differ-
ence in timing between Rbt−1 and R
h
t stems from the fact that bond issues
are underwritten. By underwriting their bond issuances, entrepreneurs can
guarantee the cost of said issuances. In this case, the pre-determinate nature
of Rbt−1 reflects this cost guarantee for entrepreneurs when their bonds are
underwritten. Similarly, the state-dependent nature of Rht reflects the fact
that the yield at which the underwriting branch sells the bonds to house-
holds will be dependent on prevailing market conditions (Melnik and Nissim,
2003).
Using the definition for bonds as per equation 2.28, one can substitute
















Equation 2.30 shows that the underwriting branch derives an income
from performing its role as underwriter in intermediating the purchase of




t−1) and own bond hold-
ings (Rbt−1B
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t + Lt + R
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I assume that each branch of the FI has to finance a portion of their assets
with branch capital. Letting Eit for i = l, b denote FI branch i’s capital, this
condition is formally stated as follows16:
16Here Ebt refers to the bond underwriting branch’s capital whilst E
l
t refers to the loan
branch’s capital.
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Elt ≥ ϑ[ϕl(Lt − Etε
l
t+1)], (2.32)
Ebt ≥ ϑ[ϕb(Bt)− γ f Etε
b
t+1)]. (2.33)
Where requiring the underwriting branch to hold capital against the ag-
gregate level of entrepreneur bonds is consistent with the notion that the
underwriting branch guarantees Bt before having sold any of these bonds
onto households (Bht ). Note that, as with the household, the impact of the
bond shock on the underwriting branch is weighted by its steady state share




Having a separate capital constraint for each FI branch is akin to assum-
ing balance sheet independence between the two branches. This assump-
tion is likened to operational diversification in the financial sector as a whole
and is coherent with a Glass-Steagall setting where proprietary trading re-
strictions see that deposit-taking banks are prohibited from engaging in cer-
tain credit markets. As a result of balance sheet independence, the gains or
losses made by one branch do not materially affect those of the other. In
this way, balance sheet independence can help stabilize the financial sec-
tor when a credit market specific shock hits. This assumption is relaxed in
section 2.4.1, where I allow for balance sheet linkages between FI branches.
Conditions 2.32 and 2.33 state that in each period FI branch capital must
be greater than a fraction ϑ of its assets, taking into account expected losses.
To generate a wedge between the cost of external finance for loans as com-
pared to bonds, I assume that the imposed risk coefficient on loans (ϕl) is
greater than that of on bonds (ϕb). This captures that, ceteris paribus, FIs
need to hold more capital for loan extension than holding underwriting
bonds according to the capital regulation authority.
As per Iacoviello (2015), FI loan branch capital at the beginning of the
period (before credit market shocks have been realized) is defined as Elt =
Lt − Dt − Etεlt+1. Analogously, bond underwriting branch capital is given
by Ebt = Bt − B
h
t − γ f Etε
)
t+1. Letting κi = 1 − ϑϕi for i = b, l, I can rewrite
(2.32) and (2.33) as
Dt ≤ κl(Lt − Etε
l
t+1), (2.34)
Bht ≤ κb(Bt − γ f Etε
b
t+1). (2.35)
17Households hold approximately 98% of all bonds issued at the steady state and so
γ f = 0.02.
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Where this re-phrasing of each branch’s capital requirement negates the
need to explicitly model branch capital.
Similar to the bond shock as defined by (2.6), εlt gives losses arising from
a shock to loan markets. The representation of this shocks sees that these
losses serve to reduce the level of the loan branch’s capital. As before, I






In (2.36), ιlt ∼ N(0, σl) is an independent white noise process with a normal
distribution with zero mean and standard deviation of σl . This indepen-
dence between loan and bond shocks – as per (2.6), bond shocks are also
independent white noise processes – places focus on FI balance sheets in
the propagation of shocks and reflects a desire to study credit market spe-
cific shocks as well as the difference between shocks that affect FI capital,
and those that affect FI liabilities.18
The FI takes Rdt and R
h




t , and Lt to max-
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t+1 = 1 − κlλ
f
l,t. (2.40)
Equation 2.37 equates the utility benefit of lending from households in
the current period to the discounted utility cost it generates in the next pe-
riod. The next period utility cost is given by the interest rate on deposits
multiplied by the stochastic discount factor. 1 − λ
f
l,t gives the utility gain
18The bond shock also affects FI capital; however, because γ f = 0.02 and γh = 0.98
bond shocks predominantly affect Bht , and as such, serve as a shock to the liabilities of the
underwriting branch’s balance sheet.
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offered by new deposits less the utility cost from a tightening of the capital
constraint.
The first order condition for Bht shows that in order to intermediate the
purchase of bonds by households, FIs require that the net benefit obtained
from bond market intermediation equates to the discounted interest rate on
bonds demanded by households. Benefits from intermediation in the bond
market consist of the additional consumption that bankers can enjoy as a
result of the funds received from households plus the utility gain (in con-
sumption units) from lower underwriting risk. At the same time, household
purchases of bonds infer a cost to bankers via a tightening of their capital
constraint as per (2.35).
Equation 2.39 states that in underwriting bonds, FIs set the interest rate
payable by bond issuers such that it equates to the utility cost of underwrit-
ing less the utility gained by the increase in bank capital necessitated by an
extension of credit. In the case of loans, equation 2.40 equates the net cost
of loan issuance today to the discounted benefits that accrue to the FIs in
the next period. Period t utility costs consist of a one unit reduction in FI
consumption less the utility value of higher capital as required by constraint
2.34. The benefits arising from loan extension equate to the interest rate on
loans multiplied by the FI’s stochastic discount factor.
Using equations 2.37 to 2.40, I derive the spreads between the different






















(1 − κb). (2.42)
Equation 2.41 shows that the FI loan branch requires a premium over
the deposit rate on their holdings of entrepreneurial loans whilst equation
2.42 governs the underwriting premium required by the FI bond underwrit-
ing branch. One can see from equations 2.41 and 2.42 that the loan-deposit
spread and the underwriting premium are increasing in the multipliers on
each FI branch’s capital constraint. This results from the liquidity differen-
tial that capital constraints generate between the asset and liability sides of
each branch’s balance sheet.
The spreads between the interest rates on deposits and household bonds
as well as that between the interest rates on entrepreneurial bonds and loans
are given by equations 2.43 and 2.44 below:
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l,t − ν f C
f
t ). (2.44)
Conditions (2.41) to (2.44) reveal that financial frictions in the form of capital
requirements reduce the efficiency of the financial sector by generating a
spread between the interest rate earned by savers (households) and that
paid by borrowers (entrepreneurs).19
The household problem requires a positive spread between Rh and Rd.
From equation 2.43 one can see that, from the FIs perspective, a positive






b,t > 0. Using steady
state conditions of equations 2.37 and 2.38, this will be the case so long as
1
βh
< Rh. Looking at equation 2.44, one can see that the spread between
entrepreneurial loan and bond rates is declining in FIs’ disutility to under-
writing and increasing in the tautness of each branch’s capital constraint.
As a result, an assumption regarding the magnitude of ν f is necessary in
order to preserve a positive spread between Rlt and R
b
t in equilibrium, that











Non-trivial financial intermediation requires FIs to be credit constrained
in equilibrium. Given that β f < βh, i.e., FIs are more impatient than house-
holds, the steady state of equation 2.37 shows that FIs will be credit con-
strained in equilibrium as long as the following condition holds20:
λ f = 1 − β f R





Market clearing requires the aggregate of bonds (2.28) and the following
conditions to hold:
19Indeed, absent these frictions and ignoring utility costs to underwriting (i.e. ν f = 0),






20I make use of the steady state of equation 2.7 in deriving this result.
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Hht +H
e








Equation 2.46 is a simple normalization whilst equation 2.47 gives the
aggregate resource constraint of the model economy.
2.4 Model extensions
Here, I discuss two extensions to the framework described in section 2.3. In
the first extension, I impose balance sheet dependence between the loan and
bond underwriting branches by subjecting FIs to an aggregate capital con-
straint. This extension serves to investigate how balance sheet linkages in-
fluence benefits to operational diversification within a bank, and compared
to the framework in section 2.3, mimics a situation where a bank is allowed
to participate in both traditional loan extension as well as proprietary trad-
ing activities. In the second extension, I restrict the baseline model to be
characterized by a single credit market as in Iacoviello (2015), and make use
of this extension to gauge the importance of credit market heterogeneity to
the transmission of financial shocks.
I refer to the baseline model (that presented in section 2.3) as model 1,
the extension to balance sheet dependence as model 2, and the single credit
market economy as model 3. For brevity, I do not discuss the frameworks
of these extensions in depth. In the case of model 2, I illustrate how balance
sheet dependence is introduced and how it affects FIs’ optimal behaviour.
For model 3, I highlight the equations that are surplus to requirements for a
single credit market economy and provide the complete set of equations for
each model in appendix A.
2.4.1 A heterogeneous credit market economy with balance
sheet dependence
In the baseline model (model 1), I assumed that the balance sheets of the FI
loan and bond underwriting branches are independent of one another. As
a result, bond and loan credit extension are not subject to the same financial
constraints. In model 2, I reverse this assumption and introduce balance
sheet dependence between branches by subjecting them to a common capi-
tal adequacy constraint. To be explicit, bar this change, the remainder of the
model 2 setup is identical to that of model 1.
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t , I impose balance sheet de-
pendence by merging the capital constraints for model 1 as given by equa-












The balance sheet dependence between branches as suggested by equa-
tion 2.48 is akin to operational diversification within a bank. This constraint
embodies a regulatory environment where agents are allowed to participate
in multiple credit markets so that capital requirements need to be applied
at a consolidated balance sheet level á la Basel III. In contrast, the balance
sheet independence of model 1 embodies a regulatory environment where
the prohibition of participation in proprietary trading activities sees that
capital regulation can be applied at the branch level (BIS, 2010).














































gives the multiplier on constraint 2.48. Compared to the FI
problem of model 1, the single capital constraint of model 2 produces a sim-
ilar narrative for interest rate movements; however, the common multiplier
(λ
f
t ) that results from balance sheet dependence implies that interest rates
will mimic each other much more closely in model 2 than in model 1. To
ensure non-trivial financial intermediation in model 2, requires β f < βh as
this sees λ f > 0. Similarly, a positive spread between Rl and Rb is ensured




2.4.2 A single credit market economy
To generate the framework for model 3, I reduce model 1 to an economy
in which loans are the only form of credit. This change in model structure
21Note that a positive spread between Rh and Rd is already ensured from the house-
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implies a removal of the underwriting role for FIs and assuming that house-
holds no longer invest in the bond market. Model 3’s setup is thus a carbon
copy of model 1’s, except that it has no role for equations 2.5, 2.15, and 2.28.
The complete set of equations for model 3 can be found in appendix A.2.
2.5 Estimation
The model is estimated using Bayesian methods over the sample period
1985Q1-2015Q1 for the U.S. economy. Following usual practice, I match the
number of shocks to the number of observable variables and select observ-
able variables that have a direct link to the shocks contained in the model.
There are six shocks when both bond and loan markets are present, and five
shocks in the single credit market economy (no bond shock). For the shock
to household preferences (equation 2.3), I make use of household consump-
tion data. Similarly, real estate price and entrepreneur real estate wealth
data are used to identify the real estate and loan to value ratio shocks (equa-
tions 2.4 and 2.17). The technology shock (equation 2.19) is identified using
real GDP data, whilst the financial shocks in loan and bond markets (equa-
tions 2.36 and 2.6) are identified with non-financial corporate bond and loan
data. Each variable is log first differenced and de-meaned. Figure 2.4 pro-
vides a plot of the transformed data.22
2.5.1 Calibration
Table 2.1 lists the parameters that are calibrated prior to estimation. The dis-
count rates for households, entrepreneurs, and FIs are set as βh = 0.9925,
βe = 0.94, and β f = 0.945, respectively. These calibrated discount rates
are coherent with binding constraints in equilibrium as given by conditions
2.12, 2.25, and 2.45. I set the weight on leisure in households’ utility func-
tion as τ = 2. This calibration sees households devote roughly a third of
their available time to labour. Setting the household real estate preference
as j = 0.075 and the share of real estate in production as α = 0.05 implies an
annualized ratio of real estate wealth to output of 3.67, similar to that found
in Iacoviello (2015).
The minimum capital requirement is calibrated as ϑ = 0.1 which is in
line with Van den Heuvel (2008) and implies that each FI branch is required
to hold at least 10% of the value of their assets in capital. A key novelty
of the model lies in the risk weighted capital constraint applied to each FI
branch. In this regard, I use the corporate risk weights provided in Basel
22Appendix A.3 contains the source of the observed variables used for estimation.
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Figure 2.4: Data used in estimation. See appendix A.3 for data sources.
2 to calibrate the risk weight parameter for bonds and loans. Specifically,
I make use of the AAA-rated corporate bond weight for ϕb = 0.2, and the
unrated corporate debt weight for ϕl = 1 (BIS, 2006). Finally, I calibrate
γh = 0.98 and γ f = 0.02 as per the household and FI’s steady state share
of total entrepreneur bonds, ensuring that the bond shock is in fact a shock
to the FI’s liabilities. Given the utility costs that the FI faces from the risks
of underwriting (see equation 2.26), this calibration for γh and γ f nests the
assumption that the FI is mostly successful as an underwriter in gauging
household demand for bonds.
2.5.2 Prior distributions and posterior estimates
Table 2.2 contains the prior distributions and posterior estimates of the pa-
rameters. The prior distributions of the estimated parameters are reported
in columns 3-5. I assume that all parameters are independent a priori and
allow for their prior domains to cover a wide range of values. Here, I fol-
low Iacoviello (2015) in being conservative with regards to the importance
of shocks. Specifically, the prior means for the shock processes assumes that
each shock accounts for 3% of the total variance in output and consumption.
The last three columns of table 2.2 contains the means as well as the 10%
and 90% critical values for the estimated parameters. As evidenced by the
difference between the prior and posterior distributions, the data appears
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Table 2.1: Calibration of model parameters.
Parameter Symbol Value
Household discount factor βh 0.9925
Entrepreneur discount factor βe 0.94
Financial Intermediary discount factor β f 0.945
Financial intermediary disutility to underwriting ν f 0.1
Real estate share in production α 0.05
Household real estate preference j 0.075
Household labour supply parameter τ 2
Capital to assets ratio ϑ 0.1
Risk weight on loans ϕl 1
Risk weight on bonds ϕb 0.2
Household share of total bonds γh 0.98
FI share of total bonds γ f 0.02
to be informative with regards to both the structural parameters as well as
the stochastic processes. The estimated posterior mean for νh implies that
households devote approximately 24% of their wealth to purchases of en-
trepreneurial bonds each period. The estimates for νe give a LTV ratio of
45% for entrepreneurs whilst a posterior mean of 0.35 for ω sees their fi-
nancing mix tilted in favour of loans. The estimated autocorrelation param-
eters on the shock processes indicate quite a high degree of persistence in
all shocks.
2.6 Credit market heterogeneity and financial
shocks
In this section I assess the qualitative and quantitative relevance of credit
market heterogeneity by contrasting the transmission of financial shocks
across models 1, 2, and 3. Firstly, I contrast the transmission mechanism of
loan shocks in models 1 and 3 to illustrate the attenuation benefits that arise
when heterogeneous credit markets exist. Next, I investigate how balance
sheet linkages influences this attenuation property by contrasting the trans-
mission of loan shocks in models 1 and 2. Lastly, I compare the transmission
mechanism of both loan and bond shocks in model 1 to illustrate the impor-
tance of an efficiently functioning financial sector to economic outcomes.
As in Iacoviello (2015), both the bond and loan shock are designed to reflect
balance sheet write-downs similar to that experienced by the banks during
the financial crisis.
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Table 2.2: Parameter estimates for model 1.
Parameter Prior Distribution Posterior Distribution
Mean Density Std. Dev. 10% Mean 90%
Households bonds in total portfolio νh 0.06 gamma 0.05 0.1805 0.2345 0.2923
Loan-to-value ratio for entrepreneurs νe 0.7 beta 0.05 0.3535 0.4507 0.5416
Collateral share between bonds and loans ω 0.5 beta 0.05 0.3028 0.3459 0.3871
Autocorr. tech shock ρa 0.5 beta 0.1 0.9195 0.9415 0.9613
Autocorr. bond shock ρb 0.5 beta 0.1 0.9428 0.9580 0.972
Autocorr. loan shock ρl 0.5 beta 0.1 0.9943 0.9960 0.9977
Autocorr. HH pref shock ρh 0.5 beta 0.1 0.9224 0.9435 0.9624
Autocorr. LTV shock ρe 0.5 beta 0.1 0.9097 0.9292 0.949
Autocorr. house price shock ρq 0.5 beta 0.1 0.8446 0.8717 0.8993
Std. dev. tech shock ιa 0.003 invg 1 0.0137 0.0155 0.0172
Std. dev. bond shock ιb 0.003 invg 1 0.0478 0.0610 0.0744
Std. dev. loan shock ιl 0.003 invg 1 0.1311 0.1472 0.1632
Std. dev. HH pref shock ιh 0.003 invg 1 0.1222 0.1674 0.2193
Std. dev. LTV shock ιe 0.003 invg 1 0.0605 0.0895 0.1214
Std. dev. house price shock ιq 0.003 invg 1 0.0814 0.0969 0.1114
The posterior density is constructed by simulation using the Random-Walk Metropolis algorithm
(two chains with 30,000 draws each) as described in An and Schorfheide (2007).
The transmission mechanisms through which financial shocks in the loan
market (loan shocks) affect the real economy are as follow. Loan shocks
serve to reduce the level of the loan branch’s capital, Elt. As a result, the loan
branch has to reduce the quantity of loan credit extended to entrepreneurs
in order to meet its capital requirement given by (2.32). This reduction in
loan credit lowers entrepreneur demand for real estate through constraint
2.16, where the dynamic feedback that this constraint affords culminates
in a downward spiral in real estate prices and credit quantities. Together,
these effects see that loan shocks impart a persistent negative effect on asset
prices and credit markets, and by extension, output. The introduction of a
secondary credit market as per model 1 provides an alternative to the down-
ward spiral in real estate prices and credit quantities as described above.
Since entrepreneurs are able to access both bond and loan credit markets in
model 1, reductions in the supply of one credit type as a result of a credit
market specific shock can be attenuated by increases in the supply of credit
from the unaffected market. In model 2, a common capital constraint as per
(2.48) sees that loan and bond branch balance sheets are inter-dependent.
As a result of this balance sheet dependence, loan shocks can spill over into
the bond market limiting the attenuation impact as compared to model 1.
In contrast, model 3 entrepreneurs are unable to substitute between credit
types and, as a result, the impact of a loan shock can have a much more
detrimental and persistent impact on aggregate output as compared to both
models 1 and 2.
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2.6.1 Financial shock in loan markets
To illustrate the shock attenuation property of credit market heterogeneity,
I contrast the transmission of an innovation in ιlt ∼ N(0, σl) in model 1 to
that in model 3. Figures 2.5 to 2.6 below plot the impulse response functions
(IRFs) of the main variables in models 1 and 3 to a negative loan shock.
Comparing the response of the variables that are common across both
models, figure 2.5 clearly indicates that the presence of an additional credit
market attenuates the impact of a negative loan market shock. Not only
is the impact of the loan shock smaller in model 1 than in model 3, but
the variables of model 1 return to equilibrium at a quicker rate than those
of model 3. A similar narrative applies to the other variables in figure 2.5
in that they take much longer to return to equilibrium in the single credit
























































Figure 2.5: The impact of credit market heterogeneity (solid line: model 1; dash
line: model 3).
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Figure 2.6: The impact of credit market heterogeneity (solid line: model 1; dash
line: model 3).
The shock attenuation property of credit market heterogeneity works
through asset prices and substitution toward alternative credit types. First,
in model 1 real estate prices recover much quicker compared to their sus-
tained negative response in model 3. Second, as shown in figure 2.5, al-
though loans decline in both models following the shock, bonds increase
marginally in model 1. Thus, the inclusion of an additional credit market
has improved the resilience of the model’s financial sector as evidenced by
the quicker recovery of credit (loan) extension after the shock in model 1.
Both, in turn, help output to recover quicker in the model with heteroge-
neous credit markets (model 1).
The results show that model 1 is able to replicate the shift toward bond
finance witnessed in the data. Figure 2.6 indicates that the increase in bonds
following the loan shock results mostly from an increase in household bond
holdings, but also from a marginal increase in FI bond holdings. This shift
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toward bond finance is facilitated by a reduction in bond interest rates,
whilst the marginal increase in FI consumption (as per figure 2.5) is aided
by a rise in the underwriting premium and the loan-deposit spread.
This reveals how operational diversification bolsters the financial sec-
tor’s resilience by offering alternate revenue streams. The rise in the under-
writing premium in combination with increased household bond holdings
provide profits to the financial sector that help to attenuate the impact of
loan losses23. Here, it is prudent to highlight that the balance sheet inde-
pendence between the two FI branches of model 1 implies that the model in-
sights on operational diversification relate to the financial sector as a whole.
Thus, a financial sector composed of agents that operate in heterogeneous
markets is more resilient to financial shocks than a financial sector where all
agents operate in the same market.
It is worth noting that the magnitude of variable responses are smaller
than those of De Fiore and Uhlig (2015). Although this could partly be due
to differences in shock size and origination, the attenuation of financial
shocks under credit market heterogeneity could become amplified in my
model vis-á-vis De Fiore and Uhlig (2015) via the contemporaneous impact
of expected future market conditions.24 With heterogeneous credit markets,
the impact of shocks on both current and future market conditions is atten-
uated, reducing negative contemporaneous feedback from expected future
market conditions. In this way, inter-period borrowing can introduce a vir-
tuous feedback loop in a multiple credit market economy leading to ampli-
fied shock attenuation effects. In contrast, an intra-period framework would
provide no such virtuous feedback link, explaining the disparity in magni-
tudes between the results presented here and those of De Fiore and Uhlig
(2015).
Regardless of magnitude effect, model 1 successfully replicates the em-
pirical evidence of bond and loan spreads during the 2007-2008 financial
crisis; however, compared to figure 2.3, figure 2.6 shows that the baseline
model is unable to replicate the rise in the bond-deposit spread post-2008.
That being said, the relatively muted positive response of bonds to the loan
shock matches the evidence contained in figures 2.1 and 2.2 where bonds
depict a-cyclical behaviour.
23Although the loan-deposit spread also increases as a result of the shock, lower loan
holdings erode financial sector profits gained through this channel.
24Whereas I estimate the size of the shock on US data, De Fiore and Uhlig (2015) cali-
brate their shock so that its response is in line with the EU data. Furthermore, whereas
my shock originates on FI balance sheets and is isolated to the loan market only, theirs is
modelled as a shock to the productivity of entrepreneurs’ collateral in loan markets that
affects both bond and loan markets.
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2.6.2 Balance sheet dependence and shock attenuation
In this section I investigate how balance sheet dependence influences the
shock attenuation properties of model 1 as described in section 2.6.1. To do
so, I contrast the transmission of an innovation in ιlt ∼ N(0, σl) in model 1
to that in model 2.
Figures 2.7 and 2.8 show that balance sheet linkages between FI branches
imparts a non-negligible influence on the shock attenuation properties of-
fered by heterogeneous credit markets. The response of model 2’s variables
are both larger and more persistent than those of model 1. Balance sheet
dependence between FI branches also produces a further disparity between
the models: in model 2 entrepreneurs are unable to shift toward bond fi-
nance in response to the loan market shock. Thus, as illustrated by the de-
cline in entrepreneurial bonds in figure 2.7, balance sheet linkages allow for
the loan market shock to spill over into bond markets.
Figure 2.8 reveals the causal chain behind the disparity in bond market
dynamics between models 1 and 2. Although household bonds (Bht ) in-
crease by more in model 2 than in model 1, the common balance sheet of
model 2 requires a much larger reduction in FI holdings of entrepreneurial
bonds (B
f
t ) which serves to dominate the rise in B
h
t . In comparison, bal-
ance sheet independence in model 1 allows both Bht and B
f
t to increase (see
figure 2.6 for a clear illustration). Additionally, figure 2.8 shows that al-
though deposit and loan interest rates behave similarly across models 1 and
2, the response of household and entrepreneurial bond rates are much more
muted in model 1. As a result, the contemporaneous rise in the underwrit-
ing premium is larger in model 1 than that in model 2. Thus, benefits to
revenue diversification are greater in the financial sector of model 1 than
that of model 2.
Comparing figures 2.7 and 2.5 reveals a very similar response between
models 2 and 3 to the financial shock for all common variables bar FI con-
sumption and entrepreneurial loans. The positive response of FI consump-
tion in model 2 following the shock is indicative of a more robust financial
sector as compared to model 3. Further evidence in favour of model 2’s fi-
nancial robustness vis-á-vis model 3 can be found by comparing the impact
of the financial shock on entrepreneurial loans. Compared to model 3, the
impact of the loan shock is both shorter and less severe in model 2. Taken
together, these results show that shock attenuation is present both when fi-
nancial agents specialize in a specific credit market as well as when they
diversify their operations across multiple credit markets.
Although the shock attenuation properties of model 2 are smaller than
model 1, a comparison of models 2 and 3 shows that shock spill-over as a
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result of balance sheet linkages within the financial sector do not erase all
of the benefits offered by credit market heterogeneity. This suggests that,
from an individual financial entity’s perspective, the ability to operate over
multiple credit markets is preferable to a Glass-Steagall environment as it
affords diversification away from shock affected markets. These results are
therefore coherent with both the literature which finds that operational di-
versification within a financial entity promotes financial stability as well
as the literature which indicates that balance sheet linkages limit the de-
gree to which revenue diversification can attenuate the impact of shocks
(De Jonghe, 2010; Elsas et al., 2010; Fomby et al., 2012; Köhler, 2015). Specif-
ically, I find that shock attenuation is most pronounced when the balance
sheets of financial sector agents are independent as this removes a channel






















































Figure 2.7: The impact of balance sheet independence (solid line: model 1; dash-dot
line: model 2).
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Figure 2.8: The impact of balance sheet independence (solid line: model 1; dash-dot
line: model 2).
2.6.3 Financial shocks in bond and loan markets
In the final simulation exercise, I contrast the transmission of an innovation
in ιlt ∼ N(0, σl) to that of an innovation in ι
b
t ∼ N(0, σb) in model 1. Figures
2.9 and 2.10 plot the IRFs of the main variables in response to a negative
loan shock and bond shock in model 1.
As shown by figures 2.9 and 2.10, the impact of bond market financial
shocks (bond shocks) differs from loan market financial shocks. In partic-
ular, bond shocks have a more muted impact than loan shocks, but last for
longer. This disparity between the impact of a bond shock and a loan shock
can be explained with reference to the household lending constraint (equa-
tion 2.5) and the FI’s branch-specific capital constraints (equations 2.32 and
2.33). As these equations show, loan shocks are manifest on the balance
sheet of the FI loan branch only, and thus realize a large reduction in loan
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branch capital. In contrast, bond shocks are shared between households
and the bond branch. Here, the fact that households hold 98% of the is-
sued bonds in equilibrium, implies that bond shocks are mainly manifest
as reductions in the bond branch’s liabilities (Bht ), with a small reduction
required in bond branch capital. This difference between bond and loan
shocks implies that loan shocks mostly affect the ability of the financial sec-
tor to efficiently intermediate funds, whilst bond shocks mostly affect the
financial sector’s access to said funds.
The more muted response of variables to the bond shock as compared
to the loan shock can then be seen as illustrating how important a well
functioning financial sector is in determining an economy’s shock absorp-
tion capabilities. As per the discussion around equations 2.41 to 2.44, capi-
tal requirements reduce financial intermediation efficiency by introducing a
spread between lending and borrowing interest rates. Because loan shocks
require a large adjustment to the loan branch’s capital, these shocks increase
the friction associated with capital requirements. This prohibits the efficient
flow of funds from savers to borrowers and results in a large decline in ag-
gregate economic activity. Bond shocks serve mainly to reduce the bond
branch’s liabilities, requiring a smaller adjustment in bond branch capital
than the reduction in loan branch capital following a loan shock. As a re-
sult, the friction associated with capital requirements is smaller under bond
shocks compared to loan shocks. This implies that bond shocks bear less
adverse consequences for the efficiency of financial intermediation, culmi-
nating in a more muted impact on the economy in comparison to a loan
shock.
The disparity between the persistence of bond shocks and loan shocks
can be explained with reference to their impact on household wealth. As
per constraint (2.5), when bond shocks serve to decrease household wealth,
and since households represent the savers of the economy, a shock to their
wealth reduces their demand for both deposits and bonds. This prevents
substitution between credit types as was seen (see figure 2.5) which leads
to shock persistence. In contrast, because loan shocks are borne entirely by
the financial sector, households are able to offer additional credit via their
demand for entrepreneur bonds following a loan shock. Credit extension
therefore recovers quicker under loan shocks than bond shocks, which ex-
plains why bond shocks are more persistent than loan shocks.
In summary, the simulations performed in section 2.6.1 above reveal that
credit market heterogeneity plays an important role in attenuating the im-
pact of financial shocks by allowing borrowers to substitute away from af-
fected credit markets. Section 2.6.1 also illustrated how operational diversi-
fication within the financial sector can contribute to its resilience in response
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Figure 2.9: Bond shocks (dotted line) vs. loan shocks (solid line).
to market specific shocks by affording access to revenue streams from unaf-
fected markets. Building on this result, section 2.6.2 indicates that balance
sheet linkages between financial agents play an important role in determin-
ing the degree to which operational diversification can attenuate the impact
of financial shocks. When the balance sheets of financial agents are inter-
dependent, benefits to operational diversification are limited as a result of
shock spill-over. These results indicate that, from a financial regulator’s per-
spective, a Glass-Steagall environment may be preferable as this regulatory
setup precludes balance sheet spill-over effects that can reduce the attenu-
ation benefits associated with credit market heterogeneity. Nevertheless, a
comparison between models 2 and 3 showed that this spill-over does not
completely erode the attenuation benefits of credit market heterogeneity.
Thus, from an individual financial entity’s perspective, a Glass-Steagall reg-
ulatory environment may be sub-optimal. This sub-optimality stems from
the fact that such a regulatory environment leaves balance sheets fully ex-
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Figure 2.10: Bond shocks (dotted line) vs. loan shocks (solid line).
posed to shocks from the credit market to which financial entities are con-
strained. Instead, if financial entities were allowed to operate across multi-
ple credit markets, their exposure to credit market specific shocks could be
reduced. Finally, section 2.6.3 shows that the origination of financial shocks
can influence both the size and persistence of their impact. When shocks are
borne by savers (households) as opposed to FIs, the size of their impact on
the real economy is limited since it does not reduce the efficient function-
ing of the the financial system. At the same time, when savers are directly
hit by financial shocks, the impact thereof can be very persistent by way
of limiting the aggregate amount of savings in the economy. Shocks that
are borne by FIs have a more severe, but less persistent impact on the real
economy. The severity of the impact results from reduced financial sector
efficiency in intermediating fund flows from savers to borrowers, whilst re-
duced shock persistence stems from the limited impact that FI borne shocks
have on aggregate savings.
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2.7 Conclusion
This essay presents a model where two credit markets exist and studies the
qualitative and quantitative relevance of credit market heterogeneity in a
general equilibrium setting. The model framework allows the financial sec-
tor to perform both loan extension and bond underwriting activities which
affords a comparison between the transmission of financial shocks where a
single representative credit market is assumed to a scenario where multiple
credit markets exist. Furthermore, the introduction of an additional credit
market affords a contrast of the impact of credit market specific shocks. I es-
timate the model using US data and show that credit market heterogeneity
can help mitigate the impact of financial shocks. Additionally, the findings
indicate that the financial sector is more robust to balance sheet shocks in
a framework that incorporates credit market heterogeneity as evidenced by
a quicker recovery in credit extension. Lastly, I find that financial sector
resilience to financial shocks is decreasing in the degree of balance sheet
dependence between financial agents and that the origination of financial
shocks bears implications for both the size and persistence of their impact.
To focus on the role played by financial sector balance sheets in the trans-
mission of financial shocks, this essay opts for a simplistic real business cy-
cle model structure without nominal rigidities or borrower risk. The intro-
duction of nominal rigidities in the real sector are unlikely to alter the in-
tuition behind financial sector balance sheets acting as mechanisms for the
propagation of financial shocks. The results should also be insensitive to
borrower risk; however this model feature could have a distributional im-
pact. I leave an assessment into the role of these features for future research.
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Flow specific capital controls for
emerging markets
This essay investigates the impact of capital controls on business cycle fluc-
tuations and welfare. To perform this analysis, the essay deploys an asym-
metric two country model that is subject to negative foreign interest rate
shocks. The results show that both an inflow and outflow capital control
are able to attenuate capital flow dynamics, but each control bears different
implications for macroeconomic outcomes. Whilst the outflow capital con-
trol is associated with shock attenuation benefits, the inflow capital control
is shown to amplify the impact of shocks. Easier capital control regimes
enhance the attenuation and amplification properties associated with each
capital control, whilst strict regimes do the opposite. Lastly, the welfare
analysis shows that the welfare effects of capital controls are agent depen-
dent, and that society prefers the outflow capital control to the inflow cap-
ital control. Taken together, these results are indicative of the comparative
desirability of capital controls imposed on the financial sector (outflows) as
compared to the real sector (inflows).
3.1 Introduction
The post financial crisis period has been characterized by a rise in emerging
economies’ use of foreign capital markets to meet their demand for credit.
Following Al-Saffar et al. (2013) and Catão and Milesi-Ferretti (2014), this re-
liance on foreign credit markets leaves emerging markets vulnerable to out-
put losses, with support growing for the use of capital controls to deal with
41
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this external vulnerability (Fritz and Prates, 2014; Shin, 2014).1 In this re-
gard, the deployment of capital controls is usually motivated with reference
to their effectiveness in curbing privately optimal behaviour that results in
socially sub-optimal overborrowing (see e.g., Brunnermeier and Sannikov,
2015). Indeed, emerging markets have a history of capital control deploy-
ment to address concerns related to the dynamics of their foreign debt (see
e.g., Eichengreen et al., 2007; Forbes et al.). Through restricting participation
in international credit markets, capital controls can increase emerging mar-
ket reliance on domestic sources of credit, limiting their balance sheet vul-
nerability to foreign shocks (Burger and Warnock, 2006; Hale et al., 2016).
The influence of monetary policy on lender risk appetite indicates that
easy monetary conditions in advanced economies facilitated emerging mar-
ket access to foreign sources of credit. Bruno and Shin (2015) find that re-
ductions in the Fed policy rate serve to dampen global risk perceptions
which serves to stimulate cross-border lending. Ahmed and Zlate (2014)
show that reductions in risk perception are associated with net capital in-
flows into emerging markets. Similarly, Forbes and Warnock (2012) find
that global risk factors are associated with extreme capital flow episodes.
Rey (2015) proffers further evidence on the influence that advanced econ-
omy monetary policy bears on emerging market access to foreign credit,
where this influence is predicated on a global financial cycle driven by the
stance of U.S. monetary policy.
By plotting the total amount of outstanding international debt securi-
ties for non-financial corporations in Brazil and China, figure 3.1 illustrates
the emerging market shift toward foreign credit markets. Since 2008, there
has been a marked increase in the foreign liabilities of both countries. The
outstanding amount of U.S. dollar (USD) denominated foreign liabilities of
Chinese non-financial corporations was more than 5 times bigger in 2016Q3
than in 2010Q1. In Brazil, the USD liabilities of non-financial corporations
almost tripled between 2010Q1 and 2016Q3. Although I only report the data
for China and Brazil, the same narrative holds for other emerging markets
such as India, Russia, and South Africa. Indeed, Shin (2014) finds that the
post crisis period has seen a marked increase in emerging market debt is-
suance on advanced country credit markets. Consistent with the empirical
evidence on the influence of monetary policy on lender risk appetite, figure
1Al-Saffar et al. (2013) find that emerging market output is more adversely
affected by increases in their gross external liabilities than advanced markets.
Catão and Milesi-Ferretti (2014) find that the ratio of net foreign liabilities to GDP is a sig-
nificant crisis predictor. For a discussion on the surge in global liquidity following the
financial crisis, see Shin (2014). See Fritz and Prates (2014) for evidence on institutional
support for active management of the capital account.
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3.2 shows that this switch toward foreign credit markets occurred during
a period where interest rates were comparatively lower in the U.S. than in
emerging markets.
































Figure 3.1: The outstanding international debt of non-financial corporations in
USD (dotted line) and local currency (solid line). See appendix B.2 for source de-
tails.
This essay tests the efficacy of capital controls in curbing this shift to-
ward foreign credit markets by comparing the dynamics and welfare im-
plications of models where capital controls are present, to a baseline sce-
nario where no such controls exist. To conduct this analysis, I design an
asymmetric two-country framework with flow specific capital controls and
credit market heterogeneity. This asymmetric model structure facilitates the
adoption of an emerging market perspective whilst credit market hetero-
geneity affords the post 2008 emerging market switch toward foreign credit
markets. In line with figures 3.1 and 3.2, this approach places focus on the
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home economy (emerging markets) whilst still affording endogenously de-
termined foreign economy (advanced countries) dynamics.
I embed the asymmetric model structure by assuming that the home
economy is a net international creditor, and that it is characterized by com-
paratively less developed financial markets. The higher levels of financial
market development in advanced economies is well established in the lit-
erature, whilst the net international creditor position of the home economy
is in accordance with the savings-glut hypothesis put forth by Bernanke
(2005)2. Because foreign financial markets are more developed than their
home counterparts, financial intermediation is only explicit in the home
economy. This approach is coherent with Mendoza et al. (2009), where dif-
ferences in financial market development are defined with reference to the
enforceability of contracts. In line with Reinhart and Rogoff (2015), I fur-
ther assume that financial repression is seen as unnecessary in advanced
economies, and so, capital controls are only present in the home economy3.
I contrast an inflow capital control which is imposed on the real sec-
tor, to an outflow capital control which is imposed on the financial sector.
Each flow specific capital control can be interpreted as a balance sheet re-
striction that can feasibly be implemented by emerging market authorities.
The inflow capital control is introduced as a variant of the collateral con-
straints found in Iacoviello and Minetti (2006). This strategy sees the inflow
capital control manifested as a restriction on the home entrepreneur’s abil-
ity to allocate collateral to foreign credit markets. In this way, the inflow
capital control exerts direct influence over capital inflows and can serve to
increase the prominence of home credit markets on home entrepreneur bal-
ance sheets. The outflow capital control is in the spirit of Tobin (1978) and
is manifested as a limit on the proportion of foreign assets on the home fi-
nancial intermediary’s (FI) balance sheet. Through this direct influence over
capital outflows, the outflow capital control is able to increase the propor-
tion of home credit on FI balance sheets.
This essay contributes to the literature on three fronts. Firstly, the capital
controls that I study are flow specific. This implies that they are not mod-
elled as taxes on foreign debt, but rather as quantitative limits on foreign
2See Edwards (2007), Reinhardt et al. (2013), Eichengreen and Rose (2014), and
De Nicolò and Juvenal (2014) for evidence on the comparatively higher level of financial
development in advanced economies vis-a-vis emerging markets.
3Eichengreen and Rose (2014) proffer further rationalization for this structural asym-
metry by showing that advanced economies are significantly less likely to implement cap-
ital controls than developing countries. One can vindicate this belief with reference to the
superior mobility of capital in advanced as compared to emerging economies and compar-
atively higher levels of financial development in advanced economies.
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Figure 3.2: Emerging market international debt to domestic debt ratio and 3-month
Treasury rates in advanced and emerging markets. See appendix B.2 for source
details.
borrowing and lending. Previous studies deployed capital controls as a tax
on net foreign borrowing, but because households are the only agents that
borrow in these models, this approach cannot distinguish between tighten-
ing an inflow capital control and easing an outflow capital control. As a
result, a tax on capital inflows is simultaneously a subsidy on capital out-
flows (and vice-versa, see e.g., Korinek, 2011; Bianchi and Mendoza, 2013;
Farhi and Werning, 2014). The flow specific nature of the capital controls
studied here implies that each one is imposed on a different agent, affording
an analysis of the agent specific welfare effects of capital controls. This com-
prises the second contribution of this essay as the studies cited above focus
on the social welfare implications of capital controls (see e.g., Jeanne and
Korinek, 2010; Bianchi, 2011)). The final contribution of this paper stems
from the fact that, in this analysis, financial frictions fall on both borrowers
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and lenders. This contribution is synonymous with an investigation into
flow specific capital controls and affords a contrast between capital controls
imposed on the real sector to those imposed on the financial sector. In previ-
ous studies, the use of a single financial friction prevents such a comparison
(Kitano et al., 2016).
The results show that both the inflow and outflow capital control are
effective tools for managing capital flows.4 However, the inflow capital
control bears different implications for business cycle dynamics than the
outflow capital control. In this regard, the inflow capital control amplifies
the effect of foreign interest rate shocks on the business cycle, whilst the
outflow capital control attenuates the effect of foreign interest rate shocks.
The attenuation property of the outflow capital control and the amplifica-
tion property of the inflow capital control result from their influence over
the entrepreneur’s ability to exploit the comparative cheapness of foreign
credit markets following the shock. In the framework deployed for this
analysis, optimal collateral allocation generates benefits by affording the
entrepreneur freedom in exploiting differences in the cost of credit between
home and foreign markets. The inflow capital control precludes such be-
haviour by directly constraining the entrepreneur’s ability to allocate collat-
eral to foreign credit markets. As a result, its presence effectively removes
the shock absorption properties associated with optimal collateral alloca-
tion, resulting in amplified business cycle dynamics relative to the baseline.
The outflow capital control does not impart such a direct influence over op-
timal collateral allocation. Instead, it provides a channel through which eas-
ier foreign credit market conditions can spill-over to home credit markets.
This spill-over reduces the entrepreneur’s incentive to shift toward foreign
credit markets, resulting in attenuated business cycle dynamics relative to
the baseline.
I test the sensitivity of these findings to changes in the capital control
regime, and find that the implications of such changes are capital control
dependent. In the case of the inflow capital control, easier regimes serve
to increase the entrepreneur’s exposure to foreign credit markets, resulting
in heightened inflow sensitivity to foreign interest rate shocks. As a result,
easier inflow capital control regimes serve to enhance the business cycle am-
plification property associated with this flow specific capital control. For the
outflow capital control, easier regimes serve to increase the FI’s exposure to
4The baseline model (no capital controls) replicates the emerging market shift toward
foreign credit markets following a negative foreign interest rate shock, and generates busi-
ness cycle moments that match the data quite well. Upon introduction of each flow specific
capital control, the shift toward foreign credit markets is constrained, resulting in the at-
tenuation of inflows and outflows relative to the baseline.
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foreign assets, facilitating the spill-over of easier foreign credit market con-
ditions to the home credit market. This implies that easier outflow capital
control regimes serve to enhance the business cycle attenuation property of
this flow specific capital control.
A comparison of social welfare dynamics under each capital control shows
that, although both controls are effective at managing capital flows, society
exhibits a strict preference for the outflow capital control over the inflow
capital control. This preference results from the attenuation property asso-
ciated with the outflow capital control, where its introduction improves on
baseline social welfare dynamics. In contrast, shock amplification under the
inflow capital control culminates in social welfare losses relative to the base-
line. Lastly, this analysis indicates that capital controls have agent specific
welfare consequences. An easing of foreign credit market conditions is wel-
fare enhancing for entrepreneurs and welfare reducing for FIs. By removing
their ability to exploit the cheaper cost of foreign credit, the inflow capital
control sees the entrepreneur’s welfare gain become a welfare loss. In con-
trast, the outflow capital control is able to mitigate the welfare loss that FIs
associate with foreign interest rate shocks, leading to an improvement in FI
welfare dynamics under the outflow capital control.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Before commencing with a
description of the model setup, section 3.2 discusses the implications of the
asymmetric modelling strategy, focussing on capital flows, capital controls,
and negative foreign interest rate shocks. The model framework and cali-
bration are presented in sections 3.3 and 3.4. Next, I assess the behaviour
of the baseline model without capital controls in section 3.5. The impact of
flow specific capital controls is analyzed in section 3.6, whilst the welfare
effects associated therewith are investigated in section 3.7. Finally, section
3.8 concludes.
3.2 A primer on capital flows, capital controls,
and foreign interest rate shocks
The asymmetric nature of the model takes the perspective of an emerging
market economy, henceforth termed the home country. As a result of this
perspective, capital inflows are reflected as changes to the foreign liabilities
of the home country, whilst capital outflows affect its stock of foreign assets.
In turn, the difference between the change in capital inflows and the change
in capital outflows gives the change in net flows. Thus, net inflows imply
that capital inflows were larger than capital outflows whilst the opposite
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applies for net outflows.
In the model presented here, home country entrepreneurs incur foreign
liabilities whilst home country FIs accumulate foreign assets. Thus, an in-
crease in inflows is defined as an increase in the home entrepreneur’s for-
eign liabilities, whilst an increase in outflows is defined as an increase in the
home financial intermediary’s foreign assets. Analogously, a decrease in in-
flows is defined as a decrease in the home entrepreneur’s foreign liabilities
whilst a decrease in outflows is defined as a decrease in the home financial
intermediary’s foreign assets.
The home economy’s level of foreign liabilities is dependent on the credit
ceiling of home borrowers in foreign credit markets as determined by their
foreign credit market collateral constraint. In a similar fashion, the level
of foreign assets owned by the home economy is determined by the col-
lateral constraint of foreign economy borrowers. This demand-side ap-
proach to modelling credit access is standard in the literature as it affords
dynamic feedback between credit markets and borrower wealth (see e.g.,
Kiyotaki and Moore, 1997; Bernanke et al., 1999).5 As a result, capital in-
flows are driven by the home economy’s demand for foreign credit whereas
capital outflows are driven by the foreign economy’s demand for credit.
Negative foreign interest rate shocks increase the present value of bor-
rower collateral allocated to foreign credit markets, which leads to higher
demand for foreign credit by both home and foreign borrowers. In turn,
this increase in demand for foreign credit (by home and foreign borrow-
ers) realizes a simultaneous increase in capital inflows and capital outflows.
That is to say, both the foreign liabilities and foreign assets of the home econ-
omy increase following a negative foreign interest rate shock. The increase
in foreign assets is counter-intuitive, as one would expect home economy
accumulation of foreign assets to decline when the return that they offer
decreases (see e.g., Cerutti et al., 2017).
Figures 3.2 and 3.3 provide some empirical backing for the increase in
home economy foreign assets, indicating that emerging market supply of
foreign direct investment to advanced countries is relatively insensitive to
declines in foreign interest rates. Data limitations on bilateral capital flows
restrict my focus to outward foreign direct investment and the 2006-2012
period. Thus, the period covered by figure 3.3 is shorter than that of figure
3.2; however it does span implementation of the quantitative easing pro-
grams of the Federal Reserve (Eichengreen and Gupta, 2015; Feyen et al.,
2015). Similarly, although focusing on outward foreign direct investment
5Since collateral constraints are imposed on borrowers, they operate on the demand-
side of the credit market.
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precludes any insights on whether emerging markets increased their pur-
chases of advanced economy debt securities or equities, it can still serve as a
proxy of emerging market demand for advanced economy assets since such
investments reflect a lasting interest and control in an enterprise resident in
a foreign country (Buckley et al., 2007). Nevertheless, this model character-
istic cautions against the applicability of this analysis across all emerging
markets. Indeed, the empirical evidence indicates that the impact of ad-
vanced economy monetary policy varies greatly across emerging markets
(see e.g., Eichengreen and Mody, 1998; Arora and Cerisola, 2001; Ferrucci,
2003; Ahmed et al., 2017) .















Outward FDI stock in advanced countries
China
Brazil
Figure 3.3: The stock of outward FDI held by emerging markets in developed
economies. See appendix B.2 for source details.
The distinction between capital inflows and outflows in the model af-
fords the introduction of flow specific capital controls by home authorities
that can reduce the increase in net inflows to the home country. Since de-
mand for foreign credit by home borrowers lies at the heart of capital inflow
behaviour, the inflow capital control takes the form of a quantitative restric-
tion on foreign borrowing by these agents (home entrepreneurs). Home
regulators have no authority over foreign borrowers, and so cannot impose
an outflow capital control on foreign borrowers. Instead, the outflow cap-
ital control takes the form of a quantitative restriction on home agent (FI)
purchases of foreign assets.
The impact of these flow specific capital controls on inflows, outflows,
and the business cycle are assessed by comparing the dynamics of a baseline
model where these controls are absent, to one where either the inflow capital
control or the outflow capital control are present. This approach is used to
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indicate whether the capital controls attenuate or amplify the impact of a
negative foreign interest rate shock on capital flows and the business cycle.
I test the sensitivity of these findings to changes in capital control reg-
ulation when either of the two capital controls are present. Here, I distin-
guish between baseline, strict, and easy flow specific capital control regimes.
For both capital controls, strict regimes reduce the economy’s exposure to
foreign credit markets – foreign liabilities in the case of the inflow control,
foreign assets in the case of the outflow control – relative to the baseline
regime, whilst the opposite occurs under the easy regime. This exercise
indicates how changes to each capital control influence its attenuation or
amplification effects on capital flows and the business cycle.
3.3 The model
The world economy is populated by citizens of the home country (H) and
citizens of the foreign country (F). The home country’s citizens consist of
households, entrepreneurs, and FIs. In the foreign country, a comparatively
higher level of financial development precludes the need for explicit finan-
cial intermediation, and so their citizenship is composed of households and
entrepreneurs only. Thus, I liken the home country to an emerging market
economy, and the foreign country to an advanced economy.
As in Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995), trade between countries occurs exclu-
sively through financial markets. I follow the standard approach, assigning
the role of saver to households and that of borrower to entrepreneurs. Home
entrepreneurs have access to the credit markets of both countries whilst for-
eign entrepreneurs make use of the foreign country’s credit market only.
Here, the model’s asymmetrical structure sees that home households pro-
vide FIs with deposits which are used for credit extension. In comparison,
foreign households can extend credit to home entrepreneurs directly. This
asymmetrical model structure allows for an equilibrium spread between
home and foreign interest rates and concurs with previous studies that iden-
tify country specific factors as important determinants of sovereign interest
rate spreads (see e.g., Uribe and Yue, 2006; Bellas and Papaioannou, 2010;
Kennedy and Palerm, 2014).6
Global risk sharing is imperfect in this asymmetric framework because
financial markets are incomplete. Financial market incompleteness results
from the presence of collateral constraints in both economies and a capi-
6The model’s asymmetrical structure sees that foreign entrepreneurs can only access
credit from the home FI; however the results are insensitive to allowing the foreign house-
hold to also extend credit to the foreign entrepreneur.
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tal requirement for home FIs. As noted by Heaton and Lucas (1996) and
Corsetti et al. (2008), when financial markets are incomplete, individuals are
unable to adequately insure against country specific shocks. Thus, financial
frictions in both the home and foreign economy retard the efficient transfer
of resources between countries such that global risk-sharing is imperfect.
The model’s transmission channel comprises the effect that changes in
collateral values have on home entrepreneur credit ceilings. This chan-
nel works through dynamic feedback between credit ceilings and expected
collateral values and is standard in models with collateral constraints à la
Kiyotaki and Moore (1997). Here, home entrepreneur access to two credit
markets requires two collateral constraints whereas restricting foreign en-
trepreneurs to foreign credit markets sees that they are only subject to one
collateral constraint. The specification for the home entrepreneur’s collat-
eral constraints follows Iacoviello and Minetti (2006) and implies that home
FIs face constant average liquidation costs whilst those of foreign house-
holds are increasing in the value of home entrepreneur collateral. This dif-
ference between the liquidation costs faced by home and foreign lenders
implies that the dynamic feedback between home collateral values and in-
flows is less efficient than that between home collateral values and home
loans. As a result, lower foreign interest rates are relatively inefficient in
realizing virtuous feedback with home collateral values.
Departing from this baseline scenario, I assess the implications of flow
specific capital controls that restrict home entrepreneur and FI participation
in foreign credit markets. Here, the framework affords distinction between
an inflow capital control that imparts direct influence over inflows, and an
outflow capital control that directly influences outflows. The flow specific
nature of these two instruments implies that introduction of the inflow cap-
ital control requires an adjustment to the baseline home entrepreneur opti-
mization problem, whilst the outflow capital control requires an adjustment
to the optimization problem of the home FI.
I subject this asymmetric framework to negative foreign interest rate
shocks that serve to realize the shift toward foreign credit markets as de-
picted in figures 3.1 and 3.2. These shocks reduce the relative inefficiency of
the home entrepreneur’s foreign collateral constraint, facilitating the switch
toward foreign credit markets.
This framework is presented in the next section, where I differentiate
between countries by denoting country F’s variables with a star. I first con-
sider a baseline version of the model where no capital controls are present
(sections 3.3.1 – 3.3.4) and then describe the addition of flow specific capital
controls in section 3.3.5. The full set of model equations can be found in
appendix B.1.
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3.3.1 Home households








t ) + j log(H
h
t ) + τ log(1 − Nt)}, (3.1)
where βh gives the home household’s discount factor, whilst τ > 0 and j
> 0 are coefficients that govern the utility generated by leisure (1 − Nt) and
real estate (Hht ). Household consumption is denoted by C
h
t .
The maximization of household utility is restricted by their budget con-





t−1) + Dt = WtNt + R
d
t−1Dt−1. (3.2)
The term qt(Hht − H
h
t−1) captures real estate purchases by the household
where qt denotes the domestic price of real estate. Households make use of
interest income (Rdt−1Dt−1) on their deposits (Dt) as well as labour income
(WtNt) to finance their purchases of real estate.
This setup sees optimal behaviour in labour, real estate, and credit mar-

















gives the home household’s stochastic discount factor.
The first order condition for labour supply (3.4) shows that the optimal
household wage rate is given by the marginal rate of substitution between
consumption and leisure. Equation 3.3 indicates that households require
the present value of utility benefits associated with real estate accumulation
to equate to the utility lost through postponed consumption. Lastly, the first
order condition for deposits sees the interest rate on deposits to equate to
the inverse of the household’s stochastic discount factor.
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3.3.2 Home entrepreneurs























t−1 + WtNt = Yt + Lt + StB
H
t . (3.7)
Lt gives loan finance obtained from home FIs that accrues state-dependent
gross interest of Rlt, whilst B
H
t denotes foreign capital inflows on which
state-dependent gross interest of RHt is paid. The real exchange rate (home
goods in terms of foreign goods) is given by St, and I assume that purchas-
ing power parity holds (i.e. S = 1 at the steady state). Het denotes en-
trepreneurs’ stock of real estate whilst Yt and WtNt denote their real income
and wage bill from production.
Domestic production takes a Cobb-Douglas form, where labour real es-






Here, α denotes the share of entrepreneur real estate in production and 1− α
gives that of household labour.
Entrepreneurs make use of inflows and home loans to finance their use
of the factors of production. If entrepreneurs “walk away” from their debt
burdens, debt holders have to incur information and transaction costs be-
fore being able to sell the pledged collateral. The presence of these costs
reduce debt holders’ expected return should the issuer “walk away”, and
create quantitative credit limits that depend on the expected proceeds of
collateral sales, net of information and transaction costs (Korinek, 2011).
I assume that information asymmetries exist in these markets such that
the collateral liquidation ability of home and foreign lenders differ. Follow-
ing Iacoviello and Minetti (2006), foreign lenders may have a poorer under-
standing of home country bankruptcy practices than home lenders, such
that they need to hire costly legal expertise in order to obtain ownership
of the collateral pledged by home entrepreneurs. Alternatively, Hermalin
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and Rose (1999) argue that the information acquisition technology of for-
eign lenders exhibits decreasing returns to scale. Both cases indicate that the
expected recovery value of foreign lenders will be lower than that of home
lenders. These insights are embedded by making the home lender’s trans-
action and liquidation costs a linear function of pledged collateral whilst
that of foreign lenders is quadratic in nature.7 Formally, this setup sees the






















where one can interpret 0 < µ < 1 as reflecting a loan to value regulatory
parameter whilst 0 < Ωt < 1 is a choice variable that allows the home








giving entrepreneurs’ stochastic discount factor, ΛHt ≡
λHt
Cet




multiplier on constraint 3.10, the first order conditions for labour, real estate,
home loans, and foreign bonds are given by






t + Etµ̃t+1(1 − Ωt)λ
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Where Etµ̃t+1 ≡ 1 −
2(1−µ)
qHe Etqt+1(1 − Ωt)H
e
t gives the marginal productiv-
ity of collateral in foreign bond markets.
The first order condition for labour demand (3.11) shows that labour is
paid its marginal product. Equation 3.12 indicates that entrepreneurs re-
quire the current price of real estate to reflect the discounted utility benefits
7The quadratic specification of the foreign lender’s liquidation costs is similar to the
financial asset transaction costs used by Heaton and Lucas (1996) and Aiyagari and Gertler
(1999).
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that its purchase proffers through relaxing constraints 3.9 and 3.10. Real
estate accumulation also delivers utility benefits from the higher consump-
tion that results from asset price growth and increased production. En-
trepreneurs’ first order conditions for home loans and foreign bonds shows
that they require the interest on their debt to equate to the net utility gains
associated with debt incursion. Utility benefits accrue through the higher
consumption that debt affords whilst utility costs result from a tightening
of entrepreneurs’ collateral constraints 3.9 and 3.10. As per equation 3.15,
optimal collateral allocation requires the multipliers on constraints 3.9 and
3.10 to equate the marginal productivity of collateral in each credit market.
The home entrepreneur’s participation in foreign credit markets is moti-
vated through an interest rate differential between home and foreign credit
markets. In keeping with the empirical evidence contained in section 3.1, I
desire an equilibrium where foreign interest rates are lower than home in-
terest rates. Thus, I require Rl > RH at the steady state. Through equations
















Equation 3.16 is the uncovered interest parity (UIP) condition for home en-
trepreneurs. Absent the entrepreneur’s collateral constraints (i.e. λHt =
λFt = 0), (3.16) reduces to the standard UIP condition where the spread be-
tween interest rates is determined by expected exchange rate dynamics.
Re-arranging (3.16), one can show that Rl > RH in equilibrium will be
optimal from the home entrepreneur’s perspective when he is relatively
more constrained in foreign credit markets:
λF > λH. (3.17)
A pre-condition for (3.17) is that the home entrepreneur’s collateral con-
straints are binding in equilibrium, i.e. λH > 0 and λF > 0, as ensured by










βe < βh. (3.19)
Condition 3.18 is derived using equations 3.25 and 3.26, and requiring that
βeR
H
< 1. In a similar fashion, condition 3.19 results from 3.41 with the
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< 1. When (3.17), (3.18), and (3.19) hold, it will be the
case that the home entrepreneur is both credit constrained in equilibrium
and faces lower borrowing costs in foreign credit markets, i.e. Rl > RH .
Taking (3.15) at the steady state, the equilibrium share of collateral de-







+ 2(1 − µ)− 1
)
. (3.20)
Re-arranging (3.20), it is possible to ensure that the home entrepreneur finds
it optimal to be active in both home and foreign credit markets, i.e. 0 < Ω <











When conditions 3.17, 3.18, 3.19, and 3.21 hold simultaneously, it will
be the case that the model’s equilibrium sees the home entrepreneur ac-
tive in both home and foreign credit markets, 0 < Ω < 1, even though
there is a positive spread between their home and foreign borrowing costs,
Rl > RH . These conditions ensure that the home entrepreneur is borrow-
ing constrained in equilibrium and, even though the interest rate on foreign
bonds is lower than that on home loans, is active in the credit markets of
both countries.
3.3.3 Home financial intermediaries
The FI consumes all of its profits and uses a combination of capital and
home household deposits to extend credit in the home and foreign economy.
Home economy credit extension by the FI consists of issuing loans to the
home entrepreneur, whilst foreign economy credit extension occurs through
purchases of bonds issued by the foreign entrepreneur.









where β f is the FI’s discount factor and C
f
t gives FI consumption. The FI’s
budget constraint is given by
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with BFt giving capital outflows that are remunerated at a state dependent
gross interest rate of RFt . As before, Dt denotes deposits received from
the home household on which the FI pays pre-determined gross interest
of Rdt whilst Lt gives loans issued to the home entrepreneur on which state-
dependent gross interest of Rlt is earned.
A non-trivial role for the FI is ensured by subjecting it to risk-weighted
minimum capital requirements. With BKt = Lt + BFt − Dt giving FI capital,
this requirement can be formally represented as
Dt ≤ (1 − ϑϕH)Lt + (1 − ϑϕF)StB
F
t . (3.24)
In (3.24), 0 < ϑ < 1 gives the minimum capital requirement whilst 0 <
















representing the multiplier on constraint 3.24, optimal behavior by the FI

















t+1 = 1 − κFλ
K
t . (3.27)
Where κH = 1 − ϑϕH whilst κF = 1 − ϑϕF. The first order condition for
deposits shows that the FI requires the present value of interest paid on
deposits to equal the utility gains it proffers. In a similar fashion, FIs require
the interest rate received on home and foreign entrepreneur debt to equal
the utility lost through forgone consumption. Here, equations 3.25, 3.26,
and 3.27 show that minimum capital requirements reduce the utility cost
associated with purchases of entrepreneur debt, and increase the utility cost
associated with deposits.
As per the empirical evidence, the interests rates in home credit markets
should be higher than those in foreign credit markets, i.e. Rl > RF > Rd.8
8A steady state where Rl > RF follows from figure 3.2. Although RF > Rd is not
material to this analysis, it nests the idea that the FI will only be active on foreign credit
markets if it is profitable to do so.
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t+1) = (κF − κH)λ
K
t . (3.30)
In the absence of the FI’s capital requirement (λKt = 0), (3.29) and (3.30)
reduce to the standard UIP condition.
Equations 3.28, 3.29, and 3.30 show that a precondition to Rl > RF > Rd
is that the FI’s capital requirement is binding in equilibrium, i.e. λK > 0.
Taking equation 3.25 at the steady state, a binding capital requirement in
equilibrium is generated by assuming that the FI is less patient than the
home household:
β f < βh. (3.31)
Provided (3.31) holds, it will be the case that Rl > Rd and RF > Rd. Then,
equation 3.30 shows that a positive spread between Rl and RF requires a
higher risk weight on home entrepreneur debt as compared to foreign en-
trepreneur debt:
ϕH > ϕF. (3.32)
Thus, provided conditions 3.31 and 3.32 hold, the model’s equilibrium will
see that Rl > RF > Rd.
3.3.4 The foreign economy
As stated in the model pre-amble, the setup for the foreign economy is
asymmetrical to that of the home economy. Since the focus of this analy-
sis is on the home economy’s (emerging market) dynamics, foreign agent
participation in the model occurs within a simplified structure. I assume
that the foreign household only purchases home entrepreneur debt issued
in foreign credit markets. This assumption implies that all of the debt issued
by the foreign entrepreneur is bought by the home FI.9
9For simplicity, I restrict the foreign entrepreneur’s supply of credit to the home FI.
This assumption is in keeping with a desire to focus on the home economy; however, the
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I embed these assumptions by imposing fewer financial frictions on the
foreign economy. Specifically, the absence of an FI in the foreign economy
precludes the need for a minimum capital requirement as per (3.24), whilst
sole reliance on foreign credit markets by the foreign entrepreneur is cap-
tured through a single collateral constraint. Given that these asymmetries
are motivated as reflective of comparatively higher levels of financial devel-
opment in advanced countries, the model nests an assumption that finan-
cial development is decreasing in the amount of financial frictions (see e.g.,
Mendoza et al., 2009). Apart from these asymmetries, the setup for the for-
eign household and entrepreneur is identical to that of their home economy
counterparts. I present the foreign economy problem (in foreign currency)
below.







t ) + jlog(H
h∗
t ) + τlog(1 − N
∗
t )}, (3.33)


















Ch∗t and βh∗ gives the foreign household’s consumption and discount factor,
whilst Hh∗t and N
∗
t gives their stock of real estate and supply of labour. In
the foreign economy, labour fetches a real wage of W∗t and the price of real
estate is given by q∗t . Equation 3.34 shows that the foreign household’s only
financial asset is given by BHt which earns state-dependent gross interest of
RHt .




























qualitative implications of the results remain when foreign entrepreneurs can also access
credit from the foreign household.
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Where βe∗ gives the foreign entrepreneur’s discount factor, C
e∗
t gives their
consumption, and He∗t is their real estate holdings.
In addition to their budget constraint, the foreign entrepreneur’s maxi-
















with µ∗ denoting the foreign economy’s loan to value parameter.
Under this setup, the foreign household’s first order conditions for labour,











1 = mh∗t EtR
H
t+1, (3.41)
whilst those of the foreign entrepreneur are









































, give foreign agents’
stochastic discount factors whilst Λ∗t ≡
λ∗t
Ce∗t
gives the multiplier on con-
straint 3.38.
As with the home entrepreneur, a binding equilibrium collateral con-
straint in the foreign economy (λ∗ > 0) is ensured by restricting the feasible
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3.3.5 Flow specific capital controls
The focus of this essay lies in capital controls that can be implemented by
home country authorities.10 To meet this requirement, I rely on capital con-
trols that are manifest as quantitative limits on capital flows. This capital
control structure constrains the ability of home agents to manage the com-
position of their balance sheets, with the objective being to minimize the
home economy’s exposure to foreign credit markets. In the case of the out-
flow control, the balance sheet restriction is imposed on the FI, whilst the in-
flow control sees this restriction imposed on the home entrepreneur. Thus,
in the context of this analysis, the outflow capital control is imposed on the
financial sector, whilst the inflow capital control is imposed on the real sec-
tor.
The manifestation of these capital controls as quantitative limits on cap-
ital flows differs from the capital inflow tax approach that is usually de-
ployed in the literature. In this regard, the quantitative nature of the cap-
ital controls assessed here implies that their transmission effect will work
through quantitative financial variables, not interest rates.11
3.3.5.1 Outflow capital control
The outflow capital control (or outflow control) is inspired by Tobin (1978)
and is manifest as a limit on the proportion of foreign entrepreneur debt on
the FI’s balance sheet12:
StB
F
t ≤ ν(Lt + StB
F
t ). (3.46)
Equation 3.46 shows that the outflow control restricts FI holdings of foreign
entrepreneur bonds such that they cannot exceed a fraction, 0 < ν < 1,
of total FI assets. (3.46) can be re-written to show that the outflow control
imposes a linear relationship between the FI’s assets, implying that L and
BF will exhibit similar dynamics when the outflow control binds:
10Sections 3.3.1 – 3.3.4 describe a model setup where no capital controls are present.
Here, I extend this baseline setup such that home agents are subject to both inflow and
outflow capital controls.
11A tax-based approach to capital controls is feasible when authorities seek to curb for-
eign participation on domestic credit markets (see e.g., Jeanne and Korinek, 2010; Bianchi,
2011; Forbes et al., 2016). In this analysis, capital flows are manifest in foreign credit mar-
kets, and so, the use of taxes imposed on foreign agents is not feasible for home authorities.
12Tobin (1978) argued for the use of capital controls that impair the efficient functioning
of the financial sector.
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With this setup for the outflow control, ν → 1 implies easier outflow control
regulatory regimes whilst ν → 0 implies stricter outflow control regulatory
regimes.
When the outflow control is active, optimal behavior by the FI generates
first order conditions for deposits, home loans, and foreign bonds as per:
mFt R
d















t+1 = 1 − κFλ
K








gives the multiplier on constraint 3.46.
Given that (3.31) holds (i.e. λK > 0), I make use of (3.13), (3.15), (3.41),


















Using (3.51), the necessary condition for a binding outflow control in equi-














(3.52) and (3.18), the condition for a binding collateral constraint in the home
economy (λH > 0), are quite similar. A comparison of these two conditions
reveals that their co-existence requires µ̃ > 0 and βh∗ > βe, i.e. the marginal
productivity of the home entrepreneur’s collateral in foreign credit markets
is positive, and the foreign household is more patient than the home en-
trepreneur.
The FI’s first order conditions for loans and foreign bonds, (3.26) and
(3.27), reveal that the outflow control reduces the utility cost of loan exten-
sion to home entrepreneurs and increases the utility cost associated with
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foreign entrepreneur bond purchases. In this way, the outflow control can
serve to subsidize credit extension from the FI to the home entrepreneur.
That is, when λOC > 0, the cost of loan finance to the home entrepreneur is
strictly lower than when there is no outflow control. In contrast, a binding
outflow constraint implies that foreign entrepreneurs face borrowing costs
that are strictly higher than when there is no outflow control in the home
economy.
As a result of the outflow control’s influence over home loan and foreign
bond rates, generating Rl > RF in equilibrium requires a restriction on the
outflow control parameter, ν. Taking (3.49), (3.50), and (3.51) at the steady























Thus, when conditions 3.52 and 3.53 hold, it will be the case that Rl > RF
even though λOC > 0.
3.3.5.2 Inflow capital control
For the inflow capital control (or inflow control), I seek to restrict the home
entrepreneur’s ability to manage the composition of their debt. Thus, the in-
flow control is introduced by removing the home entrepreneur’s ability to
optimize the allocation of collateral between home and foreign credit mar-























where Ω gives the inflow control parameter. With this setup, Ω → 1 implies
stricter inflow capital control regulatory regimes as the home entrepreneur
is forced to allocate more collateral to the home credit market. Conversely,
Ω → 0 implies easier inflow capital control regimes as the home entrepreneur
is able to allocate more collateral to the foreign credit market.
The inability of the home entrepreneur to optimally allocate his collat-
eral between credit markets sees that the inflow control imposes a linear
relationship between his debt limit in home and foreign credit markets.
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Thus, whilst the outflow control imposes a linear relationship between the
FI’s assets, the inflow control imposes this relationship between the home
entrepreneur’s liabilities. At the steady state, this relationship can be ex-
pressed as:
Rl L = µqHe −
µRH BH
1 − (1 − µ)(1 − Ω)
. (3.56)
And so, the entrepreneur’s debt ceiling in the home credit market is de-
creasing in his preference for foreign debt.
The use of Ω as an inflow control implies that the home entrepreneur’s
problem now consists of one fewer choice variable. As a result, optimal
behaviour by the home entrepreneur is given by






t + Etµ̃t+1(1 − Ω)λ
F




























t giving the marginal productivity
of collateral in foreign bond markets.13
3.3.6 Flow specific interest rate shocks
The bulk of the analysis relates to how the capital controls described above
can influence the transmission of foreign interest rate shocks to the home
economy. These shocks are designed to mimic the easy credit conditions
that prevailed in advanced economies following the financial crisis. These
shocks are defined below.
From the home country’s perspective, RFt denotes the gross interest rate
earned on capital outflows whilst RHt gives that paid on capital inflows. This
association between interest rates and capital flows affords the introduction
of flow specific interest rate shocks as per εFt and ε
H
t below:
13Note that apart from the removal of condition 3.15, the introduction of an inflow con-
trol in the form of Ω does not require any other changes to the baseline model structure.
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log(RFt ) = (1 − ρ) log(R
F) + ρ log(RFt−1) + ε
F
t , (3.61)
log(RHt ) = (1 − ρ) log(R
H) + ρ log(RHt−1) + ε
H
t . (3.62)
The specification of (3.61) and (3.62) assumes that each interest rate can be
described as an AR(1) process where ρ = governs the persistence of each
process. εFt ∼ N(0, σ
F) and εHt ∼ N(0, σ
H) give flow specific white noise
interest rate shocks. Letting Σ denote the variance-covariance matrix of the
flow specific interest rate shocks, I incorporate correlated shocks through γ:
Σ =
[
σF γ × σFσH
γ × σHσF σH
]
, (3.63)
where 0 < γ < 1 sees that the flow specific interest rate shocks are positively
correlated.
With this setup, one can view a flow specific interest rate shock as reflect-
ing a foreign monetary policy shock that lowers foreign interest rates such
that both home and foreign entrepreneurs face lower borrowing costs. Here,
positive correlation between εFt and ε
H
t implies that each flow specific inter-
est rate shocks affects both foreign credit markets (BHt and B
F
t ); however,
because 0 < γ < 1 the impact of each shock is stronger on its respective
interest rate. Thus, a shock to εFt sees a response in both R
F and RH , but
the response is stronger in RF than in RH . Conversely, a shock to εHt sees a
stronger response in RH than in RF.
The asymmetric response of RF and RH under each shock implies that
flow specific interest rate shocks are unevenly distributed between the FI
and the home entrepreneur. Both shocks serve to reduce the return on out-
flows and inflows. For the home entrepreneur, this reduction affords higher
levels of consumption, whilst the FI associates each shock with consump-
tion losses. In this regard, 0 < γ < 1 sees that an outflow interest rate shock
is associated with larger consumption losses for the FI than gains for the
home entrepreneur, and as a result, outflow interest rate shocks realize net
consumption losses in the home economy. The opposite applies under in-
flow interest rate shocks, where the gain in home entrepreneur consumption
dominates the loss suffered by the FI such that inflow interest rate shocks
realize net consumption gains in the home economy.
3.3.7 Market clearing and the current account
The quantity of real estate in each economy is normalized to one so that real
estate market clearing is given by
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1 = Hht + H
e
t , (3.64)
1 = Hh∗t + H
e∗
t . (3.65)

















































where YWt = Yt + StY
∗
t . As in Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995) (3.66) sees that, in
the absence of goods trade, any income in excess of home consumption is




















Each country’s current account can be defined as the change in its net















t−1 for i = F, H. This definition for the current account
produces the standard two-country model outcome in that CAt = −StCA∗t .
Defining the current account of each country as per (3.70) and (3.71) im-
plies that net inflows (∆BHt > ∆B
F
t ) are associated with current account
deficits, whilst net outflows (∆BHt < ∆B
F
t ) generate a current account sur-
plus. Current account deficits therefore represent a decline in the net foreign
asset position of the home country whilst the opposite occurs under current
account surpluses.
Similar to Chang et al. (2015), (3.69) and (3.70) see that the home current
account is defined as the sum of its financial trade surplus and net interest
income received from foreign asset holdings, less the net interest paid on its
foreign liabilities:
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Equation 3.72 shows that a balanced current account implies home con-
sumption is matched perfectly by home production and the net income from
financial trade.
3.4 Calibration
The model’s calibration is presented in table 3.1, where the model is cali-
brated for a quarterly frequency. In line with conditions 3.18, 3.19, 3.31, and
3.45, the calibration is consistent with a steady state where minimum capital
requirements and collateral constraints are binding. The parameter values
are also in line with (3.52), such that when it is active, the outflow capital
control binds in equilibrium.
Table 3.1: Calibration of model parameters.
Parameter Symbol Value
Foreign household discount factor βh∗ 0.988
Home household discount factor βh 0.99
Foreign entrepreneur discount factor βe∗ 0.94
Home entrepreneur discount factor βe 0.94
Home FI discount factor β f 0.945
Household utility to leisure τ 2
Household utility to real estate j 0.075
Real estate share in production α 0.05
Home LTV ratio µ 0.8
Foreign LTV ratio µ∗ 0.8
Home FI minimum capital requirement ϑ 0.1
Risk weight on home loans ϕH 1
Risk weight on foreign entrepreneur bonds (outflows) ϕF 0.2
AR parameter for shocks ρ 0.9
Correlation between shocks γ 0.5
The parameters are calibrated so that in the baseline scenario, the steady
state interest rate relationships are given by Rl > RH > RF > Rd. As
per Iacoviello (2015), the calibration for j = 0.075 and α = 0.05 implies
a home real estate wealth to output ratio of approximately 3 at the steady
state, whilst τ = 2 sees households devote a third of their time to labour
activities. The discount factor values are standard in the literature. I cali-
brate βh∗ < βh to generate a spread between entrepreneur borrowing rates
in the foreign economy so that RH > RF. In this regard, setting βh∗ = 0.988
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sees the foreign household require a return of RH = 4.84% per annum
on home entrepreneur bonds in equilibrium whereas the return on foreign
entrepreneur bonds is given by RF = 4.44%. Therefore, in the foreign
credit market, home entrepreneurs pay marginally more than foreign en-
trepreneurs. βh = 0.99 sees home households require a deposit rate of R
d =
4.04% per annum. With the home entrepreneur’s cost of loan finance given
by Rl = 5.96%, the baseline calibration sees a spread of Rl − RH = 1.12% be-
tween home and foreign credit markets. The calibration for ϑ is taken from
BIS (2010) whilst the values for ϕH and ϕF are as per the risk weights on
AAA and BBB rated corporate debt given in BIS (2006). I assume symmet-
rical LTV regulation between the two countries, and in line with IMF (2011)
and Iacoviello and Minetti (2006), set µ = µ∗ = 0.8. Finally, the AR(1) pa-
rameter on the flow specific interest rate shocks is set at 0.9 and I assume
that these shocks are positively correlated with γ = 0.5.
When the outflow capital control is active, I calibrate ν = 0.3 such that
70% of the FI’s balance sheet is devoted to home loans. Similarly, when the
inflow capital control is active, I calibrate Ω = 0.6 such that 60% of home en-
trepreneur collateral is allocated to the home credit market. The calibration
for each of these controls is in line with the home bias observed on emerg-
ing market balance sheets (see e.g., Burger and Warnock, 2006; Hale et al.,
2016) and sees that in the absence of capital controls, foreign credit occupies
a larger portion of both the FI and home entrepreneur’s balance sheets.14
3.5 The baseline model performance
Before commencing with the analysis on the impact of flow specific cap-
ital controls, this section investigates the behaviour of the baseline model
through two simulation exercises. The first exercise comprises an assess-
ment of the business cycle performance of the baseline model whilst the sec-
ond exercise comprises impulse response function analysis following nega-
tive flow specific foreign interest rate shocks.
3.5.1 Business cycle moments
To test the applicability of the framework, I compare the baseline model’s
moments to the data. The model moments are generated following a pos-
itive productivity shock in each country with technological spill-over as in
14That is, without capital controls, the steady state levels of inflows and outflows are
higher.
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Backus et al. (1992).15 Table 3.2 reports the correlation of home output with
consumption, real estate prices, and credit flows. Following the interna-
tional business cycle literature, I also consider the cross-country correlations
of these variables. Here, I make use of emerging market data for the home
economy and advanced market data for the foreign economy.
The data shows that emerging market output is positively correlated
with all of the home variables considered. The positive correlation between
emerging market output (Y) and inflows (BH) concurs with the notion that
the foreign debt dynamics of emerging markets are underpinned by eco-
nomic fundamentals (Forbes and Warnock, 2012; Ahmed and Zlate, 2014).
In terms of cross-country correlations, the data shows a positive correlation
between emerging and advanced market output. This international cycle is
also present in consumption and real estate prices, but not across all credit
flows. In particular, emerging credit markets are negatively correlated with
advanced credit markets. Nevertheless, capital inflows (BH) and outflows
(BF) are positively correlated. Capital inflows and emerging market domes-
tic debt are also positively correlated. Combined with the co-movement of
emerging market output and outflows (BF), and the positive relationship
between capital flows, BF and BH, the data is indicative of an international
credit cycle as described in Rey (2015).










Y, Y∗ 0.30 0.67
C, C∗ 0.19 0.94
q, q∗ 0.20 0.95
L, BH 0.42 -0.84
L, BF -0.23 -0.10
BF, BH 0.49 0.61
15The formal setup for this shock is provided in appendix B.1.7 whilst the data sources
and transformations used are described in appendix B.2.
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The baseline model is generally able to replicate the direction of both
the domestic and international correlations seen in the data; however, it
mostly overestimates the magnitude of the relationships. This amplifica-
tion stems from the relatively simplistic nature of the model setup and is
line with estimates produced by other papers that deploy the canonical
real business cycle framework (Backus et al., 1992; King and Rebelo, 2000;
Kehoe and Perri, 2002). Similarly, the negative correlation between L and
BH is driven by model design. This outcome results from the collateral con-
straints of Iacoviello and Minetti (2006), where optimal collateral allocation
allows the home entrepreneur to exploit differences in the liquidation tech-
nology of home and foreign lenders. Nevertheless, the baseline model’s
ability to match most of the correlations seen in the data implies that it pro-
vides a reasonably sound foundation from which to assess the implications
of flow specific capital controls.
3.5.2 Foreign interest rate shocks in the baseline model
I subject the baseline model to negative foreign interest rate shocks de-
signed to mimic easing conditions in advanced credit markets. Because
these shocks reduce foreign interest rates (RHt and R
F
t ), they serve to increase
the present value of the home and foreign entrepreneur collateral in foreign
credit markets, and by extension their foreign credit ceiling (see equations
3.10 and 3.38). This easing of foreign credit market conditions raises de-
mand for foreign debt by both the home and foreign entrepreneur such that
both inflows and outflows increase following the shock. However, the in-
crease in outflows is insufficient to offset the increase in inflows, and so, the
home economy experiences net inflows such that a home current account
deficit results from the shock.16 The model’s transmission channel com-
prises the effect that changes in collateral values have on home and foreign
entrepreneur credit ceilings, where dynamic feedback between credit ceil-
ings and expected collateral values culminates in shock amplification and
persistence.
The asymmetrical two-country setup implies that the home economy is
subject to two inter-related collateral value channels, whilst there is only
one channel present in the foreign economy. Negative foreign interest rate
shocks serve to reduce the relative inefficiency of the home economy’s for-
eign collateral value channel, resulting in the home entrepreneur’s switch
to foreign debt. Although this behaviour allows the entrepreneur to exploit
16Apart from figure 3.3, this increase in the FI’s holdings of foreign entrepreneur bonds
is consistent with the increase in emerging market purchases of foreign assets as mentioned
by Turner (2013).
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the lower cost of foreign credit, it implies a net increase in foreign interest
owed, and so, the shocks realize a redistribution of income between coun-
tries, such that negative foreign interest rate shocks realize contractionary
effects in the home economy. These effects are coherent with a positive for-
eign money supply shock in Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995) and the positive
foreign wealth shock deployed by Faia (2002). The contractionary effects
on the home economy stem from the increased prominence of foreign credit
markets following the shock. In this regard, the absence of goods trade in
the model circumvents the expenditure switching channel present in Faia
(2002). Instead, the focus on capital flows sees this channel manifested in
















































Figure 3.4: Negative foreign interest rate shocks in the baseline model (εFt and ε
H
t ).
Outflow interest rate shock: solid line. Inflow interest rate shock: dash-dot line.
17The financial shock of Faia (2002) is manifest as an increase to foreign net wealth.
Home output losses result from this shock as home agents exhibit a preference for foreign
goods following the shock.
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Figure 3.4 contains the impulse response functions for a selection of
home variables in response to negative foreign interest rate shocks. Both
shocks are associated with an increased spread between home and foreign
credit markets (Rl − RH and Rl − RF), a current account deficit in the home
economy (CA), an increase in foreign credit extension (BH and BF), and
an eventual contraction in consumption (C). In terms of credit flows, each
shock increases the prominence of foreign capital flows (BH and BF) whilst
the home credit market contracts (L).18 The balance sheet reduction asso-
ciated with this contraction aggravates FI consumption losses, tightening
home credit market conditions further. Together with the relative ineffi-
ciency of the home economy’s foreign collateral value channel, this tighten-
ing of home credit market conditions reduces the entrepreneur’s demand
for real estate, culminating in lower real estate prices (q).
Both the qualitative and the quantitative differences between each shock’s
dynamics can be attributed to their distribution across the entrepreneur and
the FI.19 The FI’s consumption loss is greater under the outflow interest
rate shock, which sees that the initial response of the spread between home
and foreign interest rates differs between inflow and outflow interest rate
shocks. Apart from this difference, the dynamics of an outflow interest rate
shock are qualitatively similar to that of an inflow interest rate shock. Quan-
titatively, inflow interest rate shocks have a smaller impact than outflow in-
terest rate shocks. In this case, the positive initial response of consumption
and real estate prices reflect the net gain in home consumption associated
with an inflow interest rate shock.
3.6 The impact of flow specific capital controls
The transmission of foreign interest rate shocks will differ when capital con-
trols are introduced. For instance, the outflow control introduces linear de-
pendence between the FI’s assets that contrasts with the countercyclical re-
lationship that they exhibit under the baseline model. This change in the re-
lationship between FI assets bears implications for FI consumption, and by
extension, the net consumption cost associated with outflow shocks. Sim-
ilarly, the linear dependence introduced between entrepreneur debt types
18Aggregate home consumption is defined as the sum of home agent consumptions:
C = Ch + Ce + C f . The focus of this essay is on the home economy, and as such, I do not
report the foreign economy dynamics here. Nevertheless, the shocks are expansionary in
the foreign economy, where each shock is associated with an increase in C∗ and q∗.
19See section 3.3.6 for a discussion on the distribution of flow specific interest rate shocks
across the FI and home entrepreneur.
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under the inflow control will influence the net consumption benefit associ-
ated with inflow shocks.20 I subject the model to an outflow interest rate
shock (εFt ) when looking at the impact of the outflow capital control, and to
an inflow interest rate shock (εHt ) when looking at the inflow capital control.
This approach focuses the effects of the shock on the agent most affected by
the capital control.21
3.6.1 Outflow capital controls and outflow interest rate
shocks
Figure 3.5 compares the impulse response functions obtained under the
baseline and outflow control models following a negative outflow interest
rate shock (εFt ). There are clear disparities between the dynamics of the base-
line and those obtained when the outflow capital control is present. In terms
of its influence on capital flows, the outflow control realizes a decline in both
outflows (BF) and inflows (BH), culminating in a quicker return to equilib-
rium for the current account. Shock attenuation under the outflow control
is reflected in the dynamics of home consumption, real estate prices, and
credit quantities. That being said, the current account deficit is larger when
the outflow capital control binds compared to the baseline. This outcome is
to be expected, as the outflow control restricts the home FI’s ability to lean
against the current account deficit associated with the home entrepreneur’s
switch to foreign debt.
The outflow control’s effectiveness in reducing the sensitivity of home
variables results from the linear dependence that it imposes between L and
BF. This relationship implies that home entrepreneur loans and foreign en-
trepreneur bonds will exhibit the same dynamics. Because the control is
imposed on the FI, linear dependence between L and BF does not affect the
home entrepreneur’s tilt toward foreign sources of credit; however, it does
provide a channel through which easier foreign credit market conditions
can spill-over to the home credit market. Absent the outflow control, the
collateral value channels of each country are independent of one another
and move in opposite directions.22 When the outflow control is imposed,
linear dependence between L and BF pits these two forces against one an-
20Equations 3.47 and 3.56 show how the capital controls impose this linear dependence
between credit markets.
21Outflow shocks amplify the consumption losses of the FI whilst inflow shocks do the
same for the home entrepreneur. As illustrated and discussed in section 3.7, the qualitative
insights generated by this analysis are shock invariant.
22This model characteristic is reflected in the decline of home entrepreneur loans and
increase in foreign entrepreneur bonds following the shock.
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Figure 3.5: The impact of the outflow capital control following a negative foreign
interest rate shock (εFt ). Baseline (no capital controls): solid line. Outflow capital
control: dashed line.
other and home loan extension is less adversely affected than under the
baseline. This reduction in the sensitivity of home loans implies that the en-
trepreneur’s preference for foreign debt is attenuated such that inflows are
less sensitive to the shock when the outflow capital control binds.
3.6.2 Model sensitivity to outflow capital control regimes
In aggregate, figure 3.5 illustrates that the outflow control is able to atten-
uate the sensitivity of inflows, outflows, and the business cycle (real econ-
omy variables) to negative foreign interest rate shocks. To check the sen-
sitivity of these attenuation benefits of the outflow control, I compare the
impulse response functions generated under three different outflow capi-
tal control regimes (outflow regimes for short). As per their calibrations in
table 3.3, movement across regimes change the FI’s exposure to outflows.
Under the strict outflow regime, the share of outflows on FI balance sheets
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is lower than that observed under the baseline regime. The opposite holds
true for the easy outflow regime, where outflows occupy a larger share of
FI balance sheets. Thus, relative to the baseline outflow regime, the strict
regime reduces the home economy’s exposure to foreign assets whilst the
easy regime increases the home economy’s exposure to foreign assets.
Table 3.3: Outflow capital control regimes.
Regulatory regime
Parameter Symbol Baseline Strict Easy
Outflow capital control ν 0.3 0.15 0.45
Figure 3.6 plots the impulse response functions obtained under each out-
flow regime. In aggregate, figure 3.6 shows that the attenuation benefits as-
sociated with the outflow control increase as the outflow regime becomes
easier. The easy regime attenuates the behaviour of all credit types relative
to both the strict and baseline regimes. This does not hold for the contem-
poraneous response of outflows, where the shock’s impact is largest under
the easy outflow regime. Because home loans are less sensitive to the shock
under the easy regime, the dynamics of home real estate prices are prefer-
able to those obtained under the strict outflow regime. This outcome results
from the higher marginal value of collateral with home lenders, where re-
duced sensitivity in home loans under the easy outflow regime feeds back
into comparatively higher home real estate prices. In turn, higher real estate
prices reduce the incentive for home entrepreneurs to borrow on foreign
credit markets, implying a smaller increase in BH under the easy regime.
When the strict outflow regime is imposed, the narrative runs in the oppo-
site direction, where the comparatively larger decline in home loans feeds
back into lower home real estate prices and a more pronounced shift toward
foreign credit markets.
The results show that the strict regulatory regime enhances the ability of
the outflow control to attenuate home consumption dynamics. This finding
contrasts with the superior real estate price dynamics under the easy out-
flow regime, and results from the consumption costs associated with neg-
ative outflow interest rate shocks. Recall that these shocks generate con-
sumption gains for the home entrepreneur, but entail consumption losses
for the FI. The easy outflow regime sees outflows occupy a larger share of
FI balance sheets, amplifying this consumption loss. In contrast, the wealth
effect of relatively higher real estate prices under the easy outflow regime
increases both home household and home entrepreneur consumption. Fig-
ure 3.6 shows that this wealth effect is dominated by the consumption loss
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Figure 3.6: Model sensitivity to different outflow control regimes as per table
3.3 following a negative foreign interest rate shock (εFt ). Baseline outflow control
regime: solid line. Strict outflow control regime: dashed line. Easy outflow control
regime: dotted line.
of the FI, and as such, the strict outflow regime is associated with the best
dynamics for home consumption.
The insensitivity of interest rate spreads to changes in the outflow con-
trol regime shows that the outflow capital control’s attenuation properties
are manifest through quantitative financial variables, not interest rates. Thus,
shock attenuation under the outflow capital control is founded upon the
benefits that it proffers for the FI’s balance sheet. Indeed, the fundamental
purpose of the outflow capital control is to reduce the home FI’s balance
sheet exposure to foreign interest rate shocks. This property of the outflow
capital control implies that it reduces the foreign interest rate shock sensi-
tivity of the FI’s balance sheet relative to the baseline model. Since credit
market conditions are pivotal to the model’s dynamics, the comparatively
smaller reduction in the FI’s balance sheet under the outflow control ex-
plains its ability to improve upon baseline dynamics.
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3.6.3 Inflow capital controls and inflow interest rate shocks
Whilst the outflow control identifies the FI’s balance sheet as a means to
dealing with foreign interest rate shocks, the inflow capital control places
focus on the home entrepreneur’s balance sheet. Relative to the baseline
model, the inflow capital control is able to reduce the home entrepreneur’s
exposure to inflows, but in doing so, precludes optimal collateral allocation.
This implies that the home entrepreneur is unable to exploit easier foreign
credit market conditions, constraining virtuous feedback through the home

















































Figure 3.7: The impact of the inflow capital control following a negative foreign
interest rate shock (εHt ). Baseline (no capital controls): solid line. Inflow control
only: dotted line.
Figure 3.7 shows that the inflow capital control amplifies the effect of the
shock relative to the baseline. Now, both types of entrepreneur debt decline
and feed back into contemporaneously lower consumption and real estate
prices. Dynamic feedback through the collateral value channel realizes a
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contraction in home loans that is more severe under the inflow control, lead-
ing to a smaller FI balance sheet and fewer outflows. As before, this balance
sheet reduction amplifies the consumption losses that the FI associates with
the shock. The household and entrepreneur also experience consumption
losses. Here, the wealth reduction associated with lower real estate prices
bears consequences for their consumption streams. Thus, whilst the inflow
interest rate shock is net consumption enhancing in the baseline model, it
realizes a net consumption loss when the inflow control is present.
The dynamics of capital outflows in figure 3.7 show that when the in-
flow control is present, the comparatively larger reduction in the FI’s bal-
ance sheet has an adverse effect on foreign entrepreneur access to credit.
The FI consumption losses associated with this shrunken balance sheet en-
hances the sensitivity of interest rate spreads such that the qualitative char-
acteristics of their dynamics become similar to that of an outflow interest
rate shock in the baseline model.23 Nevertheless, the reduction in outflows
is insufficient to dominate the current account surplus emanating from the
decline in inflows, and as a result, the inflow control sees a large contem-
poraneous current account surplus in the home economy. Thus, the inflow
control is able to initially reverse the income redistribution associated with
the home economy’s position as net international creditor. As reflected by
the increase in shock persistence under the inflow control, this effect is tran-
sitory and introduction of the inflow control merely delays the income re-
distribution associated with the shock.
3.6.4 Model sensitivity to inflow capital control regimes
Figure 3.7 illustrates that the inflow control is effective in curbing both the
home entrepreneur’s shift to foreign credit markets as well as the increase in
the FI’s foreign assets. However, this control over capital flows comes at the
cost of an increase in the sensitivity of the business cycle to negative foreign
interest rate shocks. Thus, whilst the outflow control exhibits shock attenua-
tion properties, the inflow control exhibits shock amplification properties. I
test the sensitivity of these amplification properties to changes in the inflow
capital control regime (inflow regime for short) by comparing the impulse
response functions obtained under baseline, strict, and easy inflow regimes
as defined in table 3.4.
23Recall that under the baseline model, outflow interest rate shocks initially bear net con-
sumption losses whilst inflow interest rate shocks are initially net consumption enhancing.
When the inflow control binds, inflow interest rate shocks bear net consumption losses and
the interest rate dynamics are qualitatively similar to those of the baseline model following
an outflow interest rate shock.
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Table 3.4: Inflow capital control regimes.
Regulatory regime
Parameter Symbol Baseline Strict Easy
Inflow capital control Ω 0.6 0.75 0.45
Figure 3.8 plots the impulse response functions generated under each
inflow regime. The strict regime sees that the share of collateral devoted to
home credit markets is larger than that under the baseline whilst the oppo-
site holds true under the easy regime. Thus, the home entrepreneur’s ex-
posure to the consumption gain associated with inflow shocks is enhanced
















































Figure 3.8: Model sensitivity to changes in the inflow capital control regime as
per table 3.4 following a negative foreign interest rate shock (εHt ). Baseline inflow
control regime: solid line. Strict inflow control regime: dashed line. Easy inflow
control regime: dotted line.
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Although only evident from the dynamics of BH and BF, the strict inflow
regime reduces the impact of the shock across all of the variables plotted in
figure 3.8, barring home loans. Thus, the amplification properties of the
inflow control are reduced as the inflow regime becomes stricter.
The strict regime reduces the role of the foreign collateral constraint, lim-
iting adverse feedback between inflows and real estate prices which attenu-
ates the impact of the shock. The opposite holds true under the easy inflow
regime, where an increased role for the foreign collateral constraint is as-
sociated with enhanced shock amplification relative to the baseline inflow
regime. Here, the easy regime’s relatively better dynamics for home loans is
a product of the larger decline in foreign debt associated with the shock.24
Regardless of the relative amplification of inflow interest rate shocks under
the easy regime, figure 3.8 indicates that all three regimes return to equilib-
rium at a similar pace. Thus, changes to the inflow regime have a temporary
impact. As with the outflow control, the insensitivity of interest rate spreads
to changes in the inflow regime reflects the manifestation of the inflow cap-
ital control as a quantitative limit on inflows.
Taken together, the impulse response function analyses of the outflow
and inflow capital controls are illustrative of the shock absorption proper-
ties of optimal collateral allocation. The model’s dynamics under the inflow
control indicate that when capital controls are manifest as quantitative lim-
its that impair optimal collateral allocation, effective management of capi-
tal flows comes at the cost of shock amplification. In contrast, the outflow
control analysis shows that quantitative limits which reduce the home econ-
omy’s exposure to foreign credit markets without affecting optimal collat-
eral allocation afford both effective capital flow management and shock at-
tenuation. Thus, the outflow control’s attenuation effects are driven by the
fact that it does not directly influence the home entrepreneur’s shift toward
foreign credit markets. Instead, the co-existence of optimal collateral alloca-
tion and the outflow capital control affords virtuous feedback through the
home economy’s foreign collateral value channel, culminating in the out-
flow control’s ability to improve upon the baseline model’s dynamics.
24As shown by equation 3.56, the inflow control sees that declines in BH raise L. Thus,
the attenuation of home loan dynamics under the easy inflow regime are a product of the
comparatively larger decline in BH under this regime.
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3.7 The welfare effects of flow specific capital
controls
Both capital controls restrict the behaviour of home agents relative to the
baseline model. In the case of the outflow capital control, the share of for-
eign assets on the FI’s balance sheet is reduced and their ability to purchase
these instruments is restricted. Alternatively, the inflow capital control pre-
cludes optimal collateral allocation and increases the home entrepreneur’s
dependence on home credit markets. The impulse response analysis con-
ducted above showed that the introduction of these rigidities influence con-
sumption dynamics, and as a result, flow specific capital controls carry con-
sequences for welfare.
Following Rubio and Carrasco-Gallego (2014), I assess the welfare im-
plications of these capital controls by numerically evaluating the welfare
derived under each shock. This approach affords a distinction between the
welfare of the home household (ωht ), entrepreneur (ω
e
t ), and FI (ω
f
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with social welfare given by the weighted sum of individual welfares:
ωt = (1 − βh)ω
h
t + (1 − βe)ω
e
t + (1 − βb)ω
b
t . (3.76)
Here, weighting each agent’s welfare by their respective discount factor en-
sures that the household, entrepreneur, and FI all receive the same level of
utility from a constant consumption stream. These specifications for the
measurement of welfare implies that impulse response function analysis
can be used to illustrate the welfare effects of the capital controls.
3.7.1 Flow specific capital controls and social welfare
The preceding analysis made use of outflow interest rate shocks to assess the
impact of the outflow control and inflow interest rate shocks to assess that
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of the inflow control. Notwithstanding the qualitative similarities between
these shocks (see figure 3.4), it may be beneficial to determine whether the
results are driven by this approach. To address these concerns, I compare
the welfare implications of each control under both shocks, and plot the
social welfare dynamics that result from this exercise in figure 3.9.








Outflow interest rate shock







Inflow interest rate shock
Figure 3.9: The implications of flow specific capital controls for social welfare fol-
lowing a negative foreign interest rate shock (εFt and ε
H
t ). Baseline (no capital con-
trols): solid line. Outflow control only: dashed line. Inflow control only: dotted
line.
Figure 3.9 shows that inflow and outflow interest rate shocks bear qual-
itatively similar consequences for the dynamics of social welfare, but differ
quantitatively. Both shocks realize a reduction in social welfare under the
baseline model. The outflow control unequivocally reduces this welfare loss
whilst the inflow control is associated with a larger contemporaneous wel-
fare loss. For both shocks, the attenuation of social welfare dynamics under
the outflow control is coherent with the analysis in section 3.6.1. Similarly,
the discussion in section 3.6.3 agrees with the amplified response of social
welfare under the inflow control. Therefore, figure 3.9 indicates that the
narratives presented in these sections are not shock dependent.
3.7.2 Flow specific capital controls and agent welfare
This similarity between inflow and outflow shocks is exploited in figure
3.10, where I compare the implications of each capital control for agent
welfare following an outflow interest rate shock.25 In the case of the en-
trepreneur and FI, welfare depends solely on consumption. For the house-
25As in figure 3.9, making use of an inflow shock does not alter the qualitative implica-
tions of these results.
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hold, welfare depends on a composite of consumption, real estate balances,
and leisure time.
The welfare consequences of foreign interest rate shocks are agent de-
pendent. Due to its effect on their wealth, the lower real estate prices that
follow the shock negatively affects the household and entrepreneur’s con-
sumption streams. In the case of the household, the ensuing reduction
in welfare is mitigated through increased leisure time and higher real es-
tate balances.26 For the entrepreneur, a concomitant increase in their for-
eign debt negates the consumption cost associated with this decline in their
wealth. The FI’s consumption depends solely on the size of their balance
sheet and the spread between the interest rates on their assets and liabili-
ties. Foreign interest rate shocks shrink their balance sheet and reduce the
return on their foreign assets. Thus, whilst the household and entrepreneur
are exposed to forces that mitigate their consumption losses, the FI is not.
Together with the baseline dynamics of figure 3.10, this characteristic im-


























Figure 3.10: The implications of flow specific capital controls for agent welfare
following a negative foreign interest rate shock (εFt ). Baseline (no capital controls):
solid line. Outflow control: dashed line. Inflow control: dotted line.
The agent specific welfare dynamics of figure 3.10 illustrate that by pre-
venting optimal collateral allocation, the inflow capital control generates so-
cial welfare losses that are driven by the entrepreneur. In this case, reduced
access to inflows implies that the inflow control carries a consumption cost
for the entrepreneur, and as such, the entrepreneur associates the inflow
26Since the shock is contractionary for the home economy, the demand for labour ser-
vices declines and real estate shifts from the entrepreneur to the household.
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capital control with welfare losses.27 In contrast, shock amplification un-
der the inflow control implies that, from the household’s perspective, the
inflow capital control is associated with welfare gains. These welfare gains
stem from amplification of household leisure and real estate dynamics un-
der the inflow control. The FI’s welfare dynamics are similar between the
baseline model and when the inflow control is present. Here, the quicker re-
covery of FI balance sheets under the inflow control is negated by the larger
initial balance sheet reduction that results from shock attenuation.
The outflow control bears no direct consequences for optimized collat-
eral allocation by the entrepreneur, and affords virtuous spill-over of the for-
eign collateral value channel to the home economy. This property realizes
an improvement on the baseline’s dynamics as illustrated by the smaller
welfare losses of the household and FI in figure 3.10. As with the inflow
control, the home entrepreneur experiences a welfare loss when the outflow
control binds. Therefore, the outflow control’s attenuation of foreign debt
dynamics sees that the wealth reduction associated with the shock domi-
nates the entrepreneur’s consumption dynamics. Because the outflow con-
trol bears no direct influence over collateral allocation, the entrepreneur’s
welfare loss is smaller than that associated with the inflow control, and so
in terms of welfare, each agent strictly prefers the outflow control to the
inflow control.
The preferability of the outflow control is consistent with the existing
literature and, as per the analysis of section 3.6, this preference stems from
the fact that the outflow control does not directly influence optimal collat-
eral allocation. In previous studies, the welfare benefits of capital controls
are predicated on these controls imparting an indirect influence over the
borrowing behaviour that they seeks to address. Since this behaviour is
optimal in the absence of such a control, capital controls that impart a di-
rect effect on borrowing can reduce welfare by more than the gains stem-
ming from a decrease in the external vulnerability of the economy (see e.g.,
Arnott et al., 1994; Korinek, 2011). In contrast, capital controls that bear no
direct consequences for this borrowing behaviour, but still reduce external
vulnerabilities will be welfare enhancing.
Thus, because the outflow capital control is imposed on the financial
sector, and not the real sector, it has an indirect effect on the borrowing be-
haviour exhibited by the real sector (home entrepreneur), and as such, is
associated with improvements to the baseline’s social welfare dynamics.28
27The baseline entrepreneur consumes the increase in foreign debt because of the nega-
tive effect that the shock has on home output.
28Although the outflow control does reduce entrepreneur welfare, figure 3.9 shows that
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In contrast, the inflow capital control’s manifestation in the real sector im-
plies that it directly affects the borrowing behaviour exhibited by the real
sector, culminating in social welfare losses relative to the baseline.
3.8 Conclusion
This essay investigates the effectiveness of flow specific capital controls as a
means to curb the increase in emerging market foreign debt that accompa-
nied the post 2008 low interest rate environment. I contrast the impact of an
outflow capital control imposed on the financial sector to an inflow capital
control imposed on the real sector.
Both controls are shown to be effective at managing capital flows and
can feasibly be implemented by emerging market authorities. The outflow
control analysis shows that, in addition to its influence over capital flows,
the outflow capital control is an effective insulator from negative foreign
interest rate shocks. In contrast, the analysis of the inflow control suggests
that its effectiveness at managing capital flows comes at the cost of shock
amplification.
The findings indicate that the outflow capital control confers social wel-
fare benefits whilst the inflow capital control is associated with social wel-
fare losses. Social welfare gains under the outflow control stem from the
ability of this control to co-exist with optimal collateral allocation. The wel-
fare analysis also shows that each capital control bears different implications
for agent welfare. Taken together, this essay points to the comparative de-
sirability of capital controls imposed on the financial sector as opposed to
the real sector.
Given the focus of this essay on the ability of capital controls to man-
age capital flows, the framework deployed in this analysis abstracted from
nominal rigidities and the ability of monetary policy and foreign reserve
accumulation to address such concerns. I leave the introduction of these
features for future research.
the indirect nature of this influence implies a net welfare gain for the home economy.
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Chapter 4
Macroprudential policy and
foreign interest rate shocks in a
small open economy
This essay presents a generic small open economy real business cycle model
with banking and foreign borrowing. I incorporate capital requirements,
reserve requirements, and loan-to-value (LTV) regulation into this frame-
work, and subject the model to a positive foreign interest rate shock that
raises the country risk premium and reduces the supply of foreign funds.
The results show that these macroprudential instruments can attenuate the
impact of such a shock, and that this attenuation property increases with
the strictness of the regulatory regime. Capital requirements and LTV reg-
ulation deliver the largest attenuation benefits and are shown to be close
substitutes. That being said, capital requirements are shown to be more ef-
fective at leaning against the financial cycle whereas LTV regulation is more
effective at stimulating the financial cycle. The analysis indicates that cap-
ital and reserve requirements can interact such that reserve requirements
are most effective when used to supplement existing capital requirement
or LTV measures. I find that financial and macroeconomic stability objec-
tives are aligned following a positive foreign interest rate shock such that a
macroprudential response to such shocks can be to the benefit of both objec-
tives. Lastly, the study shows that capital requirements and LTV regulation
may exhibit decreasing returns to scale.
86
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4.1 Introduction
This essay presents a generic small open economy framework with loan-
to-value (LTV) regulation, capital requirements, and reserve requirements,
and compares the ability of these instruments to insulate the economy from
a positive shock to the foreign interest rate. My interest in studying a macro-
prudential response to foreign interest rate shocks stems from the tightening
cycle currently underway in the United States and the reliance of emerging
markets on foreign sources of credit.1 Emerging markets’ preference for for-
eign financing comes on the back of extensive quantitative easing and his-
torically low interest rates in developed economies (Ahmed and Zlate, 2014;
Shin, 2014). In this setting, the Federal Reserve’s tightening efforts could in-
crease the country risk premium of emerging markets, reducing their access
to foreign funds (Bellas and Papaioannou, 2010; Dell’Erba et al., 2013). In
turn, restricted access to foreign funds can limit credit, asset price, and out-
put growth in these economies, with accompanied negative consequences
for their domestic macroeconomic environment (Forbes and Warnock, 2012;
Bruno and Shin, 2015; Banerjee et al., 2016).
I assess the impact of LTV, capital, and reserve requirements in isolation
of other central bank tools, focusing on the transmission channels of each in-
strument and their comparative effectiveness in dealing with foreign inter-
est rate shocks. In this chapter’s model, the presence of a Kiyotaki and Moore
(1997) collateral constraint amplifies the effects of positive foreign interest
rate shocks, where macroprudential policy can offer shock attenuation ben-
efits by limiting the feedback between the real and financial sector that re-
sults from this constraint. LTV regulation affects demand for real estate by
limiting the degree to which real estate accumulation relaxes the model’s
collateral constraint, leading to reduced feedback between the real and fi-
nancial sectors. Capital and reserve requirements affect the interest rate
on entrepreneur loans, implying that these instruments proffer attenuation
benefits by reducing demand for credit.
Macroprudential instruments have been shown as adept at addressing
foreign shocks that are transmitted through the financial sector. For in-
stance, Ozkan and Unsal (2014) find that the effectiveness of macropruden-
tial policy is enhanced in the presence of financial shocks and foreign debt.
In contrast, a monetary policy response to such shocks could be subopti-
mal. The cost-benefit framework of Svensson (2016) indicates that the costs
associated with a monetary policy response to financial shocks outweigh
1See Clarida (2015) for a discussion on the challenges faced by the Federal Reserve in
the current tightening cycle.
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the benefits. Glocker and Towbin (2012) and Bailliu et al. (2015) show that
a coordinated monetary-macroprudential response offers few benefits over
a setting where monetary policy and macroprudential policy operate in-
dependently. In Cesa-Bianchi and Rebucci (2017), monetary policy faces a
trade-off between price and financial stability such that the introduction of
a separate macroprudential instrument facilitates the simultaneous pursuit
of both price and financial stability objectives. A capital control response
to foreign interest rate shocks is also possible; however institutional sup-
port for such measures rests on the exhaustion of alternative policy tools
(Fritz and Prates, 2014). Focusing on macroprudential instruments alone
also facilitates the tractability of the analysis.
This essay contributes to the growing macroprudential literature through
its comparison of LTV, capital, and reserve requirements in a small open
economy model. In the existing literature, focus is placed on the interaction
between monetary and macroprudential policy, or on the ability of macro-
prudential instruments to reduce the frequency with which economies find
themselves in states where their financial frictions bind. These studies usu-
ally deploy a single rules-based macroprudential instrument in a closed
economy environment, finding that macroprudential policy can be to the
benefit of monetary policy, and that macroprudential regulation can limit
the occurrence of states where financial frictions bind.2 I take the desir-
ability of macroprudential policy as indicated by this literature as given,
and seek to enhance our understanding of the comparative effectiveness
of different macroprudential instruments. By studying LTV, capital, and
reserve requirements together, this analysis aims to provide insights into
the difference between measures that operate on the supply (capital and re-
serve requirements) and demand (LTV regulation) sides of credit markets
(Lim et al., 2011; Galati and Moessner, 2013).
To compare the effectiveness of these different macroprudential instru-
ments, I distinguish between strict, baseline, and easy regulatory regimes
and analyze the model’s volatility and impulse response functions for each
instrument-regime pair. This ad-hoc approach to studying the effects of
macroprudential policy differs from the optimized rules-based instruments
deployed elsewhere (see e.g., Brzoza-Brzezina et al., 2015). In this case, us-
ing an ad-hoc specification for different macroprudential instruments fa-
2See Glocker and Towbin (2012), Agénor and da Silva (2014), Mendicino and Punzi
(2014), and Rubio and Carrasco-Gallego (2014) for studies on the interaction of macro-
prudential and monetary policy. Benigno et al. (2013), Bianchi and Mendoza (2013), and
Cesa-Bianchi and Rebucci (2017) deploy frameworks with occasionally binding financial
frictions to show that macroprudential policy limits the frequency with which these fric-
tions bind.
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cilitates instrument comparison since the movement between regulatory
regimes entails a standardized change in the calibration of each instrument.
As a result, I can comment on the relative effectiveness of each instrument
in dealing with foreign interest rate shocks, as well as the returns to scale
of each instrument. This approach also affords an assessment of the trade-
offs between financial and macroeconomic stability when macroprudential
regulation is changed..
Although this methodological approach affords a comparison across macro-
prudential instruments and regimes, one could argue that the absence of
monetary policy or capital controls from the model negates the value of this
analysis. Indeed, capital controls and the policy rate are macroprudential
instruments as both proffer a means through which authorities can pursue
financial stability objectives. In the case of the policy rate, theoretical evi-
dence indicates that traditional macroprudential instruments are more ef-
fective when foreign liabilities are sizable, or when the economy is hit with
financial shocks (Glocker and Towbin, 2012; Ozkan and Unsal, 2014).3 On
the empirical front, the evidence indicates that a monetary policy reaction
to financial stability concerns brings few benefits, if any at all (Bailliu et al.,
2015; Aiyar et al., 2016; Svensson, 2016). In the case of capital controls, al-
though support for their deployment has grown, these tools are still seen
as a measure of last resort that should only be deployed once traditional
macroprudential and policy rate measures have been exhausted.4
The results concur with existing evidence in that the deployment of macro-
prudential instruments can help to attenuate the negative consequences of
foreign interest rate shocks. Capital requirements and LTV regulation of-
fer large attenuation benefits that are of a similar magnitude. Reserve re-
quirements also offer attenuation benefits, but these are small and diminish
quickly. An assessment of the transmission channels of each instrument
reveals that the smaller attenuation benefits of reserve requirements stem
from their interaction with capital requirements. Thus, analyses that study
reserve requirements in isolation of capital requirements may overstate the
impact of this instrument as they do not account for this interaction (see e.g.,
Glocker and Towbin, 2012; Agénor and da Silva, 2014)
I also find that, following a positive foreign interest rate shock, macroe-
conomic and financial stability concerns become aligned such that macro-
3The model presented here bears both of these features – the banker has foreign loans
and I subject the model to a foreign interest rate shock that increases the country risk pre-
mium.
4Fritz and Prates (2014) provide an excellent review of the institutional debate on the
use of capital controls.
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prudential policy is able to address both simultaneously.5 This result con-
curs with Angelini et al. (2014) where the authors find that, in the face of fi-
nancial shocks, capital requirements proffer significant macroeconomic sta-
bilization gains. Furthermore, my findings indicate that asymmetries exist
between both macroprudential instruments and regimes. Specifically, strict
macroprudential regulatory regimes reduce the impact of foreign interest
rate shocks relative to easy regulatory regimes, and the impact of LTV and
capital requirements diminishes as the regulatory regime becomes stricter.
In contrast, the quantitative impact of reserve requirements does not change
across regulatory regimes.
Taken together, the analysis indicates that LTV and capital requirements
are effective in dealing with foreign interest rate shocks where the mag-
nitude of their effects are quite similar. Thus, changes to LTV regulation
can easily be substituted by changes to capital requirements. Nevertheless,
the results indicate that choosing between between macroprudential instru-
ments depends on the objectives of the regulator. Specifically, capital re-
quirements are shown to be more effective at leaning against the financial
cycle whereas LTV regulation is more effective at stimulating the financial
cycle. In the case of reserve requirements, the smaller attenuation benefits
associated with this instrument points to its effectiveness as a supplement
to existing capital requirement or LTV measures.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 4.2 presents the
model framework, with its calibration provided in section 4.3. The analysis
on the ability of macroprudential instruments to deal with foreign interest
rate shocks is contained in section 4.4. Lastly, section 4.5 concludes.
4.2 The model
The generic small open economy is populated by households, entrepreneurs,
bankers, and exogenous foreign lenders. Households consume, accumulate
real estate, and supply labor to entrepreneurs. Households are the savers
in this economy, providing bankers with one-period interest bearing de-
posits. Entrepreneurs take on the role of borrowers in this economy. They
combine their real estate holdings with household labor to produce out-
put, where the use of real estate in production affords use of the real estate
5The coincidence of macroeconomic and financial stability objectives in the face of
foreign interest rate shocks concurs with the empirical evidence of Claessens et al. (2012),
Antonakakis et al. (2015), and Dees (2016) in that stronger links between the financial and
business cycle during times of distress provides scope for welfare improvements through
macroprudential regulation.
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price and credit as measures of financial stability (see e.g.„ Angelini et al.,
2014). To finance their demand for the factors of production, entrepreneurs
incur one-period interest bearing loans with bankers, subject to a collateral
constraint. Bankers intermediate the flow of credit between savers and bor-
rowers. In addition to the funds provided by households, bankers finance
entrepreneurial loan extension through funds provided by foreign lenders.
I subject this model economy to a positive world interest rate shock de-
signed to mimic a change in the stance of foreign monetary policy. This
shock increases the country risk premium and bankers’ external financ-
ing costs, restricting credit extension to entrepreneurs. In turn, the en-
trepreneur’s collateral constraint affords dynamic feedback between inter-
est rates, credit quantities, and asset prices such that positive world interest
rate shocks see a large and persistent decline in credit, asset prices, and out-
put.
This framework incorporates LTV, capital, and reserve requirements to
insulate the economy from such shocks. LTV regulation is imposed on the
demand side of the credit market (entrepreneurs), whilst capital and re-
serve requirements are imposed on the supply side of the credit market
(bankers). Each macroprudential instrument has a different transmission
channel, where this analysis comprises a comparison of their effectiveness
in dealing with the shock. In this regard, I study the effects of a standardized
discretionary change in the calibration of each instrument on the impulse
response functions and steady state standard deviations of the economy. I
present the model economy that incorporates these three instruments be-
low.
4.2.1 Households








log(Cht ) + j log(H
h
t ) + τ log(1 − Nt)
}
, (4.1)
subject to the following budget constraint




t−1) + Tt = R
d
t−1Dt−1 + WtNt. (4.2)
In the household’s utility function, the discount factor is given by βh,
whilst j and τ are utility parameters related real estate holdings (Hht ) and
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leisure (1 − Nt). Cht and Nt give household consumption and labour supply,
respectively. qt denotes the price of real estate in units of consumption and
Wt gives the wage rate. Dt denotes one-period bank deposits which earn









the household’s stochastic discount factor, the first
order conditions for deposits (Dt), real estate (H
h
t ), and labour (Nt) are as
follows:











Condition 4.3 provides the behavioural rule for the benchmark domestic
interest rate in the economy. It requires Rdt to be such that the current pe-
riod utility cost of deposits equates to the returns in the following period.
The asset pricing equation (4.4) equates the value of real estate to its direct
utility benefits in units of consumption plus the discounted utility benefit it
offers in the next period through its influence on household wealth. Lastly,
equation 4.5 sees the optimal wage rate equalling the marginal rate of sub-
stitution between consumption and leisure.
4.2.2 Entrepreneurs
Entrepreneurs allocate their available resources between real estate, loans








t )} , (4.6)
where βe is the entrepreneurial discount factor and C
e
t gives entrepreneurial







tLt−1+WtNt = Yt + Lt. (4.7)
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The left hand side of equation 4.7 represents entrepreneurs’ total expendi-
ture, which consists of consumption (Cet ), purchases of real estate (qt(H
e
t −
Het−1)), gross repayments on loans from the previous period (R
l
tLt−1), and
the wage bill (WtNt). As per the right hand side of (4.7), these expenditures
are financed with total income (Yt) and new loans incurred with domestic
bankers (Lt).
Here I introduce the first macroprudential instrument – the LTV ratio. I
assume that entrepreneurs’ borrowing capacity is limited to a fraction νe of






Following Iacoviello (2005), the entrepreneur’s production technology
has a Cobb-Douglas functional form with input shares of α for real estate






With this specification for the production function, the entrepreneur’s real











denote entrepreneurs’ stochastic dis-
count factor and the multiplier on (4.8) respectively, optimal entrepreneurial





















Condition 4.10 relates the current period marginal cost of real estate ac-
cumulation to the sum of its discounted marginal product and the utility
benefits that it proffers through a relaxation of the entrepreneur’s collat-
eral constraint (equation 4.8). Equation 4.11 is the asset pricing equation for
domestic borrowing . Lastly, (4.12) sees that labor gets paid its marginal
product.
To ensure that entrepreneurs are borrowing constrained in equilibrium
(i.e. λe > 0), requires a restriction on the feasible value of their discount
factor. Formally, so long as
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βe <
βb
1 − (1 − ϑ)λc
, (4.13)
it will be the case that λe > 0.6 This implies that entrepreneurs are relatively
more impatient than households and ensures that entrepreneur wealth is
insufficient to finance production in equilibrium (see, Iacoviello, 2005).
4.2.3 Bankers
Bankers are consumption maximizers, making use of household deposits
and foreign funds to extend loans to entrepreneurs. In their loan extension,
bankers are subject to capital and reserve requirements. The representative










where Cbt and βb denote their consumption and discount factor, respectively.
The banker’s budget constraint is given by










tLt−1 + ζt−1. (4.15)
In (4.15) above, Lt denotes current period loan extension to entrepreneurs
which accrues gross interest of Rlt+1, repayable in the next period. Similarly,
bankers pay gross interest of Rdt and R
f
t on household deposits (Dt) and for-
eign funds (B
f
t ). Lastly, ζt denotes one-period interest free required reserves.
Bankers are subject to capital requirements on their net-assets excluding
required reserves. Letting BKt = Lt + ζt − Dt − B
f
t denote bank capital, the
capital requirement is given by
Dt + B
f
t ≤ (1 − ϑ)Lt + ζt, (4.16)
where ϑ determines the proportion of bank assets that must be backed by
bank capital.
6 To derive this result, substitute the steady state of (4.11) into the steady state of (4.20)
for Rl , and require that λe > 0.
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Following Agénor et al. (2014), bankers are required to hold a fraction of
their domestic liabilities as reserves. Reserve requirements are governed by
condition 4.17:
ζt ≥ ϕDt, (4.17)








banker’s stochastic discount factor, the banker’s problem produces the first
order conditions for deposits (Dt), foreign borrowing (B
f
t ), loan extension to
















t+1 = 1 − (1 − ϑ)λ
c
t , (4.20)





Equations 4.18 and 4.21 show that reserve requirements decrease both
current period benefits and discounted future period costs associated with
raising deposits from households. Bankers’ behavioural rule for loan exten-
sion (4.20) shows that current period costs are reduced as a result of utility
benefits that loan extension provides through relaxing the capital require-
ment constraint. In contrast, (4.18) and (4.19) show that the capital require-
ment constraint reduces utility benefits from deposits and foreign funds.
The first order conditions also show that tight capital requirements increase
current period benefits, whilst higher reserve requirements reduce current
period benefits.
Through (4.18), (4.19), and (4.20) the evolution of the spreads between





















t ) = ϑλ
c
t . (4.24)
7The multipliers on constraint (4.16) is denoted as Λct ≡
λct
Cbt
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Equation 4.22 shows that the spread between the returns on foreign funds
and deposits is increasing in the tightness of their proximity to the mini-
mum level of required reserves, whilst (4.23) shows that bankers pass the
cost of capital and reserve requirements on to entrepreneurs. Equation 4.24
indicates that the spread between lending and foreign fund rates is increas-
ing in the tightness of the capital requirement constraint (4.16).
To ensure that bankers make profits on their loans regardless of the source
of their funding requires a binding capital requirement in equilibrium (i.e.
λc > 0). When λc > 0, loan extension requires that bankers forgo consump-
tion such that the interest rate on entrepreneur loans is a premium over that
of their funding sources8. Taking the steady state of (4.3), (4.18), and (4.21),





If condition 4.25 holds, it will be the case that Rl > R f and Rl > Rd.
Equation 4.22 shows how reserve requirements exert an asymmetrical
influence on the funding markets of bankers – in equilibrium, R f > Rd so
long as λr > 0 and ϕ > 0. Taking the steady state of (4.3), (4.21), and
(4.22), we have λr > 0 so long as βh < 1. Thus, an equilibrium where
R f > Rd will result when reserve requirements are present (ϕ > 0) and
binding (λr > 0). In equilibrium, household deposits are insufficient to
meet bankers’ demand for funding. Bankers, therefore, need to incur debts
with foreign lenders (i.e., B f > 0) at an interest rate that is higher than
that on deposits (i.e., R f > Rd). This implies that Dt and B
f
t are imperfect
substitutes, creating a non-trivial role for foreign lenders in the banker’s
problem which facilitates a spread between the cost of domestic and foreign
banker funding sources.
Together, these restrictions on household and banker discount factors
and the presence of reserve requirements generate an equilibrium in which
bankers generate profits from lending regardless of the source of their fund-
ing, and that the cost of domestic funds is lower than that of foreign funds.
This equilibrium relationship between interest rates can be summarized as:
Rl > R f > Rd. (4.26)
8A binding capital requirement in equilibrium implies that, in equilibrium, banker cap-
ital is positive, and so, loan extension is partly financed out of forgone banker consumption.
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4.2.4 Foreign lenders
Risk-neutral foreign lenders can allocate their funds between debt issued
either by the rest of the world or by the small open economy’s domestic
bankers. Debt issued by the rest of the world pays interest of Rwt , whilst that
issued by domestic bankers pays R
f
t . I assume the existence of information
asymmetries such that foreign lenders face additional monitoring costs in
extending funds to domestic bankers as compared to the rest of the world.
These monitoring costs result in a fraction δt of the repayment being lost
where loans to domestic bankers are concerned. Thus, for foreign lenders to
be indifferent between lending to domestic bankers or the rest of the world,
a country risk premium is required over the interest paid on debt issued by
the rest of the world.
Formally, foreign lenders will require that the interest rate they receive
on domestic banker borrowing be such that, after paying monitoring costs,
it equates to the world interest rate:
Rwt = (1 − δt)R
f
t . (4.27)




this risk premium is increasing in the size of monitoring costs. Following
Minetti and Peng (2013), the country risk premium is positively related to
the external debt to output ratio and the world interest rate. Letting vari-
ables without a t subscript denote steady state values, the behavioural rule













Where κ = R
f
Rw . The parameters γ f and γw capture the degree to which the
country risk premium reacts to changes in the external debt to output ratio
and the world interest rate.







where ρw is the autocorrelation coefficient and ε
w
t is a white-noise shock to
the world interest rate with a standard deviation of σw.
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Substituting (4.28) into (4.27) and taking logs generates the rule govern-
ing the supply of foreign funds:
γ f log(B
f
t ) = log(R
f
t ) + γ f log(Yt) + γ f log(
B f
Y
)− (1 + γw) log(R
w
t )− log κ.
(4.30)
(4.30) shows the supply of foreign funds is positively related to the interest
rate received thereon (R
f
t ) and domestic fundamentals (Yt), and negatively
related to the world interest rate. Thus, positive shocks to the world interest
rate serve to reduce the supply of foreign funds.
4.2.5 Macroprudential regimes and social welfare
To assess the welfare costs associated with each macroprudential instru-
ment, I follow Rubio and Carrasco-Gallego (2014) and numerically evaluate
social welfare derived in each case. With household (ωht ), entrepreneur (ω
e
t ),







log(Cht ) + j log(H
h



















social welfare can be defined as the weighted sum of individual welfares:
ωt = (1 − βh)ω
h
t + (1 − βe)ω
e
t + (1 − βb)ω
b
t . (4.34)
Weighting each agent’s welfare by their respective discount factors ensures
that all groups receive the same level of utility from a constant consumption
stream.
4.2.6 Market Clearing
Market clearing is given by the following conditions:
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Tt = ζt − ζt−1. (4.37)
Equation 4.35 is a simple normalization for housing as in Angelini et al.
(2014) whilst equation 4.36 is the aggregate resource constraint. To close the
model, (4.37) shows I assume that changes in reserves are financed entirely
out of lump-sum taxes (or subsidies). Since there is no trade in this model,







Table 4.1 contains the model parameters for the generic small open econ-
omy. The values for βh = 0.985, βb = 0.945, and βe = 0.94 are stan-
dard and ensure that both the banker’s capital requirement and the en-
trepreneur’s collateral constraint are binding. As in the small open economy
of Minetti and Peng (2013), j = 0.3 sees that households and entrepreneurs
split the total stock of real estate equally in the steady state. Setting τ = 2
as per Iacoviello (2015) sees households devote roughly a third of their
time to labour. I follow Iacoviello (2005), Aguiar and Gopinath (2007), and
Minetti and Peng (2013) in calibrating α = 0.4, which corresponds to labour’s
share in output being 0.6.
The baseline calibrations for each macroprudential instrument are as fol-
lows. Minimum capital requirements for bankers are set at 10%, which is in
line with the minimum total capital plus conservation buffer as per Basel III
(BIS, 2010). The reserve requirements ratio ϕ = 0.1 is as per Agénor et al.
(2014). For LTV regulation, we calibrate νe = 0.75, in line with the cross
country evidence presented in IMF (2011).
I calibrate the parameters relating to the country risk premium, (4.28),
with reference to empirical evidence on the determinants of emerging mar-
ket sovereign spreads. This literature indicates a high degree of hetero-
geneity between emerging markets in their experience of foreign interest
rate shocks; however, in general the findings indicate that γw > 0 and
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Table 4.1: Calibration of model parameters.
Parameter Symbol Value
Household discount factor βh 0.985
Entrepreneur discount factor βe 0.94
Banker discount factor βb 0.945
Household real estate preference j 0.3
Household labour supply parameter τ 2
Real estate share in production α 0.4
Loan-to-value ratio for entrepreneurs νe 0.75
Capital to assets ratio ϑ 0.1
Reserve requirement ϕ 0.1
Country risk premium sensitivity to
Rwt
γw 0.85






AR(1) coefficient on Rwt ρw 0.85
Standard deviation of εwt σw 0.01
γ f > 0.
9 I calibrate γw = 0.85 to match Minetti & Peng’s 2013 estimates
for a variant of (4.28). This value also concurs with the empirical analysis of
Eichengreen and Mody (1998) as well as that of Arora and Cerisola (2001).
In the case of the sensitivity of the country risk premium to external debt
levels, I set γ f = 0.05 to ensure that positive shocks to the world interest
rate increases the country risk premium. This calibration is in line with the
estimates of Bellas and Papaioannou (2010) and Dell’Erba et al. (2013) where
these authors estimate that a 1 p.p. increase in the external debt-to-GDP ra-
tio of emerging markets is associated with a 0.03–0.05 p.p. increase in their
country spread. It is worth noting that although changes to the calibration
of γw and γ f affect the results quantitatively, they bear no influence qual-
itatively. In evidence, figure C.1 plots the impact of a foreign interest rate
shock across alternative calibrations for γ f and γw.
10 Finally, I calibrate the
AR(1) parameter on the world interest rate shock as ρw = 0.85 with a stan-
9See Eichengreen and Mody (1998), Arora and Cerisola (2001), Ferrucci (2003), and
Ahmed et al. (2017) for evidence on the highly heterogeneous experience that emerging
markets have with foreign interest rate shocks.
10Uribe and Yue (2006) find that, in small open economy models, the optimal parameter
values that govern external debt accumulation depend on the model structure. In simpli-
fied settings such as that presented here, the values needed to match the impulse response
functions generated by a VAR can be quite large. For instance, in the absence of capital ad-
justment costs, Uribe and Yue (2006) find that γ f = 0.95 is needed to minimize the distance
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dard deviation of σw = 0.01.
4.3.1 Comparing the effectiveness of macroprudential
instruments
To analyse and compare the effectiveness of the macroprudential instru-
ments in our model, I deploy each instrument across a variety of regula-
tory calibrations as per table 4.2. I contrast the baseline macroprudential
calibration to both strict and easy regulatory regimes. Strict macropruden-
tial regimes are defined by higher capital or reserve requirements (relative
to the baseline) or lower LTV requirements (relative to the baseline). The
converse holds under an easy macroprudential regime, where capital and
reserve requirements are lower, and LTV requirements are higher than the
baseline calibration.
Table 4.2: Calibration of alternative macroprudential regimes.
Parameter Symbol Baseline Strict Easy
Loan-to-value ratio νe 0.75 0.7 0.8
Capital to assets ratio ϑ 0.1 0.15 0.05
Reserve requirement ϕ 0.1 0.15 0.05
Table 4.2’s ad-hoc specification of the different macroprudential regimes
is consistent with a setup where the financial frictions always bind and a de-
sire to conduct a comparison of different macroprudential instruments. Pre-
vious studies have made use of rules-based macroprudential instruments
and optimized policy parameters to study the effectiveness of these instru-
ments in limiting the frequency with which financial frictions bind, or to
assess the merits of including a financial stability objective to monetary pol-
icy.11 Since the entirety of this analysis occurs in a state where the financial
frictions bind, modelling the macroprudential instruments as endogenous
rules that reduce the frequency of such states is of little interest. Similarly,
my interest in comparing different macroprudential instruments to one an-
other negates the benefits of calculating optimal values for νe, ϑ, and ϕ.
In this regard, calculating optimal policy parameters would only affect the
between their model and a VAR’s impulse response functions.
11Bianchi and Mendoza (2013), Akinci and Queralto (2014), and
Cesa-Bianchi and Rebucci (2017) study the ability of macroprudential policy to limit
the frequency with which financial frictions bind. Mendicino and Punzi (2014),
Rubio and Carrasco-Gallego (2014), and Bailliu et al. (2015) study optimal macropru-
dential and monetary policy.
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
CHAPTER 4. MACROPRUDENTIAL POLICY AND FOREIGN INTEREST RATE
SHOCKS IN A SMALL OPEN ECONOMY 102
baseline level of the model’s macroprudential calibration with no effect on
the ad-hoc nature of the analysis. Nevertheless, the baseline calibration for
each macroprudential instrument is in line with that advocated by interna-
tional regulatory bodies (BIS, 2010; Lim et al., 2011).
With the macroprudential calibration as per table 4.2, switching between
regimes entails a standardized 5 percentage point (p.p.) increase or decrease
relative to the baseline. I exploit the standardized nature of these changes
in regulation to compare the effects of LTV, capital, and reserve require-
ments to one another. For instance, if Xsi is a vector containing the dynamics
of variable X obtained under the strict regime of instrument i, instrument











Where vector Xei contains variable X’s dynamics under the easy regime of
instrument i. If both equations 4.39 and 4.40 hold, the analysis indicates that
a 5 p.p. change in capital requirements has the same effect on X as a 5 p.p.
change in LTV or reserve requirements.
The ad-hoc specification also afford an assessment of the returns to scale
associated with each instrument. For an instrument to exhibit constant re-
turns to scale, the quantitative impact of moving from the baseline to the
strict regime must be the same as moving from the baseline to the easy
regime, but of the opposite sign. For example, LTV regulation will exhibit







where vector XBaseline contains variable X’s dynamics under the baseline
regime. Alternatively, decreasing returns to scale imply that the impact of
macroprudential instruments decline as the regulatory regime moves from
an easy to a strict calibration. In this case, the impact of moving from the
easy to baseline regime would be greater than the impact of moving from
the baseline to the strict regime.
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4.4 A macroprudential response to foreign
interest rate shocks
Positive foreign interest rate shocks increase the country risk premium as
per equation 4.28, and reduce the supply of foreign financing. This increase
in banker funding costs realizes higher domestic borrowing costs which
impacts negatively on entrepreneur credit ceilings through their collateral
constraint. In turn, lower credit extension to entrepreneurs tightens the
banker’s capital and reserve requirements, realizing additional increases in
domestic borrowing costs and further declines in the banker’s access to for-
eign funds. These dynamics culminate in a downward spiral in asset prices
and credit extension, which see positive foreign interest rate shocks impart
a persistent negative effect on both the financial sector and real economy.12
Macroprudential regulation can mitigate the negative effects of foreign
interest rate shocks by limiting the vicious feedback that the shock induces
between asset prices and credit extension. To illustrate this shock attenu-
ation property, I discuss the different transmission channels of each of our
macroprudential instruments and plot the impulse response functions ob-
tained under each instrument and regime. Next, I assess whether there is a
trade-off between financial stability and macroeconomic stability in the de-
ployment of each instrument following a positive foreign interest rate shock
and elaborate on these findings by comparing the effectiveness and returns
to scale of each macroprudential instrument. Taken together, this analysis
identifies which instrument(s) are best suited to respond to the negative ef-
fects of positive foreign interest rate shocks.
4.4.1 LTV regulation
The dynamic interaction between credit ceilings and asset prices afforded
by constraint 4.8 underpins the magnitude and persistence of the negative
effects associated with foreign interest rate shocks. This interaction between
the real and financial sector is governed by the entrepreneur’s first order












In (4.42) the marginal value of credit to the entrepreneur, λet , provides the
link between credit markets and the behaviour of asset prices. Thus, in or-
12The dynamics of the baseline model are in line with those in the small open economy
literature (e.g., Neumeyer and Perri, 2005; Minetti and Peng, 2013).
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der to mitigate the negative effects of foreign interest rate shocks, regulation
should either reduce the interaction between credit and real estate markets,
or reduce the marginal value of credit to the entrepreneur.
Changes to LTV regulation (νe) can affect the downward spiral in loans
and asset prices through the influence that this instrument has on the inter-
action between credit and real estate markets (λet and qt). To illustrate, figure
4.1 compares the impulse response functions (IRFs) for select variables un-
der the strict, baseline, and easy LTV regimes as per table 4.2. In the baseline
regime, a positive foreign interest rate shock causes an increase in interest
rate spreads, a reduction in entrepreneurial loans and foreign funds, as well



















































Figure 4.1: Impulse response functions following a positive shock to Rwt for different LTV
regimes as per table 4.2. Solid line: baseline calibration; Dashed line: strict LTV regime;
Dotted line: easy LTV regime.
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As per (4.42), a strict LTV regime reduces the feedback between credit
and asset markets such that the effects of foreign interest rate shocks are at-
tenuated under a strict (as opposed to baseline) regime. Shock attenuation
under the strict regime results from lower entrepreneur demand for real
estate. When the strict LTV regime is imposed, an additional unit of real es-
tate affords access to less loan credit, and since the entrepreneur’s marginal
value of credit (λet ) is unaffected by LTV regulation, this translates into a de-
mand for real estate that is both lower and less sensitive to foreign interest
rate shocks than under the baseline. Under an easy regime, the opposite
occurs, where (4.42) serves to enhance entrepreneur demand for real estate
and the feedback between credit and asset markets relative to the baseline.
This holds across all variables: the strict LTV regime attenuates the impact
of foreign interest rate shocks relative to the baseline whilst the easy regime
sees that their impact is amplified relative to the baseline.
4.4.2 Capital requirements
Whilst LTV regulation proffers attenuation benefits by reducing the entrepreneur’s
demand for real estate, capital requirements can influence (4.42) by target-
ing the entrepreneur’s demand for credit. The banker’s first order condi-
tion for loans shows that the capital requirement (ϑ) can affect the marginal
value of credit to the entrepreneur, λet =
1
Rlt+1
− met , through its influence
over the interest rate on entrepreneur loans14:
mbt EtR
l
t+1 = 1 − (1 − ϑ)λ
c
t . (4.43)
Where λct gives the marginal value of liquidity to bankers.
The stricter the capital requirement, the larger the fraction of loans that
need to be financed with capital, and because raising capital entails a con-
sumption cost for bankers, higher capital requirements increases the interest
rate that bankers charge to entrepreneurs.15 Through (4.11), higher interest
rates reduce the marginal value of credit to entrepreneurs. This lowers their
demand for credit and reduces feedback between credit and asset markets
as per (4.42). Figure 4.2 confirms this narrative and shows that the strict
capital regime reduces the impact of foreign interest rate shocks on real and




− met is derived from the entrepreneur’s first order condition for loans,
(4.11).
15Bank capital is generated out of banker’s consumption.
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
CHAPTER 4. MACROPRUDENTIAL POLICY AND FOREIGN INTEREST RATE
SHOCKS IN A SMALL OPEN ECONOMY 106
easy regime is imposed, and so the dynamics of these variables are ampli-
fied relative to the baseline.
A comparison across figures 4.1 and 4.2 shows that although strict LTV
regulation and capital requirements exhibit similar shock attenuation prop-
erties for the quantitative macroeconomic variables of the model, these two
instruments have different effects on interest rate spreads. This disparity
illustrates the different transmission channels of LTV and capital require-
ments. Specifically, where changes in LTV regulation are initially transmit-
ted through real estate markets, changes in capital requirements are initially
transmitted through interest rates. This difference between the transmission
channels of LTV and capital requirements is illustrated by the differential



















































Figure 4.2: Impulse response functions following a positive shock to Rwt for different cap-
ital requirement regimes as per table 4.2. Solid line: baseline calibration; Dashed line: strict
capital requirement regime; Dotted line: easy capital requirement regime.
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Using the relationship between interest rate spreads as given by equa-
tions 4.22 to 4.24, we can decompose the impact of capital requirements on
interest rate spreads into two parts. The first part reflects the impact of cap-
ital requirements on the feedback between asset and credit markets in (4.42)
through its influence over the marginal value of credit to the entrepreneur
and is illustrated by R f − Rd. The second part reflects the influence that
capital requirements have on the sensitivity of the banker’s consumption
stream and is illustrated by Rl − R f . In turn, the dynamics of Rl − Rd can
be seen as an amalgamation of these two forces.16 Thus, on the one hand, a
strict capital regime attenuates the behaviour of domestic spreads (Rl − Rd)
through its ability to limit the feedback between asset and credit markets in
(4.42). On the other hand, a strict capital requirement regime amplifies the
behaviour of domestic spreads by increasing the sensitivity of banker con-
sumption to foreign interest rate shocks. As a result of these two opposing
forces, changes in the capital requirement regime have a more muted effect
on domestic interest rate spreads as compared to changes in LTV regula-
tion. Nevertheless, the dynamics of Rl − Rd shows a marginal attenuation
of domestic spread dynamics under strict capital requirements.
4.4.3 Reserve requirements
The attenuation benefits of reserve requirements also result from their influ-
ence over the cost of loan finance to entrepreneurs; however this instrument
imparts less influence over interest rates than capital requirements. The
comparative inefficiency of reserve requirements stems from the fact that
this instrument does not directly affect the interest rate on loans, rather it
has direct bearing over the marginal value of liquidity to bankers, λct , which
in turn affects Rlt+1. Using equations 4.18 and 4.21, we can solve for λ
c
t as:






Equation 4.44 shows that the marginal value of liquidity to the banker is
given by the extra consumption that borrowing affords, net of repayment
obligations.
As per (4.43), reserve requirements (ϕ) can attenuate the impact of for-
eign interest rate shocks if they decrease the marginal value of liquidity to
16Equation 4.23 shows that the loan-deposit spread (Rl − Rd) depends on both capital
and reserve requirements whilst (4.24) shows that the loan-foreign fund spread (Rl − R f )
depends solely on capital requirements. Lastly, equation 4.22 shows that the foreign fund-
deposit spread (R f − Rd) depends solely on reserve requirements.
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bankers. Changes in reserve requirements exert two opposing effects on the
marginal value of liquidity. On the one hand, stricter reserve requirements
increase the marginal value of liquidity by reducing the interest rate on de-
posits (see equation 4.18). On the other hand, because the reserve require-
ment is financed with deposits, stricter regimes tighten the banker’s capital
requirement which serves to decrease their marginal value of liquidity.17
Because of these two opposing effects, changes in reserve requirements will
have a more muted impact on Rlt+1 than capital requirements.
18
The transmission of reserve requirements illustrates how different macro-
prudential instruments can influence one another. Previous analyses on the
effects of reserve requirements focus on the liquidity benefits provided by
this instrument and study it in isolation of capital requirements (see e.g.,
Glocker and Towbin, 2012; Agénor and da Silva, 2014). This analysis shows
that capital and reserve requirements interact such that the influence of re-
serve requirements on loan interest rates is reduced relative to a scenario
where reserve requirements are applied in isolation of capital requirements.
Note that the impact of the capital requirement on the effectiveness of re-
serve requirements works in one direction: the presence of a reserve re-
quirement does not affect the ability of capital requirements to influence
interest rates. Furthermore, this interaction between capital and reserve re-
quirements is predicated on the assumption that the capital requirement is
binding. In this model, if the capital requirement does not bind, λct disap-
pears from equation 4.43 and reserve requirements have no effect on loan
interest rates or the feedback between asset and credit markets.
Figure 4.3 reveals that, as a result of the two opposing effects that re-
serve requirements have on the marginal value of liquidity to bankers, this
instrument delivers smaller and less persistent attenuation benefits as com-
pared to LTV and capital requirements. Strict reserve requirements reduce
the contemporaneous impact of the shock on aggregate consumption, asset
prices, and entrepreneur loans, whilst output and household deposits are
almost invariant to changes in the reserve requirement regime.19
The analysis above provides the rationale for a macroprudential response
to foreign interest rate shocks and is illustrative of the subtle differences
17The capital requirement tightens because higher reserve requirements increase the
share of deposits on the banker’s balance sheet with no effect on the level of banker capital.
18Specifically, a 1 p.p. increase/decrease in reserve requirements will increase/decrease
the interest rate on loans by less than a 1 p.p. increase/decrease in capital requirements.
19Although graphically extremely similar, the policy and transition functions upon
which the impulse responses for output and deposits basically show a very small atten-
uation benefit for the strict regime and a very small amplification of the shock for the easy
regime.
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Figure 4.3: Impulse response functions following a positive shock to Rwt for different re-
serve requirement regimes as per table 4.2. Solid line: baseline calibration; Dashed line:
strict reserve requirement regime; Dotted line: easy reserve requirement regime.
and interactions between macroprudential instruments. For instance, even
though changes to demand side regulation (LTV) are transmitted through
real estate demand whilst changes supply side regulation (capital and re-
serve requirements) are transmitted through interest rates and credit de-
mand, both can deliver similar shock benefits. Indeed, (4.8) implies that
credit and real estate markets are in fact different sides of the same coin,
and thus, measures aimed at the real estate market can be substituted for
those aimed at the credit market. That being said, the analysis of reserve re-
quirements shows that different supply side instruments can interact even
though they have different transmission channels. As a result, the quantita-
tive impact and comparative effectiveness of supply side macroprudential
measures can vary across instruments.
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4.4.4 Macroeconomic and financial stability across
instruments and regimes
The simultaneity of business and financial cycles imply that macropruden-
tial efforts can be complimentary to macroeconomic stability objectives (Borio,
2014; Smets, 2014). To assess whether macroprudential regulation can ad-
dress both financial stability and macroeconomic stability concerns, I plot
the change in the steady state standard deviation of output (∆σY) and asset
prices (∆σq) or loans (∆σL) for each instrument across the different regu-
latory regimes. In this case, ∆σY serves as a measure of macroeconomic
stability whilst the use of ∆σq and ∆σL as measures of financial stability is
motivated with reference to their role in the financial cycle (see e.g., Galati
and Moessner, 2013; Kuttner and Shim, 2016) .
In line with Angelini et al. (2014), figure 4.4 illustrates that macropru-
dential regulation complements both financial and macroeconomic stability.
This figure shows that, for each instrument, the standard deviation of out-
put and asset prices (top panel) or output and loans (bottom panel) increases
when we move from a strict to an easy regime. Therefore, stricter macropru-
dential regimes increase macroeconomic and financial stability, whilst eas-
ier regimes reduce macroeconomic and financial stability. Nevertheless, the
size of the change in σY, σq, and σL across regulatory regimes shows that al-
though each instrument is able to foster both financial and macoreconomic
stability, macroprudential regulation is more effective on the financial sta-
bility front. As per the IRF analysis, reserve requirements have a very small
impact on the volatility of these three variables whilst LTV and capital re-
quirements generate larger effects on variable volatility.20
Although strict LTV and capital requirements deliver similar macroe-
conomic and financial stability benefits, the bottom panel of figure 4.4 in-
dicates that moving from the baseline to the strict LTV regime realizes a
marginally larger decrease in the volatility of loans than when moving from
the baseline to the easy capital regime. Thus, in line with the different trans-
mission mechanisms of LTV and capital requirements, these two instru-
ments may impart different effects on different variables. Looking at the
shape of the curves in figure 4.4, one can see that there may be decreasing
returns to scale in LTV and capital requirements whereas reserve require-
ments exhibit constant returns to scale. Decreasing returns to scale in LTV
and capital requirements is evidenced by the decline in the gradient of the
LTV and capital requirement curves as we move from the easy to the strict
20These findings are echoed by the steady state standard deviation of aggregate con-
sumption, deposits, and foreign funds.
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Figure 4.4: Trade-off between macroeconomic and financial stability across instruments
and regimes. X-axis: macroprudential regimes, easy to strict. Y-axis: change in the standard
deviation of output. Z-axis: change in the standard deviation of asset prices or loans.
Top panel plots standard deviation of output vs. standard deviation of real estate prices.
Bottom panel plots standard deviation of output vs. standard deviation of loans.
regime. Here, figure 4.4 shows that as authorities increase the strictness of
LTV and capital requirements, the reductions in the standard deviations of
output, asset price, and loans become smaller.
To get a better illustration of each instrument’s influence over the finan-
cial and business cycle, figure 4.5 shows how the impact of the shock on
output, asset prices, and loans varies across macroprudential instruments
and regimes. I divide the absolute value of the contemporaneous response
of each variable under each instrument-regime pair by the absolute value
of its contemporaneous response under the baseline. Thus, in figure 4.5,
values larger than one indicate cycle amplification relative to the baseline
whilst values smaller than one are associated with cycle attenuation rela-
tive to the baseline.
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Figure 4.5: Macroprudential instrument effectiveness. Values larger than 1 indicate shock
amplification relative to the baseline. Values smaller than 1 indicate shock attenuation
relative to the baseline.
This exercise reveals that LTV and capital requirements have very sim-
ilar effects on output and loans, but differ in their impact on asset prices.
Thus, the desirability of different macroprudential instruments depend on
the objectives of the regulator. In this regard, figure 4.5 indicates that strict
capital requirements may be more effective than strict LTV regulation when
authorities seek to lean against the financial cycle. On the other hand, when
authorities are interested in stimulating the financial cycle, easy LTV reg-
ulation is more productive than easy capital requirements. This insight is
evidenced by the fact that strict LTV regulation has a smaller attenuation ef-
fect on asset prices than strict capital requirements, and easy LTV regulation
has a smaller amplification effect on asset prices than easy capital require-
ments. In addition, the attenuating effect of strict LTV regulation on output
and loans is marginally smaller than strict capital requirements, but the am-
plification effect of easy LTV regulation on output and loans is marginally
larger than that of easy capital requirements. Within instruments, figure 4.5
reveals that both capital and LTV regulation exert the most influence over
output, marginally less influence over loans, and the least influence over as-
set prices. In contrast, reserve requirements impart the same influence over
output, asset prices, and loans.
Figure 4.5 is also indicative of decreasing returns to scale in LTV regula-
tion and capital requirements. For instance in response to a 5 p.p. increase
(strict) in capital requirements, the decline in asset prices following the for-
eign interest rate shock is approximately 20 p.p. smaller than under the
baseline. In contrast, when capital requirements are decreased by 5 p.p.
(easy), the decline in asset prices is approximately 30 p.p. larger than under
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the baseline. As a result, authorities are able to realize larger macroeco-
nomic and financial stability gains through LTV regulation and capital re-
quirements when moving from the easy to the baseline regime, than when
moving from the baseline to the strict regime. In contrast, the gradient of
the reserve requirement curve in figure 4.5 remains constant regardless of
the target variable, indicating that when changing reserve requirements, au-
thorities can impart a small, but predictable influence over both the financial
and business cycle.
Together, figures 4.4 and 4.5 indicate that following a positive foreign in-
terest rate shock, macroeconomic and financial stability concerns are aligned:
stricter policy can enhance both financial and macroeconomic stability. This
result is in keeping with Claessens et al. (2012) and Antonakakis et al. (2015)
where the findings of these studies indicate that the link between the finan-
cial and business cycle strengthens during times of distress. As per Dees
(2016), the strengthening of this link during times of distress implies that
the international transmission of financial shocks on the business cycle can
be large, providing scope for welfare improvement through macropruden-
tial regulation.21
This analysis shows that capital and LTV regulation proffer the most pro-
ductive means with which to address the negative consequences of foreign
interest rate shocks. As per the discussion of their different transmission
channels, these two instruments work on different sides of the same coin:
capital requirements reduce entrepreneur demand for credit whilst LTV reg-
ulation reduces the entrepreneur’s demand for real estate (collateral assets).
This difference in transmission mechanism sees that capital requirements
are more effective in leaning against the financial and business cycle, whilst
LTV regulation is more effective in stimulating said cycles. However the dif-
ference between these two instruments is marginal, indicating toward their
substitutability.
The similarity of social welfare dynamics under the strict LTV and cap-
ital regimes as per figure 4.6 reiterates the substitutability of these instru-
ments when dealing with foreign interest rate shocks.22 Although the con-
temporaneous shock attenuation benefits of the capital requirement are marginally
larger than that of LTV regulation, the disparity diminishes quickly. Look-
ing at the effect of the strict reserve requirement regime on social welfare,
the small and temporary attenuation benefits associated with this instru-
21The shock is manifest in the foreign economy, where international transmission occurs
through the country risk premium, equation 4.28.
22Social welfare is defined by equation 4.34. I focus on the strict regime as it attenuates
the impact of the foreign interest rate shock.
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Figure 4.6: Impulse response functions of social welfare following a positive shock to Rwt
for different macroprudential instruments under the strict regime of table 4.2. Solid line:
baseline calibration; Dashed line: strict LTV regime; Dotted line: strict capital requirement
regime; Crossed line: strict reserve requirement regime.
ment points to its effectiveness as a supplement to existing LTV or capital
requirement measures.
4.5 Conclusion
Although there is ample theoretical and empirical evidence on the benefits
of macroprudential regulation to economic outcomes, not much is known
about the comparative effectiveness of the various macroprudential instru-
ments available to authorities. This essay contributes to our understanding
of a subset of these instruments through the design a generic small open
economy with banking and foreign borrowing where capital requirements,
reserve requirements, and LTV regulation coexist. To compare these instru-
ments, I subject the model to a positive foreign interest rate shock that in-
creases the country risk premium with negative consequences for credit ex-
tension, asset prices, and output. I find that these macroprudential instru-
ments can attenuate the impact of a positive foreign interest rate shock, and
that a strict regulatory regime outperforms a baseline and an easy regime
in this regard. I study the transmission channels of these three instruments
and show that although capital and LTV regulation are imposed on different
sides of the credit market, they are substitutable. This analysis of the trans-
mission channels of reserve requirements indicate that capital requirements
interacts with this instrument so as to negate the attenuation benefits of re-
serve requirements. As a result of this instrument interaction, the effects of
reserve requirements diminish quite rapidly, indicating that this instrument
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should be used to supplement existing LTV and capital requirements. The
analysis also shows that financial stability concerns are complimentary to
macroeconomic stability concerns following a positive foreign interest rate
shock and that the desirability of different macroprudential instruments de-
pend on the objectives of the regulator. In this regard, capital requirements
seem most effective at leaning against the financial cycle whilst LTV regu-
lation is most effective at stimulating the financial cycle. Lastly, the results
indicate that that LTV and capital requirements may exhibit decreasing re-
turns to scale.
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Summary
The seminal contributions of Bernanke and Gertler (1989) and Kiyotaki and
Moore (1997) greatly improved our understanding of the relationship be-
tween the credit cycle and macroeconomic outcomes. These authors endog-
enized the credit cycle into standard macroeconomic theory through the in-
troduction of financial frictions that were predicated on information asym-
metries or incomplete markets. Through these frictions, macroeconomic
frameworks generate financial accelerator effects that replicate the ampli-
tude and persistence of observed cyclical fluctuations. This result concurred
with empirical evidence on the simultaneity of the business and credit cycle
and pointed to credit markets as important structural transmission mecha-
nisms that affect macroeconomic dynamics.
This thesis contributes to this literature in three respects. Firstly, in chap-
ter 2 a closed economy model with heterogneous credit markets is derived
and estimated using Bayesian techniques. The model relaxes the single-
representative credit market assumption inherent in most of the existing lit-
erature and affords an assessment of the effects of credit market heterogene-
ity. The model also provides a theoretical framework from which to study
the benefits associated with revenue diversification within the banking sec-
tor. This feature affords a contrast of settings where commercial banks are
prohibited from engaging in proprietary trading activities, to settings where
no such prohibition exists. Chapter 3 extends this model to an asymmet-
ric two-country setting, and investigates the efficacy of flow specific capital
controls in attenuating the effects of foreign interest rate shocks. The use
of an asymmetric setup is novel to the literature, and is used to replicate
structural differences between developed and developing markets. Flow
specific capital controls present another departure from the norm as these
afford a regulatory focus on inflows and outflows separately. As an alter-
native to capital controls, the trade-offs between three different macropru-
116
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dential instruments are investigated in chapter 4. The small open economy
framework deployed for this analysis differs from existing work in that it
is characterized by the co-existence of loan-to-value regulation, minimum
capital requirements, and reserve requirements. This model is used to com-
pare the effectiveness of each instrument in dealing with a tightening in
foreign credit markets.
The post financial crisis shift by U.S. non-financial corporations away
from loans and toward bond finance provides the empirical motivation be-
hind the focus of chapter 2. This behaviour indicated that, if credit markets
behave differently to one another, increases in the supply of one type of
credit could make up for reductions in the supply of another. To test this
hypothesis, this chapter extends the framework of Iacoviello (2015) to in-
clude both a bond and a loan market. Heterogeneity between bonds and
loans is introduced in two ways. Firstly, through an assumed risk differ-
ential in the minimum capital requirements of financial intermediaries, and
secondly, by assuming financial intermediaries only act as underwriters in
the bond market.
Chapter 2’s model is able to replicate the behaviour of U.S. non-financial
corporate debt following the crisis and shows that the heterogeneous struc-
ture of credit markets can attenuate the impact of financial shocks. This
result stems from the ability of borrowers to substitute away from the shock
affected credit market toward alternate sources of financing. The model dy-
namics also indicate that financial shocks borne by savers deliver a smaller
impact than financial shocks borne by financial intermediaries. This dispar-
ity results from the fact that financial shocks borne by savers do not directly
influence the functioning of the financial sector. In contrast, when a finan-
cial shock impacts financial intermediaries directly, the efficiency of credit
markets becomes impaired such that the shock’s impact becomes amplified.
The results from chapter 2 indicate that the shock attenuation property
of credit market heterogeneity is declining in the degree of balance sheet
linkages within the financial sector. This result stems from the fact that such
linkages allow for the spill-over of credit market specific shocks and im-
plies that borrowers are unable to substitute away from the shock affected
credit market. In agreement with De Jonghe (2010) and Fomby et al. (2012),
this finding indicates that the resilience of the financial sector as a whole
is complimented by restrictions on proprietary trading. Nevertheless, the
results also show that from an individual financial institution’s perspective,
proprietary trading affords revenue diversification that reduces its vulner-
ability to credit market specific shocks. This finding is in agreement with
Elsas et al. (2010), De Jonghe et al. (2015), and Köhler (2015), where revenue
diversification is shown to enhance financial stability.
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Historically low interest rates in advanced economies and the concomi-
tant increase in emerging market foreign borrowing serves as the back-
drop for chapter 3. This increase in foreign borrowing leaves the emerg-
ing market macroeconomic dispensation vulnerable to changes in advanced
economy conditions (see e.g. Catão and Milesi-Ferretti, 2014). Capital con-
trols proffer a means for emerging market authorities to address such con-
cerns by limiting their exposure to international credit markets. To ascertain
whether such a policy response would have been effective in curbing the
build up of emerging market foreign debt, this chapter deploys an asym-
metric two-country model with flow specific capital controls, and studies
the model’s dynamics following a negative foreign interest rate shock.
The use of this asymmetric setup facilitates the adoption of an emerg-
ing market perspective and embeds the idea that advanced economy finan-
cial markets are comparatively more developed than their emerging market
counterparts (see e.g. Reinhardt et al., 2013; Eichengreen and Rose, 2014).
This asymmetrical setup also concurs with the savings–glut hypothesis ad-
vanced by Bernanke (2005), where emerging markets are net international
creditors. In this regard, the inflow capital control restricts firms’ ability
to issue debt in foreign markets, whilst the outflow capital control restricts
financial intermediary purchases of foreign debt.
The findings from chapter 3 indicate that deployment of either the in-
flow capital control or the outflow capital control could have reduced the
increase in emerging market foreign debt following the decline in advanced
economy interest rates. That being said, each flow specific capital control
is associated with different model dynamics. Specifically, the inflow cap-
ital control is shown to exhibit shock amplification properties, whilst the
outflow capital control is associated with shock attenuation. In this two-
country model, the exploitation of comparatively cheaper foreign credit
markets acts as a natural foreign interest rate shock absorber. Thus, shock
amplification under the inflow capital control occurs because it directly af-
fects emerging market firms’ ability to exploit cheaper foreign economy
credit markets. This amplification property of the inflow capital control
declines as capital control regulation becomes stricter, whilst the opposite
occurs when regulation becomes easier.
When the outflow capital control is present, easy foreign credit market
conditions can spill-over to home credit markets through financial interme-
diary balance sheets. This spill-over mitigates the impact of foreign interest
rate shocks and culminates in lower emerging market demand for foreign
debt. Thus, the outflow capital control only indirectly affects firms’ ability
to exploit comparatively cheaper foreign economy credit markets, and so,
foreign interest rate shocks are attenuated when it is present. As capital con-
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trol regulation becomes stricter, the virtuous spill-over that occurs through
financial intermediary balance sheets is reduced, mitigating the attenuation
property of the outflow capital control. The opposite holds when capital
control regulation becomes easier, where increased spill-over enhances its
shock attenuation properties. In line with the existing literature, these at-
tenuation properties generate social welfare dynamics such that society ex-
hibits a preference for the outflow capital control (Bianchi, 2011; Korinek,
2011; Brunnermeier and Sannikov, 2015).
The emerging market reliance on foreign sources of credit leaves these
economies vulnerable to a tightening of monetary conditions in advaned
economies. Through the design of a small open economy model with bank-
ing and foreign borrowing, chapter 4 contrasts the ability of macropruden-
tial instruments to reduce this vulnerability following a positive foreign in-
terest rate shock. Three different macroprudential instruments co-exist in
this framework, namely loan-to-value (LTV) regulation, minimum capital
requirements, and reserve requirements. Whilst LTV regulation operates
on the demand side of credit markets, the other two measures operate on
the supply side of credit markets.
The co-existence of these instruments and the distinction between de-
mand and supply side measures provide insights into the comparative ef-
fectiveness of each instrument in dealing with positive foreign interest rate
shocks. The results from chapter 4 concur with the existing evidence in that
the deployment of macroprudential instruments help to attenuate the neg-
ative consequences of a positive foreign interest rate shock (see e.g. Galati
and Moessner, 2013; Brzoza-Brzezina et al., 2015). For each macroprudential
instrument, shock attenuation results from diminished feedback between
credit markets and asset prices.
The analysis of chapter 4 reveals further that asymmetries exist between
both macroprudential instruments and regimes. Strict macroprudential regimes
reduce the impact of foreign interest rate shocks relative to easy regimes.
Looking across instruments, capital requirements and LTV regulation de-
liver similar sized social welfare benefits, pointing to their substitutability.
On the other hand, because reserve requirements interact with capital re-
quirements, this instrument imparts a much more muted effect on social
welfare. In light of the fact that capital requirements and LTV regulation ex-
hibit diminishing returns, this finding illustrates that reserve requirements
are best used to complement these two instruments. The results also in-
dicate that financial and macroeconomic stability concerns become aligned
in the wake of tighter foreign credit market conditions, indicating that a
macroprudential response to foreign interest rate shocks can address both
objectives.
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Credit market heterogeneity,
financial shocks, and balance sheet
(in)dependence
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The model allows for six shocks. First, there is a preference shock to house-
hold consumption as given by εht in equation A.1. Second, is a housing price
shock that is common to both households and entrepreneurs as per ε
q
t in
equations A.2 and A.9. Third, is a technology shock as given by εat in equa-
tion A.10. Fourth is a shock to entrepreneurs’ loan to value ratio as given by
εet in equations A.11 and A.12. Fifth is the financial shock to bond markets as
per εbt+1 in equation A.3. Lastly, the sixth shock relates to a financial shock
in loan markets as given by εlt+1 in equation A.19.
These shocks all follow AR(1) processes with the following specifica-
tions:
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In equations A.35 to A.40 above, ιit ∼ N(0, σi) is an independent white
noise process with a normal distribution with zero mean and standard de-
viation of σi for i = a, b, e, h, l, q.
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Model 3 allows for five shocks. First, there is a preference shock to house-
hold consumption as given by εht in equation A.41. Second, is a housing
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price shock that is common to both households and entrepreneurs as per
ε
q
t in equations A.42 and A.47. Third, is a technology shock as given by ε
a
t
in equation A.48. Fourth is a shock to entrepreneurs’ loan to value ratio as
given by εet in equations A.49. Lastly, the fifth shock relates to a financial
shock in loan markets as given by εlt+1 in equation A.55.
These shocks all follow AR(1) processes with the following specifica-
tions:



























In equations A.60 to A.64 above, ιit ∼ N(0, σi) is an independent white
noise process with a normal distribution with zero mean and standard de-
viation of σi for i = a, e, h, l, q.
A.3 Data
All of the data relates to the U.S. economy and was downloaded from the
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis FRED database. The sample runs from
1985Q1 to 2015Q1 and is in a quarterly format. All figures are in real terms
and where necessary, were deflated using the U.S. implicit GDP deflator.
To produce figure 2.1 presented in section 2.2, I applied an HP-filter with
λ = 1600 to each of the series to generate the cyclical variation plotted in
the figure. For figure 2.3, we used the 3-month AA rated commercial paper
rate as the interest rate for bonds whereas the bank prime lending rate was
used for loans. The data are as follows:
• Output: Yt. U.S. Real Gross Domestic Product. Source: U.S. Bureau of
Economic Analysis.
• Household consumption: Cht . Real Personal Consumption Expendi-
tures. Source: U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis.
• Entrepreneur Consumption: Cet . Nonfinancial corporate business: Prof-
its before tax (excluding IVA and CC Adj.). Source: U.S. Bureau of
Economic Analysis.
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• Financial Intermediary Consumption: C
f
t . Financial business; corpo-
rate profits before tax (excluding IVA and CC Adj.). Source: Financial
Accounts of the U.S. Table Z.1.
• Real Estate Prices: qt. All-Transactions House Price Index for the United
States, Index 2009=100. Source: U.S. Federal Housing Finance Agency.
• Household Real Estate Wealth: qt H
h
t . Households and nonprofit orga-
nizations; real estate at market value. Source: Board of Governors of
the Federal Reserve System.
• Entrepreneur Real Estate Wealth: qt H
e
t . Nonfinancial corporate busi-
ness; real estate at market value. Source: Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System.
• Hours worked: Nt. Average Weekly Hours of Production and Non-
supervisory Employees: Manufacturing. Source: U.S. Bureau of Labor
Statistics.
• Entrepreneurial Loans: Lt. Nonfinancial corporate business; total loans;
liability. Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.
• Entrepreneurial Bonds: Bt. Nonfinancial corporate business; debt se-
curities; liability. Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System.
• Interest Rate on Deposits: Rdt . Effective Federal Funds Rate. Source:
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.
• Interest Rate on Household Bonds: Rht . 3-Month AA Nonfinancial
Commercial Paper Rate. Source: Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System.
• Interest Rate on Loans: Rlt. Bank Prime Loan Rate. Source: Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System.
• GDP deflator. Gross Domestic Product: Implicit Price Deflator. Source:
U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis.
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Flow specific capital controls
B.1 Model equations
Below, we present the full set of model equations for the baseline scenario,
i.e. when no capital controls are active. When capital controls are active,








t ) + jlog(H
h




















Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za






















































t + Etµ̃t+1(1 − Ωt)λ
F








































































t+1 = 1 − κFλ
K
t (B.21)
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B.1.6 Market clearing
1 = Hht + H
e
t (B.34)





















































The model moments in table 3.2 are generated following a positive produc-
tivity shock in the home country. Supposing that home and foreign tech-
nologies are given by At and A
∗
t , the model setup assumes exogenous tech-







ρ η × ρ











Where ιt ∼ N(0, σ) gives the home technology shock whilst ι∗t ∼ N(0, σ
∗)
gives that of the foreign country. This specification allows for technological
spill-over between countries through the scaling parameter η < 1. I incor-
porate this feature to realize positive cross-country output correlations as
per the international business cycle literature. I follow Backus et al. (1992)
and Iacoviello and Minetti (2006) and set the value for this parameter at
η = 0.1 such that η × ρ = 0.09.
B.2 Data
B.2.1 Empirical evidence
To generate figure 3.1, I sum the amount of USD international debt securities
outstanding for Chinese and Brazilian non-financial corporations according
to the resident definition with that according to the nationality definition.
As noted by Shin (2014), this affords inclusion of debt issuances that occur
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through the foreign branches of these corporations. The data used in figures
3.1, 3.2, and 3.3 were gathered from the following sources:
• Figure 3.1
– Brazil USD: Total international debt securities issued by non-financial
Brazilian residents + total international debt securities issued by
non-financial Brazilian nationals in USD. Source: BIS table C3.
– Brazil local currency: Total international debt securities issued
by non-financial Brazilian residents in local currency. Source: BIS
table C3.
– China USD: Total international debt securities issued by non-financial
Chinese residents + total international debt securities issued by
non-financial Chinese nationals in USD. Source: BIS table C3.
– China local currency: Total international debt securities issued
by non-financial Chinese residents in local currency. Source: BIS
table C3.
• Figure 3.2
– Brazil international debt to domestic debt ratio: Total amount
of non-financial international debt securities of Brazilian nation-
als and residents outstanding divided by total amount of non-
financial domestic debt securities of residents outstanding. Source:
BIS table C3.
– China international debt to domestic debt ratio: Total amount
of non-financial international debt securities of Chinese nation-
als and residents outstanding divided by total amount of non-
financial domestic debt securities of residents outstanding. Source:
BIS table C3.
– Brazil treasury rate: 3-month treasury bill rate. Source: Federal
Reserve Bank of St. Louis.
– China treasury rate: 3-month treasury bill rate. Source: Federal
Reserve Bank of St. Louis.
– U.S. treasury rate: 3-month treasury bill rate. Source: Federal
Reserve Bank of St. Louis.
• Figure 3.3
– Brazil: Outward FDI stock in advanced countries. Source: UNC-
TAD Bilateral FDI Statistics 2014.
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– China: Outward FDI stock in advanced countries. Source: UNC-
TAD Bilateral FDI Statistics 2014.
B.2.2 Business cycle moments
The data below are used to generate the cross country correlations in table
3.2. All of the data are denominated in constant 2010 U.S. dollars. I take
the natural logarithm of each series and de-trend the data with a quadratic
time trend. An emerging market sample is constructed for comparison to
country H variables whilst country F moments are compared to a sample of
advanced countries. To create the data series for each sample, I sum across
countries. Thus, emerging market GDP is given by the sum of Chinese,
Brazilian, Russian, South African, Mexican, Turkish, and South Korean GDP
in constant 2010 USD. The relevant model variables and data sources are as
follows:
• GDP implicit price deflator. Re-based so that 2010=100. Source: U.S.
Bureau of Economic Analysis.
• Home country output: Yt. Current price GDP in national currency
converted into USD at spot rate and deflated into 2010 constant USD
using the U.S. GDP implicit price deflator. Sample: China, Brazil,
Russia, South Africa, Mexico, Turkey, and South Korea. Time period:
2000Q1–2016Q3. Source: OECD, Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System.
• Foreign country output: Y∗t . Current price GDP in national currency
converted into USD at spot rate and deflated into 2010 constant USD
using the U.S. GDP implicit price deflator. Sample: United States,
Japan, United Kingdom, and the Eurozone. Time period: 2000Q1–
2016Q3. Source: Eurostat, Japan Cabinet Office, Great Britain Office
for National Statistics, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve Sys-
tem.
• Home country aggregate consumption: Ct. Private final consump-
tion expenditure in national currency converted into USD at spot rate
and deflated into 2010 constant USD using the U.S. GDP implicit price
deflator. Sample: China, Brazil, Russia, South Africa, Mexico, Turkey,
and South Korea. Time period: 2000Q1–2016Q3. Source: OECD, Board
of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.
• Foreign country aggregate consumption: C∗t . Private final consump-
tion expenditure in national currency converted into USD at spot rate
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and deflated into 2010 constant USD using the U.S. GDP implicit price
deflator. Sample: United States, Japan, United Kingdom, Germany,
France, Italy, Spain, Netherlands. Time period: 2000Q1–2016Q3. Source:
OECD, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.
• Home country real estate price: qt. Residential price index (2010=100)
in national currency converted into constant 2010 USD. Sample: China,
Brazil, Russia, South Africa, Mexico, Turkey, and South Korea. Time
period: 2001Q1–2016Q3. We aggregate these indices into a single em-
rging market index by assigning time-varying GDP weights to each
country’s residential price index.
• Foreign country real estate price: q∗t . All transactions house price in-
dex for the United States, 2010=100. Sample: United States. Time pe-
riod: 2000Q1–2016Q3. Source: U.S. Federal Housing Finance Agency.
• Home entrepreneur home loans: Lt. Non-financial corporations do-
mestic market debt securities outstanding in constant 2010 USD. Sam-
ple: China, Brazil, Russia, South Africa, Mexico, Turkey, and South
Korea. Time period: 2000Q1–2016Q3. Source: BIS.
• Home entrepreneur foreign bonds: BHt . Non-financial corporations in-
ternational market debt securities outstanding by nationality and res-
idence in constant 2010 USD. Sample: BIS developing countries. Time
period: 2000Q1–2016Q3. Source: BIS.
• Foreign entrepreneur bonds: BFt . Total credit to non-financial corpora-
tions in constant 2010 USD. Sample: Japan, Euro Area, United King-
dom, United States. Time period: 2000Q1–2016Q3. Source: BIS and
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.
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C.1.5 Market clearing





















Tt = ζt − ζt−1 (C.27)






























































Figure C.1: Impulse response functions following a positive shock to Rwt for different
calibrations of γ f and γw. Dashed line: γ f = 0.85 and γw = 0.85. Crossed line: γ f = 0.45
and γw = 0.85. Solid line: γ f = 0.05 and γw = 0.85. Dotted line: γ f = 0.05 and γw = 0.85.
Star line: γ f = 0.05 and γw = 0.45. Dash-dot line: γ f = 0.05 and γw = 0.05.
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